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Summary
Development of smallholder agriculture is widely recognized as an important pathway to poverty
reduction in rural areas, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many researchers propose collective
action of smallholder farmers by means of rural producer organizations (RPO) as a promising
opportunity to improve commercialization and market access of small farms, which in turn will
result in improvement of rural livelihoods. However, little is known about the determinants of
RPO success. Currently, there is a broad demand for detailed analyses of RPO performance
and for ex-ante assessments of the developmental interventions and policies of RPO support.
This thesis focuses on the provision of high-resolution quantitative data for the design of such
interventions using a case study of coffee producers in the lake-shore Uganda and their RPO.
This work demonstrates the effective ways to increase farmers’ welfare through the network of
RPO and analyzes the associated risks and opportunities.
This work applies agent-based computer simulation to analyze the RPO. Designed virtual
simulation experiments assess the broad portfolio of development interventions and economic
scenarios that are challenging to investigate by means of real-world empirical research. The
agent-based nature of the model allows for a holistic integration of several modeling concepts
in the developed model application. This leads to the inclusion into the model of a number of
important aspects of the bio-economic system of coffee production in Uganda. The first aspect is
the heterogeneity among farming households, reflected by differences in natural conditions, re-
source endowments, production and market constraints, time and consumption preferences. The
second aspect is the inseparability of decisions that are taken on the farm (i.e. investment, pro-
duction, consumption and marketing) from one another. The third aspect is human-environment
interaction cycles and the dynamics of the bio-economic system, including interactions across
levels of hierarchy (here: individual farmers and RPO).
The constructed model is parameterized, calibrated and validated using the empirical data
from project and country-level surveys. The set-up of the model and the results of simula-
tion experiments are further complemented by (i) a detailed review of relevant literature, (ii)
community-based participatory research with members of RPO and (iii) interviews with key
informants.
Results of simulation experiments indicate that RPO activities can cause significant increases
in members’ sales revenues and consequently can improve their household incomes. The pos-
v
itive impacts of RPO can be amplified through external assistance. Recommended RPO-level
interventions include (i) on-the-spot payments for RPO members’ transactions and (ii) support
for group certification. Both are expected to have high cost efficiency and a low risk of failure. In
addition, results of this thesis suggest that improvement of agricultural productivity through the
provision of quality planting material and the promotion of good agricultural practices is likely to
be highly beneficial for the rural households. In order to stream the related development policies
to smallholder farmers it is recommended to use RPO networks.
Findings of the participatory research in Ugandan RPO indicate that the establishment of
transparent rules of reception of RPO services and allocation of earned benefits, together with
frequent and formal reporting of RPO administration might increase members’ cooperation
within an RPO.
This thesis also shows the vulnerability of coffee producing households and their RPO to
the risks imposed by the volatility of agricultural prices. The role of development policy is,
therefore, to provide price risk insurance for smallholder farmers and to facilitate the forma-
tion of accurate price expectations. However, viable and sustainable models of smallholder risk
insurance are yet to be found.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Entwicklung von kleinba¨uerlicher Agrarwirtschaft ist weithin als eine wichtige Strategie zur
Armutsbeka¨mpfung in la¨ndlichen Gebieten anerkannt, insbesondere in denen su¨dlich der Saha-
ra. Viele Wissenschaftler, die sich mit diesem Thema bescha¨ftigen, halten kollektives Handeln
von Kleinbauern in la¨ndlichen Produzenten-Organisationen (RPO) fu¨r einen vielversprechen-
den Ansatz, um Kommerzialisierung und Marktzugang und damit die Erwerbsfa¨higkeit land-
wirtschaftlicher Kleinbetriebe zu verbessern. Allerdings ist das Wissen in Bezug auf die Er-
folgsfaktoren von RPO noch sehr beschra¨nkt. Derzeit besteht ein großer Bedarf an detaillierten
Analysen der Leistungen, die von den RPO erbracht werden, sowie an ex-ante Bewertungen von
Entwicklungs- und Politikmaßnahmen zur Unterstu¨tzung von RPO. Der Schwerpunkt der vorlie-
genden Dissertation liegt in der Bereitstellung von hochaufgelo¨sten quantitativen Methoden und
Daten fu¨r die Planung solcher Entwicklungsmaßnahmen. Die Studie nutzt ein Fallbeispiel von
Kaffeeproduzenten und ihrer RPO in der Region Victoriasee in Westuganda. Die Arbeit zeigt
effiziente Verfahren zur Wohlfahrtssteigerung der Kleinbauern durch das Netzwerk der RPO auf
und analysiert die damit verbundenen Potenziale und Risiken.
In der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit werden die RPO mit Hilfe von agenten-basierten Com-
putersimulationen untersucht. Anhand virtueller Experimente wird ein breites Portfolio von
Entwicklungsmaßnahmen und o¨konomischen Szenarien erforscht, deren Analyse mit klassi-
schen empirischen Methoden problematisch wa¨re. Die agenten-basierte Beschaffenheit des Mo-
dells erlaubt die Integration von verschiedenen Modellierungskonzepten wa¨hrend der Modell-
entwicklung. Somit konnten einige wichtige bio-o¨konomische Aspekte der Kaffeeproduktion in
Uganda durch das Modell dargestellt werden. Zum einen konnte der Heterogenita¨t der land-
wirtschaftlichen Haushalte bezu¨glich ihrer agrar-o¨kologischen Bedingungen, Ressourcenaus-
stattung, Produktions- und Marktbeschra¨nkungen, sowie Zeit- und Konsumpra¨ferenzen Rech-
nung getragen werden. Der zweite Aspekt ist die Komplexita¨t und gegenseitige Abha¨ngigkeit der
im Haushalt getroffenen Entscheidungen bezu¨glich Investitionen, Produktionsverfahren, Mar-
keting und Konsum. Der dritte wichtige Aspekt ist die Integration der Kreisla¨ufe und Interak-
tionen zwischen den Akteuren und der sie umgebenden Umwelt, sowie die Dynamik des bio-
o¨konomischen Systems. Dies schließt die Interaktionen u¨ber die verschiedenen hierarchische
Ebenen (in diesem Fall: individuelle Landwirte und RPO) mit ein.
Das Modell wird mit Hilfe von empirischen Daten parametrisiert, kalibriert und validiert,
vii
wobei die Modellentwicklung und die Ergebnisse der Simulationsexperimente durch (i) Litera-
turrecherche, (ii) partizipative Forschung mit den RPO-Mitgliedern und (iii) Expertenbefragun-
gen erga¨nzt werden.
Die Ergebnisse der Simulationsexperimente zeigen, dass die RPO-Aktivita¨ten eine wesent-
liche Steigerung der Verkaufserlo¨se der RPO-Mitglieder und eine sich daraus ergebende Ver-
besserung der Haushaltseinkommen bewirken ko¨nnen. Diese positiven Auswirkungen der RPO
ko¨nnen durch externe Entwicklungsmaßnahmen weiter versta¨rkt werden. Folgende zusa¨tzliche
Maßnahmen werden empfohlen: (i) die Organisation von “Auf-dem-Feld“-Zahlungen an die
RPO-Mitglieder und (ii) die Unterstu¨tzung von RPO zum Aufbau der Gruppenzertifizierung.
Beide Maßnahmen lassen eine hohe Kosteneffizienz bei gleichzeitig niedrigem Ausfallrisiko er-
warten. Weitere Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit deuten darauf hin, dass sich die Steigerung
der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivita¨t durch die Bereitstellung verbesserten Pflanzmaterials und
die Fo¨rderung optimierter Anbauverfahren sehr vorteilhaft auf die Wohlfahrt der la¨ndlichen
Haushalte auswirken. Diesbezu¨glich erscheint es empfehlenswert, die RPO-Netzwerke als Medi-
um zu nutzen, um die Kleinbauern mit entsprechenden Entwicklungsprogrammen zu erreichen.
Die Ergebnisse der partizipativen Forschung mit den ugandischen RPO ergeben, dass die
Einrichtung transparenter Regeln fu¨r die Inanspruchnahme von RPO-Dienstleistungen, die Ver-
teilung der erwirtschafteten Gewinne, sowie die regelma¨ßige und formelle administrative Be-
richterstattung die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den RPO und ihren Mitgliedern deutlich verbes-
sern kann.
Außerdem zeigt diese Dissertation die Risikoanfa¨lligkeit der kaffeeproduzierenden Haus-
halte und ihrer RPO hinsichtlich hoher Volatilita¨t der Agrarpreise auf. Deshalb sollten die ent-
wicklungspolitischen Entscheidungstra¨ger Versicherungen gegen Preisschwankungen fu¨r Klein-
bauern bereitstellen und sie bei der Bildung von korrekten Preiserwartungen unterstu¨tzen. Al-
lerdings mu¨ssen realisierbare und nachhaltige Modelle zur Risikoversicherung fu¨r Kleinbauern
erst noch erfunden werden.
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Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis is a contribution to the international research project “Working together for
market access: Strengthening rural producer organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa” conducted
from 2009 to 2012 in Senegal and Uganda. Project partners included the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) and Universita¨t
Hohenheim (UHOH). The project implemented a novel research approach of combining eco-
nomic experiments with computer simulation in order to support the economic performance of
rural producer organizations (RPO). By means of virtual simulation experiments, the author as-
sessed the effectiveness of Ugandan RPO in marketing of robusta coffee under various “what-if”
scenarios and identified suitable measures of development support. Virtual experiments were
designed based on participatory research involving project stakeholders and empirical data ob-
tained by the project partners. Specifically for this research, the author created an application
of the agent-based simulation model MP-MAS, which was developed at the Chair of Land Use
Economics in the Tropics and Subtropics at Hohenheim. The simulation model was construc-
ted to capture the empirical heterogeneity between farm households, and to explicitly simulate
interactions between farm households and RPO as well as between farm households and their
biophysical environment. This work aims to deliver quantitative information for policy devel-
opment and to contribute to the improvement of livelihoods of smallholder farmers by strength-
ening the ability of RPO to improve their members’ access to input and output markets. The
software application is available as freeware and can be reused for further quantitative assess-
ments, decision-support and other academic and applied purposes. This thesis describes in detail
the methods and data used for the virtual experiments and presents the simulation results and
empirical findings.
Problem statement and research motivation
World Bank (2007) emphasizes the vital role of the smallholder farming sector as “one of the
cornerstones of an agriculture-for-development strategy”, and estimates that 1.5 billion people in
the world are involved in smallholder agriculture (i.e. farm households with 2 hectares or less).
One reason for such emphasis is that the development of smallholder agriculture is currently
seen as key poverty reduction in developing countries (Hazell et al. 2010). Experience with
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the “Green Revolution” in Asian countries shows that reaching smallholder farmers through
agricultural growth can greatly develop rural economies and significantly decrease the share of
people living in poverty (Evenson & Gollin 2003), since the majority of the rural poor reside on
small farms (Hazell 2005). Also, as Heltberg (1998) demonstrates, smallholders provide more
employment opportunities (in per unit of land calculation) compared with large farms, because
of the lower costs of labor supervision and the labor-intensive nature of production. Moreover,
the expenditure patterns of smallholder households are oriented towards locally produced goods
and services (Hazell & Roell 1983), which serve as an additional catalyst for economic growth
in rural areas. Land productivity is another reason for focusing the attention of the development
authorities on small farms. An inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity (i.e.
decline in productivity with increasing farm size) is a widely observed fact (Chen et al. 2011,
Heltberg 1998, Lipton 1993).
Despite being more efficient in production, smallholder agriculture is often subject to in-
efficient allocation of goods and services, as well as other forms of market failures. Small-
holder agricultural producers face high transaction costs that are associated with dis-economies
of scale (Poulton et al. 2010, Key et al. 2000). Relatively high (in comparison with large farms)
transaction costs for small farms may be observed in most non-labor transactions, such as in-
put purchases, capital access or selling of output, which may outweigh the efficiency advantages
(Poulton et al. 2010). These costs are further aggravated by the poor infrastructure of rural areas.
With rising intensification of agricultural production, the cost of access to inputs, finance and
equipment becomes increasingly important (Poulton et al. 2010). When it comes to marketing,
low levels of market access and bargaining power, as well as imperfect information, prevent
many rural producers from benefiting from high agricultural commodity prices (Fafchamps &
Hill 2008). Market access constraints are especially strong in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) coun-
tries like Uganda, where market liberalization reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s led to the disen-
gagement of the state from marketing agricultural commodities and providing factors of produc-
tion. Organization of respective services by the private sector, however, remains underdeveloped
(World Bank 2007, Kherallah et al. 2002).
Organized stakeholder groups have demonstrated their capacity for contribution to natural
resource management (Kirsten et al. 2009, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002). They succeeded in over-
coming market imperfections (Kirsten et al. 2009, Thorp et al. 2005), and in pro-poor agricultural
development (Kirsten et al. 2009, Mwangi & Markelova 2009). Recent scientific works underline
the potential of collective action for developing countries; rural producer organizations (RPO)
have great potential to overcome smallholders’ obstacles in input procurement and produce mar-
keting (Markelova & Mwangi 2010, Markelova et al. 2009, Shiferaw et al. 2008). Uniting small-
and medium-scale farmers under the umbrella of RPO can potentially create linkages to market,
decrease per-unit transaction costs, and improve farmers’ bargaining power (Bernard & Taffesse
2012, Shiferaw et al. 2008, Bacon 2005). Aggregation of smallholders’ produce at the RPO
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level is a widely recognized way of improving commercialization of small farms through: (i)
reduction of transaction costs, (ii) negotiation of better terms of trade, (iii) improvement in co-
ordination of operations (Markelova & Mwangi 2010, Bernard & Spielman 2009). Therefore,
over the past decade, governments and development agencies have come to see collective action
institutions as important partners in implementation of agricultural programs and key to the em-
powerement of rural farmers (IFAD 2010, World Bank 2007, IFAD 2001). A need to respond
to market and government failures constitutes a driving force for RPO formation and develop-
ment. It has recently led to the emergence of many grassroots farmer-controlled organizations
in developing countries (Wanyama 2008, Uphoff 1993, Arcand 2002).
Sttudies show, however, that in Sub-Saharan Africa RPO have had mixed success (Bernard
& Taffesse 2012, Bernard et al. 2008, Gabre-Madhin 2001, Akwabi-Ameyaw 1997). Scientific
explanations of these varying results are scarce. Little is known about what exactly determines
the effectiveness of RPO in developing countries and the extent to which RPO provide benefits
for their members. This knowledge gap is caused by the high degree of complexity and diversity
among RPO (Ragasa & Golan 2012). At the same time, especially in the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, there is a broad demand for thorough quantitative studies of RPO performance. These are
required in order to design adequate measures for effective RPO support (Ragasa & Golan 2012,
Bernard & Spielman 2009). Ex-ante assessments are a vital prerequisite for effective targeting
and case-specific design of development interventions that would help RPO to fully tap their
potential in terms of pro-poor agricultural development.
The need for improvement of understanding of RPO and the identification of effective types
of RPO support is the motivation of this study. This thesis contributes to the development of
RPO-related knowledge, on which donor organizations and governments rely when designing
respective policies, programs and projects. The study establishes practical tools for the analysis
of RPO, and with their application provides quantitative information on RPO functioning. Based
on this information the author derives concrete recommendations on RPO improvement and
empowerment.
Case study introduction
This research focuses on smallholder coffee producers in Uganda and their RPO. The question
of smallholder empowerment is very relevant for coffee growers from Uganda. Coffee is a major
source of income for 74% of households residing in the regions of Uganda that are suitable for
coffee production (UCTF 2010). It is mostly grown by smallholders (according to Hill (2010b)
70.3% of coffee-growing households in Uganda have less than five acres of land). Farmers
market their coffee either individually or collectively through RPO (Kwapong & Korugyendo
2010). In total, sales of coffee constitute on average 23% of farm revenue of coffee-growing
households (Hill 2006) and there are around 500,000 households engaged in coffee production
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in Uganda (UCTF 2013). In total, the coffee production sector employs around three and a half
million households in Uganda (UCDA 2013). So, having a strong and effective network of RPO
in the sector will benefit a large number of people, a significant share of whom live below the
poverty line (latest estimates of IFAD (2010) indicate that 51.5% of the Ugandan population
lives under the 1.25 usd per day poverty line and 75.6% lives under the 2 usd per day line).
Findings of Fafchamps & Hill (2005) suggest that collective selling and the resulting reduction
in per unit transaction costs can provide significant benefits for Ugandan coffee producers.
Choice of the research methodology
This research was done in collaboration with an IFPRI project on RPO in Uganda. The IF-
PRI counterparts conducted the field experiments with RPO members. They were testing the
impacts of various treatments that could have improved RPO functioning, such as provision of
actual market information or advancing the portion of money paid by the RPO to its member
producers. But of course, experiments with human subjects in the real-world setting have cer-
tain limitations: (i) not all factors can be controlled and varied, (ii) treatments that carry the
risk of negatively affecting participants have to be avoided, (iii) the realization of some effects
may take an impractical amount of time, (iv) implementation costs and budget constraints may
be prohibitively high. Hence, many of the possible interventions and scenarios could not been
tested with the field experiments. In order to broaden the portfolio of assessed interventions and
improve the project results, it was decided to set up virtual experiments by means of simulation
modeling. Outcomes of simulation modeling were intended to complement the findings of other
project partners and generate information that is useful for RPO administrators, government au-
thorities working on improvement of local markets, and donor agencies involved in agricultural
development.
Typically, development studies have to deal with a high heterogeneity among farming house-
holds in developing countries. There, it is common to observe large variations in yields, input
application intensity, crop mixes, and crop management practices, which is caused by signific-
ant differences in resource endowments, and knowledge, market and infrastructural constraints
(Ruben & Pender 2004, Schreinemachers & Berger 2006). Effective targeting of development
policies and interventions in less-favored areas requires that the diversity of farming households
be taken into account (Ruben & Pender 2004, Berger et al. 2006). A suitable way of reflecting
this heterogeneity in a simulation model is the agent-based modeling (ABM) approach (Berger
et al. 2006), which makes possible a direct implementation of each farming household as a model
agent without any aggregation, so called one-to-one correspondence. The review of Boulanger
& Brechet (2005), who compares various modeling approaches from the perspective of their
suitability for the purposes of sustainable development policy making, also supports this choice
of modeling method. Boulanger & Brechet (2005) evaluates modeling alternatives according to
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five different criteria and ranks multi-agent models as the most appropriate tool for this purpose
(see Table 1).
Table 1: Relative suitability of modeling approaches with respect to sustainable development policy making
Criteria
Approach Inter-
disciplinary
potential
Long-term,
intergenera-
tional
Uncertainty
management
Local-global Participation Ranking
Multi-agent 0.29 0.27 0.3 0.34 0.4 1
System dynamics 0.29 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.2 2
Bayesian networks 0.17 0.07 0.39 0.17 0.13 3
Optimization 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.08 6
General equilibrium 0.1 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.08 4
Macro-econometric 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.1 5
Source: Boulanger & Brechet (2005)
*criteria scores are defined on [0,1] interval, where 1 stays for the only appropriate tool
and 0 – for not appropriate tool at all
In recent years, a number of ABM software packages were designed for application in ag-
ricultural economics. Schreinemachers & Berger (2011) compare these packages and describe
their main features. Based on this comparison, the software MP-MAS (Mathematical Program-
ming-based Multi-Agent Systems) was selected as a framework for implementation of the agent-
based simulation model of RPO. This software is being developed at the Chair of Land Use
Economics in the Tropics and Subtropics (Josef G. Knoll Professorship) by the development
team (team members are listed in Schreinemachers & Berger (2011)) based on the earlier work
of Berger (2001). MP-MAS software is suitable for the modeling of semi-subsistence agricul-
ture (Schreinemachers & Berger 2011), which is the type of agriculture practiced in the case
study of this research. Most importantly, MP-MAS was already applied for modeling the coffee-
banana production system of the lake-shore Uganda in the research of Schreinemachers & Berger
(2006). Therefore, some parts of its parameterization were suitable for reuse in this study. Addi-
tionally, the implementation of the author’s modeling concepts in the software code in the form
of extensions was negotiated with the MP-MAS developement team.
Before proceeding with the elaboration of RPO-modeling concepts, a thorough literature
review was conducted and a field visit to Uganda was made. Community-based participatory
research with members of RPO was conducted and key informants were interviewed. The find-
ings of the field work helped to structure and parameterize the simulation model. They also
enriched the final results of the research through provision of invaluable insights into issues that
the model was not able to address.
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Goal and objectives of the work
The particular goals of this research are to determine the effective ways of increasing RPO
members’ welfare and to provide quantitative information for the development of the re-
spective policies and interventions of RPO support. Achievement of the research goals re-
quired sequential fulfillment of the following objectives:
1. Provision of a knowledge base on RPO functionality and their roles in terms of rural de-
velopment
2. Formulation and implementation of the agent-based simulation model for modeling the
activities of RPO and their member farmers
3. Model parameterization, calibration and validation on the example of the selected coffee
RPO from Uganda
4. Application of the developed model to analyze sensitivity of the RPO and its members
with respect to production and price factors
5. Identification of development interventions that can improve the livelihoods of RPO mem-
bers and assessment of the impact of interventions via simulation modeling
With regard to the first objective, this work reviews, synthesizes and discusses the experi-
ences of various scientific studies and development projects. An in-depth analysis of coffee RPO
in Uganda is performed using various statistical, participatory and modeling techniques. RPO
and their networks of involvement constitute systems that are too complex for analytic analysis
and solutions. Therefore, the construction of computer simulation models (the second object-
ive) is required. Issues of model flexibility and re-usability are in focus during model choice and
building. The author seeks to implement a model that could be adapted for use in cases outside
of the related research project. This thesis aims to demonstrate how the applied model could be
parameterized, calibrated and validated using available sources of empirical data, stakeholder
knowledge and expert opinions (the third objective). It provides an example of how to over-
come problems of data scarcity and incompleteness. Sensitivity analysis (the fourth objective)
is required to understand the risks that variation of the production and price factors imposes on
the coffee producers and their organizations in Uganda. Results of the sensitivity analysis un-
derline the importance of creating safety nets and risk-coping mechanisms among smallholder
farmers in SSA. Results of the impact assessment supply policy makers with insights into the
potential effects of RPO empowerment measures and support selection or rejection of respective
interventions for practical application (the fifth objective).
Research questions
The above listed objectives can be fulfilled once the following six research questions are answered:
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What are RPO and what is their place in the context of sustainable development? The
subject of this research is RPO. Therefore, it is important to define the notion of an RPO, to
understand which goals it may have, which functions it may perform and which services it may
provide. Identification of different types of RPO and provision of dimensions for their compar-
ison will provide a framework for understanding the RPO in question. Review of historical facts,
recent empirical evidence and theoretical concepts will identify current and potential roles of the
RPO in the development agenda.
How can RPO be researched? Review of the implemented and proposed approaches for the
research of RPO as well as documentation of other-party researches on RPO will help to structure
this research, and to consider possible limitations and extensions. Justification of the applied
methodology must consider strengths and weaknesses of alternative methods. A niche for the
effective application of a multi-agent approach has to be identified. A toolbox for participatory
assessment of the state of affairs in the Ugandan coffee RPO must be included.
What are the characteristics and specifics of coffee RPO in Uganda? Understanding the
characteristics of local agriculture, the cooperative sector and the institutional framework as well
as the specifics of the coffee business is important for the identification of problems, bottlenecks
and potential for improvement. The modeling process requires having a clear picture of aspects
and actors that are influential for decision making and performance of real RPO and its mem-
bers. Community-based participatory research and expert interviews together with the literature
review are expected to draw this picture. Findings obtained during the field work in Uganda will
undergo a qualitative and quantitative analysis, the results of which will highlight the current
situation in Ugandan RPO and assist in the organization of measures of their support.
How can RPO be modeled as multi-agent systems? Agent-based modeling is a relatively
new approach in agricultural economics. Therefore, its application for the case of RPO has not
yet been established. This work must develop a respective framework for modeling RPO and
provide an example of its application with a case study. Suitable modeling concepts that can
mimic the actual behavior of the study area have to be found. Implementation of the model
must be feasible given the available data. Empirical validity of the model has to be ensured and
characterized. The results that the model produces must be able to support practical measures.
What impact does the varying of production and price factors have on coffee farmers and
RPO in Uganda? Sensitivity analysis is expected to reveal the relationship and vulnerability of
rural households and RPO with respect to external factors. Such analysis computes the impacts
of factor change and factor variability and quantifies the risks related to these factor alterations.
The ABM approach allows the analysis to be conducted on different scales (e.g. organization,
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household). Also, there are few dimensions on which effects of factor changes can be analyzed
(e.g. income, food security, etc.). Results of the respective simulation modeling experiments
will yield information and practical recommendations that are useful for decision making.
What are the likely impacts of the development interventions on Ugandan coffee farmers
and their organizations? Such an assessment will at first require the translation of interven-
tions to the form of model simulation scenarios. Virtual experiments will simulate the effects
of interventions on model agents, which reflect real-world households and RPO. As mentioned
above the analysis of simulation results must be done on several dimensions and scales. Analysis
of the results will show the impacts of various interventions, cross-compare their efficiency and
help in selecting appropriate ones for real-world implementation.
Quick guide to this thesis
This Ph.D. dissertation contains six chapters. Their contents are briefly outlined in this section.
Chapter 1 provides the reader with important background information on the research topics,
applied methodology and research setting. This chapter gives definitions of rural producer or-
ganization and collective action and introduces different classifications of RPO. Here, the author
finds a niche for RPO in the context of rural development and poverty reduction, discusses the
common problems that can occur under RPO set-up and draws lessons from empirical evidence
on RPO support and empowerment measures. Chapter 1 also presents the main methodological
concepts and approaches used in this work and characterizes the research setting: the research
project in which frames this work was conducted, the past and present RPO in Uganda, and
important specifics of coffee production and marketing.
Chapter 2 explains the methodology and organization of the participatory research conduc-
ted with farmers from the study area and other key informants. By summarizing the results of the
assessment the author provides additional insights on Ugandan coffee farmers and their RPO.
The structure of the RPO was visualized by stakeholder-created maps of the socioeconomic net-
work, which indicated the actors involved and their importance and located problems and weak
linkages. Based on the assessment results, Chapter 2 analyzes the functionality of coffee RPO in
Uganda and indicates the points where development interventions might have a positive impact.
The gathered insights on farmer decision making and RPO activities were later considered when
setting up the simulation model.
Chapter 3 presents the application of the MP-MAS simulation modeling framework construc-
ted for this study and discusses its capabilities, structure, main modules and components. The
model description addresses the topics of generation of agent populations and landscapes, model
representation of household decision alternatives and preferences, simulation of crop yields,
household dynamics and learning of agents from past experience. This chapter explains the
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process of the model’s empirical parameterization. It describes the implementation of coffee
marketing and RPO activities in the MP-MAS modeling framework.
Chapter 4 develops the principle for calibration of the MP-MAS Uganda simulation model
and discusses its application in practice. In this chapter the validity of the entire simulation
model is assessed. Model validation is discussed with respect to various relevant validity types
outlined by the author. Selected model components are statistically validated using the empirical
data.
Chapter 5 describes the set-up of computer simulation experiments that were conducted.
Results of these experiments are reported and analyzed in this chapter.
Finally, Chapter 6 interprets the outcomes of simulation modeling, summarizes the main
findings and the experience gained during this research, and discusses the results of the entire
research. The chapter develops practical recommendations for policy makers concerning RPO
empowerment measures. The chapter also outlines perspectives for future research related to
RPO empowerment and proposes possible extensions of the constructed model application.
9
Chapter 1
Background information
The overall aim of the research project, within which this work was conducted, was to derive
and evaluate possible development treatments that could improve the performance of agricul-
tural RPO and increase the welfare of its members. This thesis develops an empirically-based
computer simulation for intervention assessments in organizations of rural producers. To under-
stand the functioning, as well as the challenges faced by RPO, and to learn lessons from previous
experiences in supporting RPO, this chapter reviews the related theoretical concepts and empir-
ical evidences. It introduces the reader to the world of RPO and explains the specifics of the
undertaken case study.
1.1 Role of rural producer organizations in the development
context
Before proceeding to in-depth analysis of the case study, let us first uncover the role of the rural
producer organization within the development context by providing some fundamental defini-
tions and facts from the literature.
1.1.1 Definitions
Rural producer organization (RPO) in agriculture is an either formal or informal social ar-
rangement with voluntary membership that pursues the goal of provision of economic benefits
to its member producers. Agricultural RPO can appear in different structural set-ups, such as
farmer unions, agricultural cooperatives, village groups, bargaining associations among others,
and exist on various levels (from village to international). It can perform an assortment of eco-
nomic, political and social activities aimed at support of its members, such as:
• Bulking of produce, marketing and collective sales
• Coordination of transport and logistics
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• Input supply
• Processing
• Extension and capacity building
• Granting access to financial services
• Quality improvement and control
• Collective certification
• Risk management
An RPO can be narrowly specialized, but they usually perform a broad set of activities and
operate in multiple agricultural sub-sectors. In contrast to other kinds of organizations that
are promoted and supported by governments or NGOs, an RPO is a business-oriented entity
that has to generate additional utility for its members with cost recovery. However, this does
not mean that an RPO cannot receive external grants, subsidies or preferential loans. In the
long term, an RPO has to be financially sustainable, like any other type of business. Unlike
corporation shareholders, RPO shareholders typically make a contribution into the share capital
of the organization in order to receive certain services and goods, rather than seeking profits
down the line. RPO can be distinguished from private-public partnerships and other externally
controlled structures by that producers are the main shareholders of RPO.
In the literature, the type of organization that is defined here as a rural producer organization
(RPO) can appear under different names, such as ”agricultural cooperative” (Hussi et al. 1993),
”farmer organization” (Chamala & Shingi 1997), ”agricultural producer organization” (Rondot
& Collion 2001) and others.
According to Bijman & Ton (2008), an RPO can be defined by two principles: utility and
identity. The utility principle states that an RPO is useful to its members, and they are contribut-
ing towards the achievement of common goals. The identity principle underlines that members
typically have similar backgrounds, share common values and visions, and agree upon the rules
within the organization and external communication with the outside world. This shared identity
serves as a social instrument that sustains and further develops interactions between members.
So, in order to be a member of an RPO, individuals have to meet certain criteria (e.g. member-
ship fees, being of certain ethnicity etc.), which can discern them from other farmers (Bijman &
Ton 2008).
Since RPO actions are usually performed by a group of people, not individuals, the term
rural producer organization is closely related to the term collective action.
Collective action is an action taken by more than one person in pursuit of common goal or set
of goals. From the perspective of group formation, collective action can be explained using the
concepts of social learning and social capital (Kruijssen et al. 2009, Uphoff 1993). Collective
action is defined and triggered by social learning and social capital through various drivers. This
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process is schematically described in Figure 1.1. As shown in the figure, in order to start acting
as a group, individuals, firstly, need to have the ability and the need to collaborate. Secondly,
individuals expect to receive certain benefits from the collective action. Groups continuously
go through social learning: through communication, members learn to interact and work as
a collective and form collective cognition (Jordan et al. 2003). Social capital is a structure
of relations inside the group. Among characteristics of social capital, Pretty & Ward (2001)
distinguish (i) trust within the group, (ii) reciprocity, (iii) common rules, norms, sanctions, and
(iv) group connectedness (i.e. a set of internal and external connections of group members).
Social capital lowers the costs of working together and, therefore, serves as a catalyst of collective
action (Pretty & Ward 2001). For investing their assets in collective activities individuals have
to agree with the activities and be confident that others would invest their assets as well.
Figure 1.1: Process of collective action
Source: Author
1.1.2 Typology
RPO are complex organizations differentiated by the political, economic, social and juridical
environments in which they function. Hence, RPO can be categorized by several attributes:
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Cause of origin There are various forces that can spark the creation of an RPO. Sometimes, it
can be formed autonomously as farmers’ reaction to unfavorable circumstances (low bargaining
power, high risks, absence of certain public goods, etc.). In this case, RPO emerge from existing
social structures (for example, neighborhoods or religious communities). In other cases, RPO
are created by external initiatives of the state, NGOs, or international development organizations.
RPO can be formed directly or be developed from other externally created networks, like natural
research management organizations or micro-finance institutions.
Provided goods RPO can be distinguished by the types of goods they provide. Generally,
RPO can provide any type of good of a rivalry-excludability classification: private (inputs, draft
power), club (certification), common (irrigation water) and public (rural infrastructure).
Provided services RPO can provide a wide range of services. According to Bosc et al. (2002)
they can be grouped into five categories:
• Economic: Management and procurement of production factors, production, processing
and marketing.
• Social: Improvement of education, health, cultural issues, etc.
• Representative: Defense of the members’ and the group’s interests and advocacy.
• Coordination: Systematic organization of members’ activities in time and space, making
them work efficiently for the achievement of common goals.
• Knowledge and information sharing: Dissemination of knowledge and information among
group members, establishment of internal and external communication channels and ca-
pacity building.
Marketable products Four groups of marketable products and related markets on which RPO
may concentrate can be defined (based on Markelova & Mwangi (2010), Poulton et al. (2010)):
• Staple crops: Products have limited opportunities in terms of value addition; somewhat
easy to store and transport. In most cases, there is a demand for these products on the local
market. Substantial portions of the harvest can be also consumed on farms.
• Cash crops: Typically require processing and, therefore, are often sold to large agribusi-
nesses that possess the necessary equipment.
• Perishables: Associated with high risks, these require sophisticated storage and transport-
ation mechanisms, and are subject to complex quality requirements, but have high revenue
potential.
• Livestock products: Multiple by-products, and are easy to sell locally.
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Degree of specialization RPO can have a narrow specialization (often focused on a specific
commodity or function) or perform a broad set of activities. Because of the sophisticated live-
lihood structure of farmers in the developing countries, RPO may aim to tackle several issues
(like marketing, education of farmers, quality control) at the same time.
Level of operation The stakeholders of RPO are local level actors – agricultural producers.
However, RPO can be represented on various levels. One way of doing so is forming region-
or county-wide federations/associations/unions. Also, RPO can be directly linked to large ex-
porters, importers, processors or retailers, thus also operating on various levels. Finally, in some
cases, RPO can take part in international certification schemes or development programs.
Organizational structure Membership conditions, internal rules, regulations and sanctions,
and management types can vary significantly.
Organizational form There is a wide range of legal forms under which RPO can be registered.
RPO may also exist only as informal groups and may not be officially registered.
Mode of group operation In an RPO, group objectives might not be fully shared by individual
members of the group. Therefore, a group must use certain mechanisms in order to keep indi-
vidual activities in line with the objectives of the group. Hence, Thorp et al. (2005) distinguish
between the following three mechanisms of group operation:
• Power and control: One or several dominant members (leaders) dictate their decisions to
other members using threats and/or sanctions. By consenting to these decisions, regular
members release themselves from the responsibilities of participation in management and
decision making.
• Material incentives: Members participate in the group and contribute to achieving group
objectives because in doing so they get a material reward or expect to be rewarded in the
future.
• Cooperation: Members are concerned with the well-being of others in the group. Mem-
bers agree that group objectives prevail over their individual interests.
In practice, groups do not apply only one mechanism, but rather certain mixtures of them (Thorp
et al. 2005).
Internal composition RPO can be distinguished by the demographic characteristics of its
members. For example, there are women’s RPO, youth RPO, etc.
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Evolution path RPO are dynamic groups and their activities, inter- and intra- relations, evolve
over time. In many cases, such evolution is the outcome of adaptation to changes in surrounding
economic, social, political, institutional, technical and technological environments.
1.1.3 Relevance for the development agenda
Currently, there are about 1.5-2 billion people involved in smallholder agriculture worldwide;
this group of people mostly resides in rural areas of developing countries and includes the ma-
jority of the world’s rural poor and undernourished (Hazell et al. 2010, Bailey et al. 2009, World
Bank 2007, Hazell 2005). Despite many expectations, the number of small farms in developing
countries and the share of agricultural land under their operation has not fallen, but keeps on
growing (Hazell et al. 2010). Thereby, the livelihoods of an enormous number of rural people
continue to be dependent on smallholder agriculture. This consideration makes enhancing the
profitability and sustainability of smallholder agriculture, and the subsequent improvement of
the rural livelihoods, one of the primary pathways of poverty reduction (World Bank 2007).
Smallholder agriculture in developing countries is subject to a number of cases of inefficient
allocation of goods and services by the free market (also known as market failures), such as:
• High price dispersion due to poor transportation infrastructure
• Credit constraints due to a lack of formal financial institutions
• Under-developed labor markets
• Weak insurance mechanisms
• Inefficient management of common resources due to communal property rights
Inefficient policies and bad governance may widen the listed market imperfections and create
additional negative externalities. Responding to the market and government failures is a driving
force for RPO formation and development in developing countries.
Smallholder farmers all over the world are facing two main challenges, which are related
to the size of their enterprises (Valentinov 2007). They are (i) the inability to reach benefits
of external economies of scale when acting independently on the market and (ii) much less
bargaining power in comparison with upstream and downstream industries. Networks of RPO
can potentially unite farmers and help them to overcome these two problems. Through RPO,
farmers may acquire the missing capacities, and bridge existing knowledge and technology gaps
with today’s leading producers. The importance of RPO is that they provide links between
producers and consumers, which increase farmers’ market access (Shiferaw et al. 2008, Bacon
2005). On paper, RPO have clear advantages over individual action:
• Benefits of economies of scale
• Knowledge and information sharing
• More bargaining and political power
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• Safety nets and lower costs for externalities management
• Access to larger markets
• Access to financial services
• Group certification
In terms of rural development that also means:
• Improvement of rural livelihoods
• Linking small producers to national economies
• Improvement of competition in rural areas by provision of alternative sales channels
• Vulnerability reduction through organization of community-based institutions and self-
help groups
By reducing market transaction costs and increasing market power, collective action through
RPO is a development opportunity. Hypothetically, rural farmers can better solve some of their
problems by acting as a group than they could if acting individually. But can RPO in developing
countries indeed tap this potential and make a difference for rural farmers and communities?
What do the facts say?
The literature assesses the contribution that RPO make to farmer welfare. Some studies
reveal that participation in RPO serves to increase selling prices of member producers, thus
improving household incomes (Shiferaw et al. 2008, Wollni & Zeller 2007, Calkins & Ngo
2005). For example, Shiferaw et al. (2008) observe pigeon-pea prices offered by Kenyan RPO
to be 22–24 % higher than the respective prices offered by middlemen traders. With regards to
price differences, Kruijssen et al. (2009) report the different situation observed in the groups of
Indian horticultural producers: in order to save time coordinating sales and free up labor to be
used elsewhere, farmers accepted lower prices offered by their RPO.
Creation of employment opportunities in the rural areas is an important effect of RPO pres-
ence. According to Develtere & Pollet (2008), these effects can be (i) direct (staff of RPO and
related institutions), (ii) indirect (support of members’ self-employment), or (iii) spillover (non-
members, whose employment is dependent on the existence of cooperatives). A study by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) (Schwettmann 1997), estimated that the cooperative
sector in 15 selected African countries provided around 159,000 direct and 468,000 indirect
employment opportunities. In certain areas, the cooperative sector can be the only suitable em-
ployer for farmers. In the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal 70% of interviewed RPO
members had never been employed prior to joining the RPO (Theron 2008). The spillover effects
are difficult to quantify, but it is clear that jobs of certain economic actors (like seed, input or
transportation providers) are dependent on the activities of the RPO (Develtere & Pollet 2008).
The RPO-induced financial and social capital improvements can allow members to use RPO
networks to organize investments into the socio-economic infrastructure of the community (for
example, building a school or small water reservoir), as the findings of Calkins & Ngo (2005)
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show. RPO networks can also be used as an effective means of information transmission (health
messages, fertilizer recommendations, etc.). For example, around 100,000 farmers were given
information about AIDS during an agricultural intervention on input provision in Zambia (Uliwa
& Fischer 2004).
An ordered probit model by Wollni et al. (2010) estimated that in the case of small-scale
farmers in Honduras, RPO membership had a positive effect on the adoption of soil conservation
practices. Devaux et al. (2009) argue that market chain innovations for indigenous products
promoted through collective action efforts can support biodiversity conservation in rural areas.
Findings of Kruijssen et al. (2009) concluded from four different case studies that RPO contribute
to the sustainable management of natural resources.
There are a few study cases that support the hypothesis that RPO make a positive impact on
the market access of their members. The results of the analysis by Wollni et al. (2010) suggest
that RPO members are more likely to be involved in organic markets, therefore, RPO were able
to improve market access. Myers (2004) notes that Ethiopian RPO successfully linked farm-
ers to the international coffee market. Evidence from the Meso-American setting shows that,
even if RPO do not provide better access to output markets, they mainly serve their members
by facilitating access to production inputs (Hellin et al. 2009). The statistical evidence from co-
coa producing RPO in Ghana and Cote d’Ivore presented by Calkins & Ngo (2005) shows that
RPO members (in comparison with non-members) get significantly better access, not only to
marketing, but also to such services as credit, input procurement, extension and health services.
Therefore, RPO members interviewed by Calkins & Ngo (2005) agreed with the expression ”a
cocoa cooperative in the village benefits community development”.
Results of Bernard et al. (2008) demonstrate that RPO provide a channel for governments
and development organizations to stream their development assistance. This forms a channel for
reaching the rural poor and targeting development policies.
1.1.4 Problems and challenges of rural producer organizations
The related literature underlines a wide set of problems that RPO in developing countries have
to deal with. Some of these problems (free-riding, limited planning horizon) are linked to the
nature of the cooperative firm type, some (inclusion of the poor, gender inequality) are defined by
the development context specifics and some (efficiency/equality trade-off) are matters of priority
setting. In order to be successful, development policies have to find the respective solutions to
the problems discussed in this section.
Dealing with heterogeneous membership Differences in values, visions, judgments of RPO
members and resulting potential clashes between individual and group motivations can form the
base for cooperative failures. That is especially relevant for the groups with large numbers of
members (Nilsson 2001). For the RPO management it may be hard to weight members’ opinions,
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and improper decisions on treatment of individual preferences may lead to the discontentment
of members (Richards et al. 1998). Usually, managerial decisions are taken according to some
kind of ”average” of members’ preferences (Nilsson 2001), which may not always be optimal
for the cooperative as a whole.
Free-riding This problem is associated with a situation in which certain members consume
group resources while paying less than their fair share of the full cost of production. The co-
operative structure of the firm often creates optimal conditions for such free-riding. For example,
growing RPO have internal incentives to borrow capital, since part of the debt and principal ser-
vice will be covered by members that will join the RPO later. The opposite situation occurs
in RPO with decreasing membership. Likewise, when a new member joins the RPO, he can
immediately use all assets that were accumulated in the RPO past. Thus, free-riding behavior
results in sub-optimal resource allocation.
Limited planning horizon Heterogeneity of members’ ages and their respective time prefer-
ences results in variance of their planning horizons. In general, since the individual planning
horizon is always constrained by the proximate duration of membership, they tend to be shorter
than usual (Nilsson 2001). Also, the horizons of RPO management are limited to the length
of their elective terms. All these limitations may hinder the implementation of long-term in-
vestments (Chibanda et al. 2009) and result in the choice of development pathways that offer
short-term achievements. Thus, the issues of sustainable development may be overlooked.
Need for strong leadership The issue of coordination and mediation of members’ interests
and actions creates a need for effective RPO leadership and management. In order to generate
more value addition, produce of RPO members must meet complex requirements of national and
international value chains. RPO leaders have to possess adequate managerial capacities to en-
sure the satisfaction of such demands (Arcand 2002, Berdegue 2001). After having synthesized
the empirical evidence from 20 African villages, Arcand (2002) concludes that effective RPO
leadership is vital for the creation of an RPO’s formal structure, development of RPO activities,
and facilitation of access to external networks. Yet, the leaders in the traditional communities
often lack the necessary organizational skills (World Bank 2007).
Adaptation to liberalized markets Due to recent developments in the liberalization of mar-
kets and the resulting suppression of protective domestic agricultural policies, rural producers
around the globe have entered international competition. International agreements of the WTO
and the reduction of state influence in the agricultural sector opened domestic markets to im-
ports, and led to the reduction of subsidies and price stabilization mechanisms. In order to be
competitive in today’s liberalized economic environment, rural producers have to improve their
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efficiency through productivity increase and cost reduction. This stipulates one of the major
challenges of RPO – improvement of adaptation and innovation capacities.
Openness and participation Not every rural farmer can be included in the RPO, and not all
included farmers can affect RPO decision making. Bernard & Spielman (2009), when analyzing
reasons of malfunctioning of marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia, revealed a trade-off between
a degree of heterogeneity (or openness of membership) between RPO members and the level
of positive economic performance of the RPO. Bernard & Spielman (2009) also empirically
analyzed decision making within the cooperatives by identifying the decision makers in various
collective decisions. This research estimated low levels of participation of RPO members in
collective decision making: only 19% of cooperative decisions were open to all RPO members
and around 40% of cooperatives excluded their regular members from any decision making.
Thus, despite being self-regulating organizations, RPO could fail to include members into the
decision-making process, which could be dominated by the interests of the management com-
mittee.
Gender inequality The issue of gender equality is relevant for many developing countries.
Often opinions and interests of women are neglected. After analyzing the Uganda coffee sec-
tor, Golan & Lay (2008) conclude that women face complications in entering markets of high
value crops (which are the ones usually linked to RPO) due to significant social barriers. Fair
representation of female members and their inclusion in RPO decision making must be ensured.
Reaching the poor From the perspective of rural development, low inclusion of the poor into
existing RPO and inhibited potential for formation of the new groups is a problem of cooperative
movement in developing countries (Thorp et al. 2005). The lack of assets is the main factor that
limits participation of the poorest population segments in RPO. First of all, land ownership is
a very important factor: rural landless in many cases are excluded from membership in RPO
(Thorp et al. 2005) or are not favored by RPO regulations (Copestake 2002). Low capacities of
other assets, such as labor, education, and financial and social capital, results in the inability to
make significant contributions to group capital, therefore, such members may not be considered
valuable by the rest of the group and as a result may not be included in the group (Molinas
1998). Remoteness of poor areas from markets, transport infrastructure, financial institutions
and information about opportunities significantly hinders group formation processes (Meinzen-
Dick et al. 2002, Lam 2001), thus also limiting the participation of the poor in RPO. Findings of
Bernard & Spielman (2009) suggest that the poor tend to be excluded from membership in RPO,
although they receive some benefits from the existence of RPO in the form of spillovers. Also,
this research discovered that poorer members of RPO have lower influence in RPO decision
making.
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Efficiency versus equality Efficiency versus equality is a general subject of the political dis-
cussions on various socio-economic levels. This problem also has relevance, when talking about
RPO. Ties of social inclusion and solidarity, that are typical for the traditional communities, may
cause such conflict (World Bank 2007). On one hand, support of poorer members by wealthier
ones is an important income insurance mechanism. On the other hand, obligations to deliver pub-
lic goods to a community pull the resources from individual households and, therefore, slower
their economic growth (Bernard, De Janvry & Sadoulet 2010).
1.1.5 Supporting producer organizations: Lessons from history
In the past, African governments saw and widely used RPO as instruments for implementation
of economic policies and, therefore, RPO were closely linked with the state bureaucracy, as De-
veltere & Pollet (2008) conclude. They state that in the last decades the situation has greatly
changed: reforms of economic deregulation that happened in African countries in the early
1990’s also changed the perception of RPO. Now, RPO in most African countries are considered
profit-generating private entities driven by market demand. This business-oriented approach re-
quires governments to put emphasis on issues like financial viability, solvency, profitability and
sustainability of RPO.
Markelova & Mwangi (2010), Chibanda et al. (2009), Hellin et al. (2009), Shiferaw et al.
(2008) propose that institutions and governance are the important determinants of RPO per-
formance. Availability and strength of financial institutions define RPO ability to access capital
resources, which are needed for investments in durable assets. Government influence is in the
determination of rules of the market and in setting up conditions for cooperative operations.
Government is responsible for facilitating transmission of market information and developing
infrastructure systems. The report of Hussi et al. (1993) stresses that RPO are more likely to
succeed in liberalized business environments, where private initiatives are encouraged. It is im-
portant to ensure the improvement of the legal and institutional environments of RPO, which
will allow for such value adding actions as certification, standardization, fair trade, etc. Stabiliz-
ation of these environments together with fair rules of competition can form a good investment
climate, which would allow for additional financial leverages.
Support for RPO is especially important during the formative and early stages of an RPO’s
existence (Hellin et al. 2009). Linking organizations with private sector partners is the role of
support providers during this period. It is important to remember, that RPO-supporting oppor-
tunities often create an additional incentive for RPO to emerge. In these cases, producers are
aware that external opportunities exist and that they have to form an RPO in order to benefit from
them. Thus, some RPO may appear and function only as rent-seekers from these opportunities,
as research by Arcand (2002) shows. Support measures that stimulate opportunistic behavior of
RPO lead to the formation of inefficient and unsustainable organizations and waste of resources.
For example, Lyon (2003), in analyzing RPO in rural Ghana, concluded that assisting RPO by
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giving credit privileges is rarely sustainable, since there is no incentive for producers to act as a
group after the privileges are withdrawn. Therefore, the matter of effective targeting is relevant
for implementation of the RPO-supporting mechanisms. The aim of the support is to trigger
RPO formation and to guide their transition to economic independence and sustainability. The
key issue in assessing RPO sustainability is an estimation of organizational and operational costs
that an RPO would have to bear (Markelova & Mwangi 2010).
One could argue that external support and government assistance are vital for RPO viabil-
ity. But, the history of cooperative movements in African countries has proven that streaming
the support through governmental institutions is likely to be ineffective: instead of empowering
RPO, it strengthened government control over them (Hussi et al. 1993). Also, recent evidence
from Africa (Wanyama 2008) shows that despite tendencies of state withdrawal from develop-
ment efforts the cooperative sector in Africa still exists and influences a large part of the eco-
nomy. In some countries (Egypt, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda) the number of RPO members sig-
nificantly increased with economic liberalization, which serves as proof for RPO’ potential for
self-propelling development. One can therefore conclude that the rural development community,
donor organizations and government authorities should concentrate on RPO interventions that
would target capacity building, rather than temporary resource provisions, which is only justi-
fiable in emergency situations. Investments in group social infrastructure can result in tangible
long-term benefits (as the research of Uphoff & Wijayaratna (2000) demonstrates).
As targets for capacity building, Rondot & Collion (2001) propose either technical (func-
tional literacy and numeracy, accounting and financial planning, project implementation skills,
etc.) or strategic (strategic planning, analytical skills, etc.) capacities. These actions can stimu-
late voluntary initiatives for group formation and ensure group sustainability and market orient-
ation, which would lead to a higher demand of rural financial services and trigger the formation
and growth of this market. The reduction of external influence can result in the emergence of
networks that are more adaptive to changing markets and attentive to members’ needs. Lyon
(2003) suggests that facilitating information exchange, transparency and mutual monitoring of
group activities by establishing understandable accounting procedures is important for fostering
cooperation between cooperative members. RPO have to function under self-developed rules,
rather than just following externally imposed instructions. This would develop a sense of own-
ership and members’ loyalty, which are essential prerequisites for effective RPO functioning
(Markelova et al. 2009, Thorp et al. 2005)).
Markelova et al. (2009), Shiferaw et al. (2008) outline the potentials in involving private sec-
tor actors (processors, supermarkets, exporters) in RPO empowerment. The private sector may
be interested in ensuring reliable supplies of agricultural products, as well as in enabling farmers
to meet certain quality requirements, safety regulations and certification standards. Therefore,
agribusiness may be willing to contribute some financial or physical resources to RPO capacit-
ies through contract farming, outgrower schemes, warehouse credit systems, etc. According to
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Shiferaw et al. (2008), the viability of such arrangements depends on three factors:
• Farmers’ ability to comply with quantity, quality and time requirements
• RPO ability to coordinate production and marketing
• Legal and institutional framework for composition and enforcement of agreements
Researchers (Markelova & Mwangi 2010, Bernard & Spielman 2009, Bernard et al. 2008,
Lyon 2003) seem to agree that previously followed panacea-like support strategies (one inter-
vention benefits all RPO) have to be replaced with case-specific treatment designs. Due to the
functional and organizational diversity of RPO (see Section 1.1.2) they each have different de-
mands in terms of support. For example, for market-oriented organizations the key issue is
managerial capacity and for community-oriented organizations it is access to finance (Bernard
et al. 2008). Besides, the research of Bernard et al. (2008) shows that RPO response to support
measures may vary depending on the country specifics. Also, one has always to take into ac-
count, as it is reasonably noted by Markelova & Mwangi (2010), that cooperative mechanisms
are not always able to correct market imperfections; other development measures also have to
be considered by the donors.
1.2 Main methodological concepts
This section describes core methodological approaches used in this work and justifies their ap-
plication. The complexity of RPO and the specifics of agriculture in developing countries in-
duced the choice of ABM as the main research tool of this study. This section explains the
choice, identifies a place for the approach in the RPO-focused research and outlines its potential
in comparison with alternative methods. Therefore, the author also familiarizes the reader with
existing approaches of RPO analysis and their specifics: indicators that were used and results
that were obtained.
In order to understand the functioning of RPO well, the author met with RPO members and
other key informants. This section describes the benefits of stakeholder inclusion and of learning
from them by means of participatory methods.
It is clear that cross-fertilization of individual scientific efforts is a major issue in collabor-
ative research projects. With this regard, the author sees the constructed simulation model as an
opportunity for possible integration with the work of other collaborators from the project that
frames this thesis (see Section 1.3.1). Therefore, the issue of linking computer simulation with
empirical research using survey techniques and field experiments was reviewed.
1.2.1 Analyzing rural producer organizations
The application of criteria used in economic analysis of profit-maximizing firms may have its
limitations, because of the social orientation of many RPO. Due to the wide range of RPO types
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(see Section 1.1.2), limited data records, and the multi-objective nature of RPO, various ap-
proaches for analyzing RPO performance have been developed in socio-economic research. In
analyzing RPO efficiency and the impacts of measures of RPO support it is essential to come
up with an assessment system to determine performance indicators. However, little is published
about such empirical assessments, especially for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless,
some approaches can be distinguished.
Examining differences in quantitative factors The basic approach of assessing RPO contri-
bution to rural development is capturing income differences between RPO-members and non-
members. (Likewise, members of RPO that receive and do not receive support can be com-
pared). This basic and straightforward approach is able to provide informative results as the
study of Kenyan pigeon-pea producers of Shiferaw et al. (2008) demonstrates. Shiferaw et al.
(2008) inspected the recorded selling prices in different sales channels. By doing so the research-
ers calculated the price advantages that collective action created. Further, the authors estimated
the differences in revenue that appear when using RPO-offered prices. Then these differences
were matched with costs of collective action that include membership subscriptions and annual
fees and opportunity costs of delayed payments (which occur when selling through RPO). The
result of the comparison was a change in income caused by collective marketing. Analogously,
Bernard, Spielman, Taffesse & Gabre-Madhin (2010) reviewed differences in output prices and
sales volumes between members and non-members of RPO in Ethiopia.
Ranking on quantitative factors To evaluate the effectiveness of collective marketing, Shife-
raw et al. (2008) considered two factors: the per capita value of assets produced by an RPO over
time and the per capita volume of total sales. To assess the level of collective action within an
RPO, the following quantitative factors were used in that study: the attendance of meetings, the
share of members respecting bylaws, the number of board elections since formation, the size
of annual voluntary contributions, the size of annual membership fees, and the amount of cash
at the RPO disposal. RPO then were ranked according to their factor scores. Aggregate mean
ranks for the level of and effectiveness of collective action were used as a final evaluation marks.
Members’ own assessment Bernard et al. (2008) used the proportion of RPO members that
claim to benefit from the organization’s presence as an indicator of RPO performance. Thus, the
performance measure was based on a subjective assessment of the RPO members. The research-
ers defined two models for the description of the performance indicator. The first model related
it to two independent dummy variables: ”control” variable stated whether the RPO has a control
commission or a written code of conduct, and ”professional management” which stated whether
the RPO kept accounting and registration records. For market-oriented RPO, researchers added
two more dummy variables: whether the RPO provided public goods (e.g. management of a
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collective field, casual labor exchange, maintenance of a cereal bank, etc.) and whether it did
multitasking. The second model assessed the impacts of development assistance to RPO; it de-
scribed the performance indicator by three variables that stood for RPO reception of external
grants, trainings and loans. After testing both described models on datasets from Senegal and
Burkina Faso for two types of RPO (community-oriented and market-oriented), authors were
able to draw several case-specific conclusions on parameter correlates, but none of the regres-
sion estimates were significant in all of the analyzed cases.
Binary indicators Chibanda et al. (2009), for estimation of RPO performance in their paper,
defined 21 indicators related to (i) RPO economic performance, (ii) internal regulations, and
(iii) governance of an RPO. Indicators were derived from suggestions of various literature on
institutional economics. Indicators could only take values of either 1 or 0 depending on the actual
observation. For example, if an RPO was able to generate a positive net surplus to its members,
it would get 1 for the ”surplus” indicator. Later, based on the scores, RPO were ranked and a
cluster analysis was performed. Results of the analysis were also compared with self-assessments
of RPO members. Interestingly, Chibanda et al. (2009) observed that RPO members’ perception
of RPO performance was based only on a few out of many selected indicators. This observation
made authors conclude that basing indicators only on the subjective assessment of RPO members
(as in the case of Bernard et al. (2008)) may not give the full picture of RPO functionality and
efficiency. Results of cluster analysis of Chibanda et al. (2009) conveyed that institutional and
governance problems have significance for RPO performance.
SWOT analysis Uliwa & Fischer (2004) performed analysis of Tanzanian RPO from the per-
spective of their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT). In the study, SWOT
analysis was used to summarize the authors’ opinions obtained from discussion interviews with
RPO members. Based on the results of the SWOT analysis, Uliwa & Fischer (2004) drew re-
commendations for the design of the RPO promoting and supporting program.
Every method from the examples given above has its limitations. For example, both methods
applied in the research of Shiferaw et al. (2008) are only considering marketing-related impacts
of an RPO. However, the functions of many RPO lie far beyond marketing. Only the approach
from the first example (estimation of changes in income) can yield the cost-benefit assessment of
external interventions. Members themselves may not connect some of the RPO-inflicted impacts
with their RPO (as noticed by Chibanda et al. (2009)). Scores and ranks represent arbitrary
expert opinions. SWOT analysis is a highly subjective assessment tool. So, the outcomes of
this literature review suggest that existing methods are specific to the goals and objectives of
the respective studies and projects. Any comprehensive RPO-exploring approach most likely
has to combine various assessment methods, mostly because of wide typology of RPO roles
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and actions. Such combining requires a certain framework under which the findings of various
research activities can be integrated. The advantages of using computer simulation and ABM
for this purpose are discussed in the next sections.
1.2.2 Using agent-based simulation for researching RPO
There are certain distinct advantages to using computer simulation for assessing the impacts of
the interventions of RPO support and the related policies. Firstly, in the setting of computer sim-
ulation, the researcher has all factors under control, which is different in the case of empirical
research that use survey techniques and field experiments. Secondly, implementing the simula-
tion model can be much less costly than conducting a survey or socio-economic experiments.
Thirdly, real-world experiments typically require substantial waiting time between its imple-
mentation and the point, where the results become available. There is also always a risk that the
experiment will bring negative effects to a treatment group. Finally, once a model concept is
created and a source code is implemented, the model can be scaled up, adapted and reused with
minor adjustments.
Capturing heterogeneity The choice of a suitable modeling approach for modeling rural RPO
requires deep understanding of household-level heterogeneity and complexity that are com-
mon for agricultural systems in developing countries. It is typical to observe large variations
in yields, input and labor intensity, etc., as well as a big diversity of land use decisions and
choices of farming practices between households in developing countries (Ruben & Pender
2004, Schreinemachers & Berger 2006). For example, an IFPRI household survey conducted in
Uganda in 2010 (IFPRI 2010) shows that a Ugandan rural household can sell up to nine differ-
ent crops and five livestock products in one agricultural season. There are a lot of constraining
factors that are causing such diversity: limited resource endowments, poor rural infrastructure,
climatic uncertainty, soil degradation, imperfect markets, and so on (Berger et al. 2006). Cap-
turing these variations with aggregate top-down approaches and models may be infeasible, since
it would require a large number of control variables. (As it is admitted by Berger (2001), ag-
gregated models cannot capture the individual behavior and, therefore, assume the absence of
information and transaction costs.) Breaking the system down into its basic components (agents,
networks, environments etc.) and simple rules, frees modeling from prior application of soph-
isticated mathematical translations (Boulanger & Brechet 2005). In this respect, bottom-up sys-
tems modeling (or ABM in other words) is an appropriate tool. Agent-based models (ABM)
have played a role in the social sciences since the 1990’s. Its use is mostly linked to situations
where the complexity of a studied system results in the analytical intractability of the research
problems (Nolan et al. 2009). Such problems are too difficult to solve when considering a sys-
tem as an indivisible object. Multi-agent implementation of the system may provide a solution
in these cases. ABM serves well for the incorporation of bounded rationality – assumptions of
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limited information, constrained resources and analytical capabilities of agents. As Section 1
showed, RPO are the systems for which all these issues apply.
Precision and multidimensionality Given the heterogeneity of biophysical and socio-econo-
mic constraints, ”one size fits all” type of policies are unlikely to be effective in the less-favored
areas (Ruben & Pender 2004, Berger et al. 2006). Development interventions are required to be
precisely targeted on removing most binding constraints and supporting most vulnerable house-
holds and groups. ABM can support the design of development policies providing information
for ex-ante evaluation of possible interventions (Berger et al. 2006). For example, Latynskiy
et al. (2010) and Troost et al. (2010) used multi-agent systems (MAS) to identify households
whose incomes were sensitive to variability in irrigation water supply. Table 1 provided in the
introduction to this thesis characterizes the suitability of MAS for the purposes of sustainable
development policy making.
ABM allows for multi-level analysis of agricultural systems: starting from crop, plot and
farm levels it can go to household, community and regional levels (Schreinemachers & Ber-
ger 2011, Boulanger & Brechet 2005), thus adequately representing micro-macro relationships.
One-to-one correspondence between model agents and their real-world prototypes (typical for
ABM), will ease the interpretation of simulation results Schreinemachers et al. (2010). Hence,
ABM of RPO will allow for the capturing of interventions effects on individual households and,
therefore, improve the assessments of intervention efficiency. Likewise, MAS implementation
allows for the assessment of the impact of point interventions in terms of the entire system. For
example, Troost (2009) applied MAS for analyzing the effects of public subsidies for advanced
irrigation technologies in Chile. Hoffmann et al. (2002) tackled impacts of deforestation and re-
forestation policies. Works of Schreinemachers et al. (2007), Latynskiy et al. (2010) and Wossen
et al. (2010) also showed the ability of MAS to provide information for multi-indicator assess-
ments. These authors quantified impacts of changes in terms of income, poverty, inequality,
productivity, etc. Such multidimensional analysis is desirable for the current research, since (i)
the impact of interventions has to be assessed on both household and organizational levels and
(ii) different impact indicators have to be taken into account.
Limited knowledge and learning The agent-based set-up of the model is well-suited to the
cases that assume agents’ limited knowledge and learning abilities. The assumption about lim-
ited knowledge is reasonable, since real-world economic actors cannot give perfect predictions
for the uncertain parameters such as prices, climate and crop yields, and cannot account for all
of the factors that define them. With regards to the second assumption, it is clear that individuals
consider at least their personal experience in their decision making. The fine resolution of MAS
allows for the registration of disaggregated household experiences with regard to prices, yields
and other uncertain factors (Latynskiy et al. 2010, Wossen et al. 2010, Schreinemachers 2006).
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The implementation of learning in the model enables simulations of adaptive behavior, since an
agent would base its decisions on constantly updated information.
Interactions Rural communities and their RPO are characterized by complex systems of inter-
actions. The modeling of representative households may miss these interactions, while in MAS
they can be included explicitly (Lobianco & Esposti 2010, Schreinemachers et al. 2010, Berger
2001, Deffuant et al. 2002). Therefore, ABM has strong advantages over conventional equation-
based modeling aggregated on the levels of region or sector, when dealing with problems of
agent coordination and strategic interaction (Janssen 2005). The formulation of an RPO-model
in an agent-based way is expected to simulate endogenously formation of RPO member surplus
and price advantages, depending on agent decisions.
Agents may not only interact with each other, but also with an environment, thus redefining its
state. This feature of ABM will allow inclusion of agent-specific external factors (Schreinemach-
ers et al. 2007).
Data integration In developing countries like Uganda, reliable aggregate data are hardly avail-
able. The flexibility of ABM permits the incorporation of segmented information from various
sources, such as nation-wide population censuses, project-specific sample surveys, expert opin-
ions, researchers’ own experience, and so on (Berger 2001). This is a strong advantage for this
study, which has limited resources for the collection of own datasets and must incorporate sets
of external data.
There are several technical solutions that can potentially serve for implementation of the
ABM approach for modeling of agricultural systems (Schreinemachers & Berger 2011), such as
AgriPoliS (Balmann 1997, Happe et al. 2006), PALM (Matthews 2006), RegMAS (Lobianco
& Esposti 2010) and others. As mentioned in the introduction (page 5), for the implementation
of the ABM of Ugandan RPO the author chose MP-MAS (Mathematical Programming-based
Multi-Agent Systems). This software was designed by the development team (team members are
listed in Schreinemachers & Berger (2011)) stationed at the UHOH chair of Land Use Economics
in the Tropics and Subtropics (Josef G. Knoll Professorship). A detailed description of MP-MAS
software can be found in Schreinemachers & Berger (2011) and a description of its adaptation
and extensions for current research is in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The software choice was made
for a number of practical reasons:
• MP-MAS is most suitable for semi-subsistence agriculture (Schreinemachers & Berger
2011), which is the type of agriculture in the current research case study. The software
has an integrated sub-model of household own consumption, which is important in the
case of semi-subsistence farming.
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• MP-MAS was previously successfully applied by Schreinemachers & Berger (2006) for
modeling the coffee-banana production system of the lake-shore area of Uganda. Hence,
some parts of software parameterization and methodology could be reused (e.g. the in-
tegrated crop growth model).
• The author has experience in modeling with MP-MAS from previous research (see Latyn-
skiy et al. (2010)). Therefore, he was familiar with some of the theoretical concepts and
equation forms, that lie behind the software, as well as with the structure and formatting
of MP-MAS input and output files.
• MP-MAS programmers agreed to assist in making the necessary changes to the software
code that were necessary for the RPO-modeling of the current research. At the same time,
flexible MP-based structure of the MP-MAS decision module (see Chapter 3) allowed
many extensions and adaptations to be done without having the software code changed.
1.2.3 Linking computer simulation with empirical research
For decades empirical research methods have been widely used in agricultural and social sci-
ences, while simulation modeling is a relatively new, but dynamically developing instrument of
research in these fields. These two approaches have much in common, because they both test
the impact of certain interventions on the studied object (or system) with the goal of describ-
ing it. Therefore, some authors (Eck & Liu 2008, Duffy 2006) use the terms ”empirical” and
”simulated” experimentation, when referring to real-world experiments and computer simula-
tions. The ability to address similar research problems raised issues of choice between empirical
methods and computer simulations and the identification of opportunities for joint usage of both
approaches. For example, Duffy (2006) compared the empirically obtained results from real-
world controlled experiments (performed with human subjects) with simulated results from its
virtual imitation (performed with artificial agents in computer simulation) and did so in differ-
ent conceptual set-ups. His findings show that in some study cases, computer simulation and
empirical methods can be good substitutes, in others they provide complementary results. Table
1.1 analytically compares simulation modeling with common methods of empirical research in
agricultural economics: analysis of field data using statistical techniques, field and laboratory
experimentation. From the table it can be seen that, despite some similarities, the approaches
are different and, therefore, may serve different purposes.
As Table 1.1 suggests, the advantage of model simulation over experiment is the low re-
quirement in terms of research arrangements. Firstly, modeling does not demand real world
implementation of interventions. Secondly, in order to investigate the impact of certain changes,
computer simulation models do not necessary demand the collection of real-world data, since
they simulate the required data themselves. Empirical research methods, in turn, rely only on
real-world observations. Respectively, computer modeling provides almost unlimited opportun-
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Table 1.1: Comparison of computer simulation and empirical research
Simulation Field data Field experiment Lab experiment
Mechanism required not required not required not required
Data collection not required required required required
Real-world implementation not required happened naturally required required
Manipulation extensive restricted limited limited
Internal validity varies low medium high
External validity varies high high low
Replicability high low medium high
Source: Author, based on Eck & Liu (2008), Roe & Just (2009)
ities in factor manipulation, which is limited in real-world settings. However, empirical research
methods have strong advantages, when the system mechanism (rules of behavior, interactions, ra-
tionality bounds, etc.) is unclear, while simulation modeling requires a solid theoretical concept
as its foundation. In cases in which computer simulations and empirical research methods are
equally powerful in analyzing studied phenomenon, cost and time requirements of method ap-
plication have to be taken into account.
When talking about possible complementation, there are several ways to integrate simula-
tion models and empirical research. Firstly, empirical evidence can be used as an input for
model development: findings from empirical research can provide simulation models with ba-
sic assumptions regarding the system mechanism. Secondly, empirical data and experimental
results may serve as an external calibration and validation benchmark for simulation models.
In this case, during the construction of a simulation model one seeks to reproduce empirically-
obtained results; Janssen et al. (2009) calls this procedure ”pattern-oriented modeling”. Current
research practice in linking computer simulation and experimental findings is mostly related
to this technique. Likewise, Ebenhoeh & Pahl-Wostl (2008) reproduces several social experi-
ments on dictator and investor-trustee games with their MAS built on the assumptions drawn
from the Ostrom (2004) theory of collective action, Janssen & Ahn (2006) models with MAS
learning and signaling in public good games. By comparing simulation outputs with the results
of analogous empirical work, researchers judge the validity and applicability of the theoretical
framework based on which simulation model was constructed. If a model can accurately rep-
licate a certain empirically-observed behavior, then such a model can be used for the related
simulations over time-frames that are substantially longer than in experimental studies. Also,
such models validated on empirical findings can be extended to simulate the circumstances for
which representative empirical settings cannot be designed, because of overwhelming costs and
the inability to manipulate certain factors because of ethical or other reasons. Simulations, in
their turn, may help to better design the empirical research, by providing the precautionary in-
formation on expected outcomes and their distribution in time and space. Such information may
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support data collection, the selection and targeting of interventions, and the organization of post-
experimental surveys. Finally, simulations can extrapolate empirical findings on larger scales,
thus revealing system effects of the relationships.
As this section shows, computer simulation is not a substitute for the empirical approach. It
is rather an instrument that can extend, support and complement empirical methods. Therefore,
the researcher’s role in this regard is to make practical use of the potential synergy of these two
approaches.
1.2.4 Learning from stakeholders
One of the particulars of scientific computer models is that often at the beginning of model
development not all the specifics of the studied system are clear: many issues and complica-
tions may be unanticipated. This implies that the research has to be designed in an adaptive
(agile) fashion, instead of using a predictive loom with strict frames, which is more common
for business computer models. Collaborative research is the fundamental stone of this agile
modeling approach. Joint learning helps to ensure the relevance and usefulness of the study and
stimulates practical applications of its results. Starting in the late 1980’s, many development
studies began to emerge that concentrated on such issues as stakeholder ownership of policies,
targeting and cost-efficiency, inclusiveness of the poor, transparency and accountability (Pretty
1995). Therefore, participation of stakeholders and scientific approaches ensuring it came in
focus. Considering that stakeholders of research projects in applied sciences are often the ones
to bear the effects of practical applications of the findings, in the author’s opinion they have the
moral right to participate in the research activities or at least to be informed about the research
progress. Therefore, D’Aquino et al. (2003) see workshops, discussions, social experiments and
games as ”an interface between computer modeling and people” that supports mutual under-
standing and dialogue between stakeholders and researchers. Participatory approaches help to
build more trust between the researcher and respondents (Castella et al. 2005), thus stimulating
better information exchange. With regard to modeling, Berger et al. (2010) note that collaborat-
ive scientist-stakeholder research helps to achieve the following objectives:
• Improvement of model input data
• Ensuring the relevance of the model to posed research questions
• Provision and demonstration of created decision support systems for the local users
Boulanger & Brechet (2005) argue that, in order to be able to allow for stakeholder particip-
ation, a simulation model has to be capable of (i) integration of the insights obtained from the
participants and (ii) communication of model results. Given the specifics of MAS (discussed in
the Section 1.2.2), it is a suitable set-up for the integration of various types of knowledge and
ensuring stakeholder participation at different stages of the research (Berger et al. 2010, Becu
et al. 2008, Boulanger & Brechet 2005).
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In order to make the MAS valid and simulation results applicable, one has to assess and
incorporate real-world decision alternatives and the rules of decision making and interactions.
Since stakeholders are often the prototypes of MAS agents, who can better explain these rules
and alternatives than the stakeholders themselves? Works of Berger et al. (2010), Troost et al.
(2010) and Castella et al. (2005) show that the involvement of stakeholders in different stages for
modeling may be very beneficial for the quality of MAS. There are different ways to use stake-
holder knowledge while constructing a simulation model. For example, Castella et al. (2005)
drew the rules for agent behavior in MAS from stakeholder actions in the role-playing game.
D’Aquino et al. (2003) organized members of a rural community to self-design a MAS by sketch-
ing GIS-maps and defining behavioral rules. Berger et al. (2010), Latynskiy et al. (2010) and
Walz et al. (2007) captured the knowledge of the participants during discussion interviews or
a workshop. The ”Integrating Governance and Modeling” (IGM) project within the CGIAR
Challenge Program on Water & Food led by Berger et al. (2010) organized interactive model
validation sessions with stakeholders during which the MAS structure and assumptions were
discussed and revised. The close interaction with stakeholders helped the IGM project team to
create MAS-based decision-support tools for local water user associations (see Latynskiy et al.
(2010) and Troost et al. (2010)). During the later sessions, the tool was distributed among the
respective authorities. Some research (Walz et al. 2007, Castella et al. 2005, D’Aquino et al.
2003) incorporated stakeholders into the identification of model use cases and design of simu-
lation scenarios.
A variety of modern participatory approaches have been developed in recent years: parti-
cipatory rural appraisal, rapid rural appraisal, soft systems methodology etc. These approaches
commonly lean on one or several of the following cornerstones (based on Pretty (1995)):
• Facilitation: Employed methods have to create an awareness of studied issues, provide an
environment for thinking and discussion, and stimulate stakeholder participation.
• Group learning: An interactive group set-up ensures that different opinions are represen-
ted. Learning in such a set-up is more efficient. Also, group work produces more output,
since group member ideas spread inside the group and facilitate the emergence of follow-
up ideas.
• Visualization: The aim is to record the flow of the participatory work, to provide a better
and a simpler understanding, and to support deeper analysis. Visualization in comparison
with discussion involves respondents better and focuses the dialogue. Replacing the writ-
ing communication channel with symbols can bridge literacy gaps and ensure the inclusion
of all participants in the group work.
• Adaptation to context: Flexibility of research methods and tools have to allow to adapt
them to different conditions and respondents.
• Multiple perspectives: Different views on the research questions provided by different
individual responses create a more complete picture of the studied phenomena in compar-
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ison with aggregated data.
The implementation of the participatory approaches could be done through various scientific
methods and techniques for sampling, interviewing, group work and visualization. Any particip-
atory approach is nothing more than a package, a selection of particular methods and techniques.
The choice of the methods is defined by specifics of the given study frame and research questions.
The participatory methods used in this study are described in Section 2.1.
Along with all the benefits that participatory approaches may bring to agricultural stud-
ies, one also has to be cautious about the challenges associated with stakeholder-led research.
Van Asten et al. (2009) classifies these challenges into three categories:
• Insufficient understanding of system complexity: Stakeholders’ understanding of the sys-
tem may be incomplete or mistaken.
• Different reference frameworks: Scientists are usually interested in obtaining generalized
knowledge on the studied phenomenon, but stakeholders’ knowledge is likely to refer to
particular locations (e.g. each farmer would describe his own field), situations and cultural
paradigms. Farmer responses may be unclear and difficult to analyze quantitatively.
• Methodological errors: Methods of data collection may lead to biased responses. Farm-
ers may provide false information if they think that a particular response would attract
development assistance from the research project. Another well-known example of in-
formation distortion happens when respondents, in order to appear competent, fabricate
answers instead of declining to respond.
The above listed matters may result in extra degrees of model uncertainty linked to the in-
accuracy of the model input data. With this it can be concluded that the acquisition of valuable
stakeholder knowledge also demands that the researcher cross check for possible biases in re-
sponses and weaknesses in the participatory research methods applied.
1.3 Characteristics of the research setting
This thesis was written in the frames of international research project (described in Section 1.3.1)
in Senegal and Uganda. This chapter describes the placement of author’s individual research in
Uganda within the framework of a broader project and links it to project objectives and research
activities. The chapter characterizes the specifics of Ugandan context by guiding the reader
through country-wide, industry sector and study area levels. Historical and current phenomena,
developments and tendencies observed on these levels are described here.
1.3.1 IFPRI–IZA–UHOH Project ”Working together for market access”
The three-year joint research project “Working together for market access: strengthening rural
producer organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa”, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Eco-
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nomic Cooperation (BMZ), was implemented in the period of 2009–2012. This project was part
of a larger IFPRI-led research program “Institutions and Infrastructure for Market Development”.
The program explores various policy and development topics related to the role of rural infra-
structure and institutions in improvement of market access of smallholder farmers. Apart from
rural producer organizations, the program investigates aspects of contract farming, urban-rural
linkages, poverty reduction, weather securities, irrigation and power subsidies, etc. The results
of the program are open to the public; they provide strategic knowledge on addressing the needs
of rural households in developing countries through institutional and infrastructural improve-
ments. The main collaborators of the ”Working together for market access” project were: (i) the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC, (ii) the Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn and (iii) Universitaet Hohenheim (UHOH), Stuttgart. The project’s
field work took place in two Sub-Saharan African countries: Senegal and Uganda. Since the
support of smallholder commercialization through RPO is recognized as critical for rural agri-
cultural development (it is one of three development strategies identified in World Bank (2007)
Development Report dedicated to agriculture), the findings of the project may be relevant in
other developing countries.
The main goal of the project was analysis of the abilities of RPO to improve their mem-
bers’ access to input and output markets. The project research objectives were formulated as
follows:
• Identification of interventions that can improve RPO members’ capacity to access and
benefit from input and output markets
• Elaborating and testing universal schemes of RPO-leadership and members’ collectiviza-
tion that can improve RPO performance
• Assessing the impact of RPO-empowering measures on rural livelihoods and local input
and output markets
The present research focuses on the Ugandan case, and was linked under one framework with
the research activities of other project collaborators (see Figure 1.2).
The baseline project survey (IFPRI 2010) was conducted in Uganda from March to April
2010 on three different levels: county or sub-county level RPO (typically called in Uganda
either “depot committee” – DC or “area cooperative enterprise” – ACE), village level primary
RPO (called simply “producer organization” – PO) and household (for the distinction between
DC/ACE and PO see Section 1.3.2). The survey covered 21 DC/ACEs from different districts of
the country; each of the DC/ACE from the sample is focused on the marketing of one specific ag-
ricultural commodity. The majority of the sample DC/ACEs (12 out of 21) were occupied with
marketing of robusta coffee, 4 – with marketing of arabica coffee, 4 – maize and 1 – plantains.
The PO part of the survey was conducted in 375 POs, which are located under the umbrellas of
sample DC/ACEs. The questionnaires for the POs and the DC/ACEs were similar in structure
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Figure 1.2: Project framework
Source: Author, based on project documentation
and their main topics were: leadership, membership, group activities and decision making, finan-
cial and information services, trade partners, and sales quantities. The questionnaire used simple
exercises to assess the leaders’ capabilities in basic financial mathematics. The dictator game
was played with leaders and members. In addition, the DC/ACE part of the survey addressed
the topic of group certification. The household sub-survey approached two randomly selected
households from each PO from the sample. This household sub-survey addressed questions of
labor and land use, agricultural production systems with the main focus on coffee growing, mar-
keting and consumption of the produce, income structure, household relationships with RPO,
and use of its services. Also, the household part of the survey recorded farmers’ time preferences
in coffee transactions.
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1.3.2 Rural producer organizations in Uganda
Historical development Organizations of agricultural producers were first formed in Uganda
in the beginning of the 20th century and were traditionally involved in the marketing of coffee
and cotton. For a long time local RPO were mostly state-managed, until market liberalization
reforms were undertaken by the Ugandan government in 1990’s. Rapid liberalization of markets
and the consequent increase of market competition led to the excessive failures of those exist-
ing organizations (Kasozi 2008, Mrema 2008). The strict hierarchical top-down structures of
the organizations (see Figure 1.3) of that time were not efficient in the free market (Kwapong
& Korugyendo 2010, Kasozi 2008). In that old market configuration farmers delivered their
produce to the PO and then it was aggregated at the level of producer unions and delivered to
marketing boards. Government-owned marketing boards served as exclusive market regulat-
ors, buyers, processors and exporters for agricultural commodities. As Kasozi (2008) states,
that administrative power of marketing boards stimulated them to behave as rent-extractors from
farmers and primary processors by dictating prices and controlling quality.
Figure 1.3: Configurations of collective marketing in Uganda
Source: Kwapong & Korugyendo (2010)
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With the liberalization, a class of intermediate commodity traders appeared in the market,
providing alternative selling opportunities for the farmers, which resulted in reduced turnover
of unions and their unprofitability. The relaxation of market restrictions led to the emergence of
a large number of processors and exporters (Kasozi 2008). In response to new market circum-
stances a new decentralized and self-regulated framework of agricultural cooperative marketing
emerged (see Figure 1.3). In this new market configuration farmers have more sales channels
at their disposal and, therefore, more bargaining power. Strong competition for farmers’ pro-
duce among exporters and middlemen resulted in better trade conditions for farmers and their
organizations (Kasozi 2008, Baffes 2006).
Despite the reduction of the state development support in the cooperative sector, the new
market configuration led to a quick expansion of RPO marketing schemes in Uganda in the
2000’s. As the IFPRI (2010) survey discovered (see Figure 1.4), the vast majority of functioning
RPO were established after 2000. This survey outcome supports earlier findings of Wanyama
(2008), who estimated that with the economic liberalization, the cooperative sector in African
countries (Egypt, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda) had grown. Figure 1.5 reports that most of the RPO
were self-organized, which underlines RPO potential for self-propelling development.
Figure 1.4: Time of RPO establishment
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
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Figure 1.5: Initiative to establish a RPO
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
Functions and services As assessed during the project, RPO in Uganda are mainly occupied
with the marketing of produce and the generation of additional value by means of product trans-
formation, grading and/or packing. Commonly, they are formed according to the one or several
agricultural commodities that they market (coffee, maize, sunflower, etc.). In most cases, pro-
ducers are organized on two levels:
1. Primary farmer society (PO) unifying farmers from the same village or parish
2. Sub-county or county level associations, usually called depot committees (DC) or area
cooperative enterprises (ACE)
Typically, the PO is responsible for bulking the produce of individual farmers and coordin-
ating transport for delivering produce to the DC/ACE. Collection of PO-gathered quantities,
product transformation, value addition, coordination of market sales and input procurement is
organized at the DC/ACE level. Farmers may deliver their produce to the DC/ACE individually,
bypassing the first level of the organization. DC/ACE is a small-scale producer union consisting
of several POs from the same sub-county or county. It is usually not tied to a certain buyer and
is able to bargain for better deals. Furthermore, the DC/ACE may be a member of a country-
or region-wide union or federation, like the National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm
Enterprises (NUCAFE), the Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE) and others. These
umbrella unions have advocacy and representative functions, they serve the lobbying interests of
agricultural producers, facilitating access to buyers, financial services and certification schemes.
Also, if a competitive marketing chain has already been developed, the umbrella organizations
can buy agricultural commodities from the DC/ACE, but are not obliged to do so, contrary to
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unions from the past that collapsed because of this.
As shown in Figure 1.3, DC/ACE faces competition from middlemen traders. DC/ACE com-
petitive advantage is efficiency (in comparison with individual sales to traders), which is gained
by reducing transportation and marketing costs. Members of the DC/ACE save on the commis-
sion of village traders, since the DC/ACE performs bulking and transportation services by itself.
But on the other hand, additional costs may arise. They are associated with time delays during
bulking, when farmers have to wait for a coordinated sale to be made. Therefore, in order to
attain a higher turnover rate and stimulate farmers to sell their produce through the DC/ACE,
it offers a range of additional services (listed in Table 1.2). The most common services are as-
sociated with agricultural extension (95.2% of sample DC/ACEs), marketing (90.5%), and the
provision of market information (81%). With regard to service provision, Kwapong & Kor-
ugyendo (2010) underlined an important role of savings and credit cooperative organizations
(SACCOs) in the restructured model of cooperative marketing. SACCO provides financial ser-
vices for its registered members. DC/ACE may use SACCO accounts to transfer payments for
the produce delivered by the farmers. Also, producers may acquire short-term loans in SACCOs
by using their delivery records at DC/ACE as a guarantee of repayment. Together with POs and
DC/ACEs, SACCOs form a triangular system of cooperative marketing. These organizations
supply farmers with material inputs, financial resources and market linkages. However, as noted
during field work in Uganda, in the majority of rural areas SACCOs are still not present.
Table 1.2: DC/ACE services
Frequency Percentage
Agricultural extension 20 95.2
Marketing 19 90.5
Provision of market information 17 81.0
Paying cash on delivery 11 52.4
Transporting 11 52.4
Input procurement 10 47.6
Processing 8 38.1
Savings accounts 7 33.3
Credit provision 5 23.8
Certification 5 23.8
Warehouse receipt system 4 19.0
Grading 3 14.3
Emergency funds 2 9.5
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
Membership Table 1.3 provides some statistics on cooperative membership. One DC/ACE
unites 23 POs on average and 17 on median. The number of members in a DC/ACE varies
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significantly from around 150 persons in the smallest DC/ACEs, up to around 3000 in larger
ones. The number of members in a PO is not so differential and is around 10–40 members.
The presence of women and youth in cooperatives also varies; on average sample DC/ACEs are
36.4% female and 25.3% young (24 years of age and younger) members, 31.4% and 29.8% on
median, respectively.
Table 1.3: DC/ACE membership
Members total Percent of women Percent of youth PO total PO size, members
Mean 1006.6 36.4 25.3 23.3 33.8
Median 550.0 31.4 29.8 17.0 24.0
10th percentile 154.5 18.4 8.3 9.0 12.0
25th percentile 251.5 25.7 10.0 12.0 16.0
75th percentile 857.5 44.4 36.6 27.0 30.0
90th percentile 2975.0 70.0 40.0 35.0 37.0
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
Constraints There are several constraints that are hindering the development of the DC/ACE-
based system of cooperative marketing. During the IFPRI (2010) survey, administrations of
DC/ACEs were asked to list the three most important constraints that the DC/ACE was facing.
Table 1.4) provides the results of the self-assessment. The most frequently mentioned constraint
was ongoing liquidity (reported by 57.1%of DC/ACEs) and transportation (52.4 %). Low li-
quidity forces DC/ACE to delay payments to farmers for the delivered quantities; such delays
may prevent farmers from selling their produce through the DC/ACE. Low transportation ca-
pacities lead to additional transaction costs, which are associated with vehicle hire. There are
also matters, which, despite being rarely mentioned, receive the highest importance rankings.
This means that their occurrence might lead to a notable decrease in market efficiency for the
DC/ACE. Such constraints include mistrust among members, poor management skills, and lim-
ited access to market information.
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Table 1.4: Constraints faced by DC/ACEs
Frequency Percent Mean Rank *
Liquidity 12 57.1 1.9
Transportation 11 52.4 1.7
Lack of storage capacity and packaging materials 8 38.1 1.6
Capital 5 23.8 1.8
Lack of processing facilities 3 14.3 2.3
Low quality of produce 3 14.3 2.0
Price uncertainty 2 9.5 2.5
Inability to offer competitive price 2 9.5 2.0
Lack of market information 2 9.5 1.5
Lack of production-related information 1 4.8 3.0
Crop diseases 1 4.8 3.0
Competition from middlemen 1 4.8 3.0
Bad image of RPO from the past 1 4.8 3.0
Low qualification of personnel 1 4.8 2.0
Limited trust among members 1 4.8 1.0
Poor management skills 1 4.8 1.0
Problems with electricity supply 1 4.8 1.0
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
* Rank 1 indicates most important constraint; 2 – second most important;
3 – third most important
1.3.3 Coffee sector in Uganda
Economic and social role For decades, coffee has remained the most important cash crop and
the main export product in Uganda. The latest statistics of BOU (2013) estimated that coffee
comprises 15.1% of the total value of Ugandan formal exports. According to FAO (2013) data
from 2011, Uganda is the second largest coffee producer in Africa (after Ethiopia) and the 11th
largest in the world. There are approximately 500,000 coffee producing households in Uganda
(UCTF 2013). In total, the coffee sector provides jobs for around three and a half million people
(UCDA 2013). In the regions of Uganda that are suitable for coffee growing, coffee sales are
a major source of income for 74% of households (UCTF 2010). Around 23% of farm revenue
of coffee-growing households comes from coffee sales (Hill 2006). These numbers indicate the
vital role of Uganda’s coffee sector for the well-being of its citizens.
According to ICO (2013), in 2011, 95.3% of the country’s coffee production was exported.
Of this export volume, 78.4% is robusta coffee (coffea canephora) (ICO 2013), which is an
indigenous variety of Central Uganda that can still be found growing in the wild. The remaining
21.6% of export volume is arabica (coffea arabica). Large areas of Uganda are home to robusta
trees, especially the periphery of Lake Victoria and the western and eastern areas of the country.
Arabica is common at higher elevations (1500–2300 m): Mount Elgon region at the Kenyan
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border, Mount Rwenzori region and the West Nile region (Masiga & Ruhweza 2007, Musoli
et al. 2001). Estimates of average coffee production are given in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Average annual coffee production in Uganda
Robusta Arabica
Region Acreage, ha Production, tons Acreage, ha Production, tons
Central 190,000 113,000 0 0
Eastern 21,000 12,600 21,000 12,600
Northern 0 0 1,700 1,030
Western 32,600 19,610 5,700 3,420
Source: Own calculations, based on Musoli et al. (2001)
History of the sector Coffee-growing in Uganda has a long tradition. In ancient Buganda,
beans of robusta coffee were used for ritual and ceremonial purposes (Musoli et al. 2001). Com-
mercial coffee cultivation (of the arabica variety) was introduced in Uganda at the beginning
of 20th century by British colonial authorities. In parallel with arabica, smallholder farmers
started to focus on market-oriented robusta growing, since this variety requires fewer inputs and
can be grown in lower altitude areas, which typically have better market access (Baffes 2006).
Until the time of the civil wars, coffee production in Uganda expanded constantly and reached
220,000 tons of export quality coffee in 1972, and then reduced substantially because of conflicts
and poor government policies (Musoli et al. 2001). In the 1980s, the coffee industry recovered
and returned to previously achieved levels. The sector improved steadily in the early 1990s,
when it underwent a series of successful liberalization reforms: the abolishment of export taxes
and minimum prices, the reduction of non-tariff barriers and ensuring competitiveness in sales
to the government. As a result, the producer share of export revenues rose from 20% to 75%
(Kasozi 2008, Baffes 2006), which led to a significant improvement in growers’ livelihoods and
decreased poverty rates (Deininger & Okidi (2003) and Bussolo et al. (2006) revealed increases
in income elasticities and poverty reduction in relation to coffee price).
The liberalized market, however, tends to be vulnerable to global price shocks, because of
the export orientation of coffee production, as around 95–97% of Ugandan coffee is sold for
export (ICO 2013). Figure 1.7 displays the changes in producer prices in Uganda (as recorded
by ICO (2013)). The reforms of 1991 led to high variation in local coffee prices: the relative
standard deviation of producer prices of 1992–2010 was 49.6% for robusta and 38.9% for ar-
abica. Because of such price fluctuations, farmers, traders and exporters are exposed to a price
risk. Coffee is mostly grown by smallholders: 70.3% of coffee-growing households have fewer
than five acres of land (Hill 2010b). Small subsistence-oriented farmers in developing countries
(like most of Uganda’s coffee growers) typically have low risk coping capacities. As a result,
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Figure 1.6: Exports of all forms of coffee from Uganda
Source: Author from ICO (2013) data
Figure 1.7: Producer prices of coffee in Uganda
Source: Author from ICO (2013) data
90% of the coffee farmers during 2000–2003 were unable to satisfy their basic needs during the
period of the low coffee prices (Hill 2006). Figures 1.7 and 1.6 suggest that coffee exports (i.e.
production) respond to the price changes, which are driven by the price movements on the world
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market. The production response is likely to have a lag of one to two years with respect to the
price changes.
Value chain and common production practices Drinking coffee-based brewed beverages is
the most popular form of coffee consumption. Prior to this consumption a coffee bean goes
through several stages of product transformation and value addition. Some of the steps, like
brewing or roasting, are often performed by the end consumers themselves. Figure F.1 shows
the value chain of robusta coffee and provides definitions for products that appear on different
stages of the chain (by-products such as coffee husks are not considered in the figure).
Local coffee is usually grown without the application of fertilizers. Mineral fertilizers are
rarely applied (relevant for 2% of the plots Pender et al. (2009)); typically manure, compost, crop
residues and household refuse are used instead. Van Asten et al. (2011) reported that manure is
applied on 60% of intercropped robusta/banana plots and 62% of mono-cropped robusta plots.
Other soil management practices include investment in drainage trenches (27% of plots) and tree
sheds on the plot boarders (14%), rarely in grass strips, terraces or irrigation canals (Pender et al.
2009). Smallholders traditionally intercrop coffee with food crops, mainly banana (in this case
coffee is grown in the shade of banana leaves) (Oduol & Aluma 1990): approximately 80% of
coffee plots in the country contain banana plants (Pender et al. 2009). The results of the partial
budget comparison done by Van Asten et al. (2011) explains this pattern: the authors estimated
investment in plots with intercropped robusta and banana to have a 100% higher rate of return
(on current price and wage levels) than plots with robusta as a monocrop. Besides, the presence
of shade trees on a coffee plantation might be beneficial, because it is natural for the coffee plant
to grow in shade, but there is a lack of experimental findings in the Ugandan context to make a
distinct conclusion on this issue. The general recommendation of the national Coffee Research
Center (COREC) is to intercrop coffee with banana at a 1:3 ratio for robusta coffee (Musoli
et al. 2001). Therefore, most coffee producers also have surplus bananas for sale and/or home
consumption. However, monoculture coffee plots also exist, probably because farmers were
discouraged from coffee intercropping in the past, before liberalization, when the government
was more interested in coffee output for export than in crops for household subsistence and local
markets (Van Asten et al. 2011).
Uganda exports only graded green robusta (green coffee export quality) (FAO 2013), further
product transformations are done only for the locally consumed coffee. Coffee beans in Uganda
are harvested twice per year (November–January and June–July). Picking has to be done manu-
ally, which creates seasonal labor demands in the growing areas. Robusta coffee is dry-processed
and the drying is usually organized by the grower, unless he wants to sell the harvest quickly.
Smallholders perform sun-drying, which takes around four weeks. Hence, selling wet coffee
results in earlier cash inflows, but excludes farmers from the opportunity of value addition by
drying. According to the calculations presented in Table 1.6, robusta growers generally avoid
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selling wet coffee – it constitutes only 0,5% of total sales volume. All of the wet coffee is sold
to traders, since DC/ACE regulations do not typically accept it. Mostly coffee is sold in the
form of dried cherries (known locally as ”kiboko”). Such sales make up 93.2% of total sales
volume. The rest, 6.3% of sales, are dehusked beans called ”fair average quality” coffee (FAQ),
prevailingly through DC/ACEs (92.2% of all FAQ). Selling as FAQ can be only achieved, when
a farmer is able to access a coffee mill for dehusking either individually or through DC/ACE.
Six out of 11 robusta-dealing DC/ACEs contacted by the IFPRI (2010) survey provide such pro-
cessing opportunities. Just 52.1% of total robusta produce is sold through DC/ACE channel:
this fact signifies tough competition for supply from local traders.
Table 1.6: Sales channels of robusta coffee (as % of total sales)
Sales channel
Product To traders Through DC/ACEs Total
Wet 0.5 0.0 0.5
Kiboko 46.9 46.3 93.2
FAQ 0.5 5.8 6.3
Total 47.9 52.1 100.0
Source: Own calculations, based on IFPRI (2010)
Production constraints Coffee wilt disease (CWD) creates an important production con-
straint for coffee-growers in Central and Eastern Africa (Uganda in particular). Hill (2010a)
found out that 81% of coffee farmers had cases of coffee wilt on their plantations. Also, Hill
(2010a) estimated that the average coffee-growing household lost 45 coffee trees due to CWD
in the period of 1999–2002. The disease is caused by a soil inhabiting fungus that blocks water
and nutrient transport within a plant. CWD is spread by air, water and human activity. There-
fore, prevention of the disease has to be undertaken on scales that are larger than the individual.
Unlike other coffee diseases, CWD leads to a total yield loss. It may kill an infected tree within
just six months (Rutherford 2006) – making an enormous negative impact on potential revenue.
Baffes (2006) estimated CWD-related losses of Ugandan export revenue at around 40–50 mil-
lion usd per annum. The spread and impact of other coffee diseases and pests in Uganda (e.g.
coffee leaf rust) is either not significant or can be easily managed by individual farmer efforts
(Musoli et al. 2001).
Another production-related weakness of the Ugandan coffee sector is the old age of coffee
plantations (Musoli et al. 2001). This results in lower plot revenues, because of the declined yield
potential of old trees and the backlog (in terms of yield and quality) of volunteer seedlings used in
the past from modern clonal planting material. The planting material (seed, seedling or cutting)
of sufficient quality cannot be produced on the farm (Musoli et al. 2001). Hence, propagation
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of new trees has to be paid using the farmer’s budget. Furthermore, there is a three year period
between the planting of coffee trees and the point when they start to yield. Therefore, due to
limited liquidity, farmers are not always able to replace their trees with the optimal frequency.
Also, the hired labor has to be paid six months prior to harvesting, so relatively large capital
investments and liquid means are required for launching coffee production.
Women are heavily involved in coffee production as well as in production of other agricul-
tural commodities in Uganda, but it is traditionally men who are in control of coffee-generated
income (Bantebya-Kyomuhendo & McIntosh 2006). Female labor is often used in weeding,
water fetching and product transformation. Female-managed households are facing additional
social and institutional hurdles when looking to acquire production factors, such as credit, inputs
or land for sharecropping, which makes their entry into the sector of production of cash crops,
such as coffee, more complicated. Golan & Lay (2008), in their examination of Uganda’s coffee
sector, estimated that when the household head is female, the probability of the household en-
gaging in coffee production is reduced by 16%. Given the fact that around 30% of the farming
households in Uganda are female-managed (Golan & Lay 2008), the gender issue (low female
social power) may constitute a significant constraint for household efficiency.
Institutional framework Research of Kasozi (2008) showed that the institutional framework
historically plays a central role in forming and reshaping the coffee sector in Uganda. Table F.4
from the Appendix describes the main influential institutions that exist in Uganda nowadays.
The key entity in the sector is UCDA (for a description of abbreviations see Table F.4). It was
founded during liberalization reforms in the early 1990’s. Currently, it is financed by the 1% tax
put on all coffee exports. UCDA is responsible for the regulatory and monitoring aspects of the
sector. It often engages in broad collaborations with other institutions listed in Table F.4 (Baffes
2006). Different players of the coffee industry are united under the umbrellas of nationwide or-
ganizations: producers are under NUCAFE, traders and exporters are under UCTF, roasters are
under UCRA, and RPO in general (not only coffee-related ones) are under UCA. State budget is
streamed to the coffee industry through two ministries: MAAIF and MFPED. MAAIF finances
national advisory (NAADS) and research (NARO) public bodies, and MFPED implements de-
velopment projects in rural areas. With regards to the research institutions, UCTF (2010) stated
that local coffee research efforts are weak due to low funding. Indeed, in comparison with other
large African coffee producers, the number of coffee-focused research staff and the budgets with
which they operate are very small (see Table F.5). In recent years, a national coffee research
institute (CORI) was downgraded to a research center (COREC), despite there being a need for
local research, in particular dedicated to the selection of productive and resistant coffee varieties
(UCTF 2010).
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1.3.4 Description of a study frame
The agent-based simulation model constructed within this Ph.D. research comprises the depot
committee (DC) called “Kibinge coffee farmers association“ and all related primary producer or-
ganizations (POs) (n=46), DC member farming households (n=1716) and their household mem-
bers (n=11911). Kibinge DC is a farmer-owned organization that specializes in the processing
and marketing of robusta coffee. The Kibinge association was chosen for modeling for three
reasons:
• In comparison with other DC/ACEs from the initial project survey (IFPRI 2010), it has a
relatively large sample of interviewed farming households (71 households). Thus, more
precision can be obtained in the estimation of empirical distributions for further generation
of model agents.
• The specifics of the applied equations for soil properties prediction (discussed in detail in
Section 3.3), make it more applicable to the lake-shore robusta coffee/banana production
system.
• Incomes and livelihoods of a great number of Ugandan farmers depend on the successful
marketing of robusta coffee (see Section 1.3.3). Therefore, there is a big potential in terms
of country-wide extrapolation of research findings.
The project survey (IFPRI 2010) included only households, which were members of POs
at the time of the survey, and did not include other farm households from the areas of survey
coverage. Therefore, these other farm households were neither modeled nor visited during the
author’s fieldwork in Uganda.
Kibinge DC and its members are situated in the Central Region of Uganda, Masaka District,
Bukomansibi county, Kibinge sub-county, in a traditional coffee-growing area. It lies in the
central part of the Lake Victoria Crescent at the elevation of around 1250 masl, about 150 km
southwest of Kampala, about 25 km from Masaka, and 5 km away from the Masaka–Mbarara
highway (see Figure 1.8) in a peri-urban area.
Table 1.7 provides the characteristics of the development domain (spatial strata according to
advantages and disadvantages for certain agricultural activities) in which Kibinge sub-county is
located (according to the hierarchical classification of Ruecker et al. (2003)).
Kibinge DC is a sub-county level farmer-owned organization. It was founded in 1995 and
registered as a cooperative in 2008. DC is a member of the National Union of Coffee Agribusi-
nesses and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE). It offers a wide range of services, such as training in
agricultural practices, provision of planting material and transport management (a more detailed
description of services can be found in Section 2.2). The group claims to be one of the first in
Uganda to engage in coffee certification (Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009).
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Figure 1.8: Location of Kibinge DC
Source: http://maps.google.com/
Table 1.7: Characteristics of Kibinge development domain
Districts * Environmental and
socio-economic
conditions
Comparative advantages Comparative disadvantages
– Iganga
– Kampala
– Masaka
– Mpigi
– Mukono
– Rakai
– lowland
– binomodal seasonality
– high agricultural
potential
– high population density
– high market access
– 10–12 month growing
period
– intensive banana coffee
lake shore farming system
– Favorable agro-climatic
conditions for cultivation of
annual and perennial crops
– High market access for cash
crops and inputs
– Intensive farming due to
access to credit, technology and
extension services
– Favorable agro-climatic and
market conditions for dairy and
other livestock production
– High soil degradation due
to intensive farming
– Strong erodibility due to
heavy rainfalls
– Pest and disease pressure
– High land fragmentation
Source: Ruecker et al. (2003)
* district division of 1998
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Chapter 2
Participatory assessment and expert
opinions
Given the benefits of stakeholder involvement in the research that were discussed earlier in Sec-
tion 1.2.4, this study employed a number of participatory methods: (i) participatory mapping of
networks and processes, (ii) group discussions with farmers and (iii) public goods games. These
methods, together with discussions with key expert informants, formed a toolbox for qualitative
assessment that was conducted in the research. The qualitative assessment was carried out during
the author’s fieldwork in Uganda and was focused on the achievement of the several objectives:
• Systematization of knowledge on the topic of coffee production and marketing in Uganda
• Acquaintance with specifics of the study area and local RPO
• Assessment of investment, production, transportation, marketing decisions and alternat-
ives of robusta coffee farmers and their organizations
• Mapping of the social and economic networks and processes happening within villages
POs and respective DC/ACEs, assessment of relationship networks and influences, iden-
tification of hot spots, problems and potentials for improvements
• Elaboration of concepts, assumptions and parameter estimates for the multi-agent model
(described in Chapter 3)
• Elaboration of applied scenarios for simulation modeling
• Capture of important issues that model simulations are not able to replicate
In general, it could be concluded that the application of participatory techniques provided
numerous insights and explanations (summarized in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5) that improved
the author’s understanding of the study topics and made a good introduction into study area
problematics.
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2.1 Fieldwork in Uganda
The fieldwork took place from March to April 2011 and consisted of two major parts:
1. Meetings with key informants: 30- to 90-minute discussions with experts from various
relevant fields (farming, agronomy, economics, marketing, rural sociology) and organiz-
ations (cooperative alliances, research centers, exporters, survey coordinators). Meetings
took place in Kampala, Masaka and the surroundings of these cities.
2. Field visits with the administration of Kibinge DC and ten selected POs from this DC: all
together 11 interactive sessions of participatory research. The length of one session was
approximately 2–2.5 hours (with communication through a translator). A major part of
the session was dedicated to a Net-map exercise (explained below) with a follow-up group
discussion on coffee production and marketing systems. In addition, a public goods game
was conducted during the sessions with selected POs.
Research activities for the fieldwork were designed by the author prior to the fieldwork and
were pretested with students of UHOH. This section describes the set-up of the applied fieldwork
methods and explains the selection of participants.
2.1.1 Methods description
Interviews with key expert informants Experts from various organizations related to robusta
coffee RPO were approached for semi-structured discussion interviews. The selection of experts
was arbitrary, based on the research contacts of the author and availability of the informants.
Table A.1 lists the approached informants. For each interview an individual discussion outline
was prepared. In order to utilize the different expert knowledge of respondents and broaden
the obtained insights, covered topics and asked questions were respondent specific. Table A.2
contains information about discussion topics of each interview.
Net-map The sessions with RPO-members started with participatory mapping of the coffee
marketing system. From Section 1.3.2 it can be concluded that POs and DC/ACEs are parts of
multi-level marketing networks consisting of various actors. Moreover, POs and DC/ACEs can
be viewed as social networks by themselves. For this research it was important to understand the
structure of processes, relations, influences and power balances in these complex socio-economic
networks. For this purpose, the author adapted Net-Map Toolbox (Net-map) (for description see
Schiffer (2007)). Net-map is a visualized participatory method of systems and networks map-
ping. This interview-based tool was developed by Schiffer (2007) and was successfully utilized
by its creator in Ghana and Ethiopia for research of different stakeholder groups (water user as-
sociations, education commission, fishermen community, etc) (Schiffer 2013, Schiffer & Hauck
2010). The output of the interactive Net-map session is the map of the socio-economic network,
49
where actors, their links and roles are reflected. The provided visualization serves to improve
system understanding for the author and the interviewed persons. The map facilitates a follow-
up discussion about the state of the social system and future possibilities of its development,
especially when the exercise is conducted with the group of people (Schiffer 2007).
With slight extensions the tool can be used for mapping processes (Raabe et al. 2010). Instead
of focusing on the static network, one can look for system dynamics and ask interviewees to
depict a particular process by identifying interactions between actors of the mapped network in
time. In such a way the Net-map method was applied in this research. The application of the tool
had several benefits in comparison with the possible alternative use of “classical” focus group
discussions:
• Provision of systems view and process-understanding
• Visualization of the differences between groups
• Identification of process leaks, weak linkages, overlaps in responsibilities and potentials
for improvement
• Assessment of the production and marketing network in an agent-based way consistent
with a chosen modeling approach
• Facilitation of the follow-up discussion
In practice, the Net-map session was implemented in the following steps:
1. Introduction: PO members invited to the session were briefly introduced to the aims of
the research. The goal of the Net-map was formulated to them as ”mapping the system of
coffee production and marketing in Kibinge”. The author wrote the goal on a blank sheet
of paper that was used for setting up the map.
2. Description: PO members were asked to describe the step-by-step process of coffee pro-
duction and marketing. Each time a new actor (e.g. farmer, trader, PO leader, etc.) was
mentioned, the participants were asked to write the actor’s name and draw a symbol rep-
resenting the actor on a card. (Drawing ensured the inclusion of illiterate respondents.)
Each card was pinned to the map sheet and each step of the process was depicted by a
link between actor cards. Each link was chronologically numbered and its description
was written in the legend on the side of the map. All process steps (i.e. map links) were
defined either as necessary or optional.
3. Re-assessment: After the map was completed, respondents were asked to check whether
certain actors or links were missing. The missing ones were then added to the map. The
participants were also asked about important actors in the coffee production and marketing
process with whom the group did not have access (e.g. distributor of mineral fertilizers or
extension service).
4. Assigning importance: After the description of the process was finished, the participants
assigned importance (on a scale of 1 to 5) using dot stickers to the process actors with
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regards to their influence on the success of coffee production and marketing. The parti-
cipants were asked to explain reasons for the attributed level of importance to every actor.
5. Identification of hot-spots: The participants were asked to mark the possible complications
and risks in coffee production and marketing on the respective process links and to explain
them.
Follow-up group discussion After finishing the Net-map activity, participants were asked to
clarify certain aspects of the map and some production and marketing issues in general (e.g.
intercropping, rate of fertilizer application, etc.). The answers were written down on the side of
the map.
The paper output of the follow-up discussion and the Net-map was later converted to a com-
mented diagram in MS Powerpoint. The Powerpoint version of the map was animated in a way
that displayed the process dynamics. The computer files were revised to identify and correct
errors.
Public goods game The interactive sessions in POs continued with public goods games that
were conducted with five participating individuals. (In the meeting with DC administration this
part was omitted.) The public goods games were used to test whether trust and cooperation
among members influence their eagerness to sell their coffee produce through the PO. The res-
ults of the game could be used as a proxy for the degree of trust between members and their
willingness to cooperate and contribute to the achievement of the common goals. The game
used rewards for participation in the fieldwork (10,000 ugx per person). Monetary payoffs in
public goods stimulated thoughtful behavior of the players. The game was set up as follows:
• At the beginning of the session five participants received envelopes containing 10,000 ugx
in 1,000 ugx notes.
• Each participant was given an option to contribute any part of the reward to the common
pool under the condition that the sum of the individual contributions would be multiplied
by 1.5 and distributed among every member at the end of the session.
• So individual payoffs (P ) could be derived from individual contributions (C) as:
Pn = 10, 000− Cn +
5∑
i=1
Ci × 1.5/5 (2.1)
• Members were informed that their contributions would remain confidential (handled in
sealed envelopes).
2.1.2 Selection of participants for group meetings
From 36 POs of Kibinge DC covered by the initial IFPRI (2010) survey, 10 were selected for the
group sessions. From the selected POs five members were invited to participate in the session.
51
In order to make a selection that could provide a good statistical representation of different POs
and also meet the requirements of data availability, a combination of cluster and purposeful
sampling was used. Selection was done as follows in a statistical software package (Stata):
1. Creation of a dataset with variables containing criteria for PO selection (listed in Table
A.3) from the IFPRI (2010) project survey
2. Factor analysis with factor selection bound of Eigenvalue ≥ 1
3. Hierarchical clustering with average linkage and Euclidean distance based on the factors
from Step 1
4. Assignment of POs to clusters based on factors by k-means clustering method with Euc-
lidean distance
5. Calculation of Euclidean distance from each PO to the respective cluster center
6. Definition of a number of POs to be invited for group visits from each cluster according
to the weight of the cluster in the survey sample
7. Selection of a required number of POs according to their proximity to the cluster center
(in order to choose typical POs for the clusters)
8. POs with no information on group sales of coffee in the IFPRI (2010) survey were dis-
carded from the selection and replaced with the next closest to the cluster center (the final
PO selection is provided in Table A.4)
9. PO chairperson and four random members from the PO roster (from those with available
information on coffee sales) were invited to the participatory session
2.2 Delineation of the RPO network
2.2.1 Structure
Kibinge DC is a formal organization with open voluntary membership. It is the organization of
robusta coffee growers and deals only with this commodity. In order to be a member of the DC,
a farmer must possess at least two shares of the DC (worth 5,000 ugx each) and pay the annual
membership fee of 2,000 ugx. These fees are used for administration salaries, maintenance of
the DC office and storage facilities, organization of member meetings and payment of electricity
and telephone bills. DC profits are usually spent on dividends or small investments in the DC
capital (stationery, office equipment). Important decisions (e.g. board elections) are taken at the
annual meeting or at special meetings. Members vote on these decisions; each member has one
vote, irrespective of the number of shares they hold. DC’s organizational structure comprises a
chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a secretary, a treasurer and an executive committee, all elected
by the farmers’ assembly. The executive committee includes an executive manager, a field officer
and an accountant, whose salaries are paid with the DC budget.
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Figure 2.1 contains the output map of the Net-map session conducted with the DC admin-
istration. It displays the process of coffee production and marketing in Kibinge sub-county and
characterizes the involvement of RPO. The legend of the map is organized in a sequential way,
reading it in the numbered order will give an idea of the process flow from procurement of pro-
duction inputs to final sales. The map also indicates the importance of particular actors attributed
to them by the participants, and identifies hot spots in the business system of DC.
From Figure 2.1 it can be seen, that the DC and POs provide important linkages for farm-
ers. Through the DC, farmers are connected with big buyers, equipped with milling and trans-
portation facilities, and get access to current market information. Also, PO members have an
opportunity to get short-term credits from the DC operational capital. PO-leaders participate in
capacity building events organized by the DC and disseminate the new knowledge to the mem-
bers of their POs during group meetings.
Net-map sessions in the ten selected primary POs produced maps similar to the one depicted
on Figure 2.1. Some of the POs did not have linkages to certain services (e.g. nurseries or input
providers), while some were linked to additional nodes (e.g. development support or parish ad-
ministration). Table A.5 from the Appendix characterizes the POs that were visited, according
to the information received during the Net-map sessions and follow-up discussions. This table
informs of such PO characteristics as PO access to manufactured production inputs (i.e. fertil-
izers and pesticides) and financial institutions, on approval and reference scheme on credits from
DC (i.e. authority to assure repayment of credits taken by members), on labor scarcity and work
allocation by gender (i.e. if women and men perform different farm duties), etc. Also, Table
A.5 states whether a certain PO uses DC services, such as provision of planting material and
payment on delivery (see Section 2.2.3 for a detailed description of services).
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Figure 2.1: Kibinge DC. Process map
Source: Author, based on Net-map results
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2.2.2 Linkages and actor importance
Table 2.1: Actors in coffee production and marketing
Actor Mentions (n=10) Mean importance
DC 10 4.8
Farmers (PO members) 10 4
Local middlemen traders 10 2.6
DC-affiliated mill 10 4.8
Temporary labor 10 2.6
Transport for coffee 10 3.1
PO (leader) 9 3.8
DC-affiliated nurseries 8 3.6
PO (board) 8 3.9
Other local nurseries 7 2.7
Providers of agrochemicals 6 3
Providers of manure 5 3.8
Other farmers (non-members) 5 2
Financial institutions 4 3
Promoter (parish administration) 3 3.3
Development support 2 3
Field officer 2 3
Source: Author, based on Net-map results
Table 2.1 lists actors, who, as reported by PO members, are involved in the production and
marketing of coffee. This table shows how many times actors were mentioned during the Net-
map sessions and their mean importance rankings (on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most import-
ant). As seen in the table, DC and milling facility have the highest importance of 4.8. Such high
importance was given due to a large value addition that is achieved in processing and collect-
ive marketing of the coffee. In other words, these actors are very influential in terms of farmer
profits. In terms of importance they are followed by PO members, because PO members define
the coffee product quantities that DC sells and have collective control over the DC management.
Table 2.1, shows that, as discussed before, farmers in some POs may not have access to such
important determinants of agricultural production as agrochemicals (linked in six maps) and
financial services (linked in four maps).
2.2.3 Services provided by the RPO network
From the Net-map and follow-up discussion with the DC administration and PO members the
author outlined the following portfolio of services that the DC currently provides to its members:
• Provision of planting material: DC provides farmers with coffee seedlings and cuttings
produced in some local nurseries. The planting material provided by the DC passes the
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quality control done by the DC officer. Therefore, farmers reported that the quality of the
material provided by the DC is significantly higher than that of other nurseries, however
its price is also higher.
• Seasonal credits: Zero-interest credits for productive purposes may be provided to member
farmers at the beginning of the growing season from DC operational capital. Field officers
decide on an case by case basis which farmers will be offered these credits, based on the
farmer’s past sales through the DC and their expected coffee harvest.
• Market information: Farmers may request actual coffee prices from the DC by telephone
call.
• Transportation of farmers’ produce: Several times per season DC organizes a pickup of
dried coffee from the PO members with a hired truck. The pickup schedule depends on
the quantities that are ready for transportation at the POs.
• Milling: DC organizes milling of kiboko coffee to FAQ on the local mill owned by one
of the DC members. The cost of milling is subtracted from the sales price that farmers
receive.
• Group certification: Through NUCAFE, Kibinge DC was linked to the “UTZ CERTI-
FIED” quality certification scheme. Several PO members underwent the initial training
and currently are able to sell their coffee under the “UTZ CERTIFIED” label and, thus,
increase the value of their produce. DC field officers have to ensure farmers’ compliance
with UTZ standards.
• Payment at the time of delivery: On specific informal arrangements with certain POs,
The DC may occasionally provide payment for the coffee on the day farmers deliver it
to the DC (normally the payment is postponed for up to 14 days). However, if having
enough operational capital, the DC would be ready to organize payment “on the spot” for
all members.
• Occasional bonuses and promotions: Depending on the operational profit, in order to mo-
tivate the farmers to sell their produce through it, the DC occasionally pays price premiums
for large quantities delivered or hands out various useful materials (e.g. drying tents).
Surprisingly, there is not much collective action and decision making taking place at the
village PO level, since members usually do not perform any activities collectively (only one out
of the ten POs that were visited reported undertaking communal activities by making collective
investments in transport and storage).
2.3 Problems in coffee production and marketing
During the Net-map sessions, PO members indicated and mapped several problems that occur
in producing and marketing of coffee. These are listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Problems in coffee production and marketing
Problem description Mentions (n=10)
Fertilizers 8
Fertilizers are not always affordable (price) 7
No access to fertilizers 1
Planting material 8
DC cuttings/seedlings are not always affordable (price) 3
Nurseries are not easily accessible (distance, price) 2
Cannot get sufficient cuttings/seedlings from the DC 1
No capacity to have own nurseries 1
DC does not provide cuttings/seedlings at right time (too late) 1
Sales through middlemen 6
Middlemen traders encourage bad practices and low quality 2
Unfair prices from traders (farmers have no bargaining power) 2
Traders cheat with weighing scales 1
Traders take advantage of farmers’ problems (urgent cash needs) 1
Transport 5
Transport is expensive, prefer DC to have own vehicle 3
Price for DC transport is not fair 1
Transport is not very reliable, when the PO organizes it for itself 1
Labor 2
Laborers are scarce and costly 1
Liquidity problems do not allow for the hiring sufficient labor 1
Credits 2
High interest on microfinance credits 1
No link to long-term credits 1
Other issues 8
Coffee wilt disease 3
Coffee thefts 1
DC management does not treat members equally 1
Hard to attract other farmers to join RPO 1
Milling is expensive, prefer DC to own a mill 1
Weak link to large buyers 1
Source: Author, based on Net-map results
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Inputs As seen in Table 2.2, for many POs (eight out of ten) complications arise during fer-
tilizer and seed procurement. As PO members explained, access to inputs is limited because of
price, distance or restricted capacities of the DC.
Liquidity and access to capital Six out of ten POs complained about sales to middlemen
(Table 2.2), because middlemen buy at considerably lower prices and encourage bad production
practices (e.g., by buying coffee that has not been dried properly). Nevertheless, PO members
said that in many cases they still choose to sell to middlemen. Farmers do so mainly because
of urgent cash needs (food requirements, school fees, funeral services, etc.); middlemen always
pay on the spot and even may take coffee from the farmstead, while the DC usually delays pay-
ments, and farmers have to wait for transportation and milling to be organized. Also, middle-
men provide informal credits (to be repaid with coffee produce) for farmers in the middle of
the season. Therefore, farmers often have to sell through middlemen because of their credit ob-
ligations. These informal credits cannot be fully substituted by DC credits, which only finance
input purchases (not consumption needs) and are generally small and difficult to obtain, nor by
microfinance credits, which are also small and difficult for POs to access.
Knowledge capacity In their interviews, key informants admitted their lack of knowledge on
fertilizer application. Due to improper fertilizer choice and/or use the yield potential is not
realized. Many farmers do not fully understand the benefits of mineral fertilizer application for
their coffee. Also, absence of knowledge on soil properties of farmer plots results in suboptimal
fertilizer practices by farmers. There are only two stations for soil analysis in the country (in
Kawanda and Makerere). Hence, Kibinge farmers do not have the option of getting information
about their soils nor receiving site-specific fertilizer recommendations.
Besides, three out of the ten POs visited said that their inability to cope with coffee wilt was
a major problem.
PO leadership As administration of Kibinge DC reported, PO leaders play a big role in at-
tracting farmers to the RPO marketing channel. They promote DC services at the village level
and provide understanding of their benefits for the farmers and as a result farmers sell more pro-
duce through the DC. This in turn directly influences DC profits, because the DC benefits from
increased quantities (fixed cost degression, higher bargaining power). But because DC bulked
quantities is a sum of production volumes of many POs (46 in Kibinge case), the monetary gains
of PO leaders that result from their efforts are negligible. Therefore, the leaders, due to the
opportunity cost of time, are not contributing much to the empowerment of the PO network.
Transparency and information exchange Follow-up discussions in POs revealed a lack of
understanding among members regarding the functionality of the DC, which leads to mistrust.
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The reason is the absence of clearly communicated rules and transparency regarding the pro-
vision of DC services and benefits. For example, the DC provision of planting material and
seasonal credit does not follow any systematic rules. The DC officers decide on their own about
every service request. Further, transportation and payment schedules are absent. Therefore,
firstly, PO members cannot plan their cash flows and production in advance and, secondly, it
creates rumors of the DC favoring certain farmers and discriminating against others. According
to the farmers, similar issues apply to the ongoing certification program that, as they stated, was
not well communicated to them. The benefits of certification and ways to get the produce certi-
fied were unclear to most of the interviewed POs. Apparently, the existing information system
of the DC via member meetings and PO leaders is not effective in communicating to farmers the
services that the RPO network provides.
Low physical capital of RPO and reluctance for long-term investments Since milling and
transportation facilities are often used in DC operations, it might be profitable for the DC to own
mills and vehicles. Such propositions were made by the DC administration and some village
PO (four out of ten prefer their DC to own its vehicles or mill). But, as the DC administration
described, members are reluctant to make long-term investments in the organization, and the
largest part of the DC profits are redistributed among members. Therefore, up to the time of this
research no significant collective investment projects took place in the DC.
In fact, as explained in Section 1.1.4, this is a recognized problem of RPO and other co-
operative firms in general (Chibanda et al. 2009, Nilsson 2001). It is caused by the limited
planning horizons of RPO members (limited to the proximate duration of membership) and the
administration (limited to the length of their elective terms).
2.4 Outcomes of public goods games
Public goods games contributions of participated individuals varied. As can be seen from Figure
2.2, PO members decided to contribute between 20% and 90% of the received amount of cash
into the common pool. Figure 2.2 also shows that 50% contribution was by far the most popular
choice among the participants. This “fifty-fifty” strategy was used by 38% of the sample. Table
2.3 characterizes contributions of the participating groups of PO members. From Table 2.3 it
can be seen that contribution characteristics varied across the POs. On average, each group
collected 25,300 ugx from the distributed 50,000 ugx in the common pool, which is a mean
member contribution of 5,100.
The results of public goods games were linked with the statistics on coffee sales collected by
the IFPRI (2010) survey. Since only two members of each PO were approached by the household
part of the IFPRI (2010) survey and not every member was willing and/or able to provide es-
timates about his or her sales to middlemen, the data on member coffee production was limited.
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Nevertheless, linking public goods game outcomes with production and delivery data from the
survey provided three data frames for analysis:
• Individual game contributions of the PO member and his or her individual sales through
the PO in absolute terms (48 observations)
• Group contributions and group sales through the PO in absolute terms (“group sale” refers
Figure 2.2: Public goods game. Individual contributions
Source: Author, based on public goods game results
Table 2.3: Public goods game. Contributions (in th. ugx)
PO name Sum Mean Min Max Stdev
Bunyenya farmers group 24 4.8 3 6 1.1
Kalubaya farmers group 30 6 5 8 1.4
Kamanda coffee farmers group 30 6 5 7 1.0
Katoma coffee farmers group 19 3.8 2 6 1.6
Kiryasaka farmers group b 26 5.2 3 8 1.8
Kisojo farmers group 17 3.4 2 9 3.1
Kyetume farmers group 27 5.4 4 7 1.1
Maleku farmers group 21 4.2 3 5 0.8
Mitugo farmers club 27 5.4 4 8 1.5
Serinya Twekembe UTZ kapeh group 32 6.4 3 8 2.1
Mean 25.3 5.1 3.4 7.2 0.334
Source: Author, based on public goods game results
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to the sum of sales by participants of the game, not all PO members) (10 observations)
• Individual game contributions of the PO member and individual sales through the RPO
as a share of total coffee sales of the respective PO member (12 observations)
In order to reveal the correlations between game contributions and coffee sales in the listed
data frames, three non-parametric tests were applied: Spearman’s rho, Kendall’s tau and distance
covariance (dcov) of Szekely (2007). Table 2.4 reports test error probabilities for rejecting the
null hypothesis of selected variables, x and y being statistically independent. Test results in
Table 2.4 show that rho and tau tests may reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level in
case of testing group sales (y) versus standard deviation of PO member contribution at the group
level (x). Hypothesis rejection at the 10% level could be done by both tests in the case of group
sales (y) versus range of PO member contribution at the group level (x). In addition, dcov test,
since (unlike the other two tests) it accounts not only for relationships that can be explained by
monotonic functions, determined two more pairs as potentially dependent. Figure A.1 scatters
variable pairs that were identified as statistically dependent. An econometric estimation of the
relationship within the respective variable pairs was attempted.
Table 2.4: Tests for statistical dependency. Error probabilities
Variable y Variable x N obs Rho test Tau test Dcov test
Individual delivery Individual game contribution 48 0.821 0.734 0.690
% of individual delivery
in total sales
Individual game contribution 12 0.392 0.477 0.005
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (mean) 10 0.443 0.589 0.305
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (max) 10 0.356 0.350 0.005
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (min) 10 0.247 0.302 0.600
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (stdev) 10 0.054 0.049 0.100
Group delivery (sum) Group game contribution (range) 10 0.077 0.098 0.005
Source: Author, based on public goods game results
After evaluating the model fit (R-squared) using different combination of variable pairs, it
was concluded that out of all independent variable tested (see Table 2.4), “standard deviation
of group contribution” is the best descriptor of the dependent variable “group coffee delivery”.
Probably, because it is less affected by the norm “fifty-fifty” response of the game displayed in
Figure 2.2.) Table 2.5 presents the estimated simple linear regression model. F-test statistics
of the model are significant at the 5% level and both constant and intercept terms are also sig-
nificant at the 5% level. As expected, the sign of the intercept term is negative. If we take the
standard deviation of member game contributions within a group as a proxy for the diversity
of members within the respective PO, then this negative sign shows us that in selected POs di-
versity is negatively related to the total coffee sales done through the PO (expressed by sales of
the group).
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Table 2.5: Simple linear model of group coffee deliveries
Dependent Variable = Sum of participant
deliveries to PO, kg
Coef. SE
Log10(Stdev of group contributions) - 1811.6** (770.2)
Constant 14883.3** (5616.6)
F-test (1,8) 5.53**
R-squared 0.4087
N obs 10
Source: Author, based on public goods game results
** implies significance at 5%-level
There was no correlation detected between individual game contributions (y) and the volume
of individual sales through PO in absolute terms (x) (see Table 2.4). This probably happened
because the independent variable in this case do not consider the total production of the member,
unlike the case in which contribution is expressed in relative terms as a share of production
sold through PO. Unfortunately, due to the lack of information in the survey, calculation of this
relative measure was possible only for a very small sample (12 observations), and, therefore, no
interval data dependency was discovered. Nevertheless, some causality estimation was possible
when a statistical classification analysis was conducted with a probit model. For estimation of
the probit model, the dependent variable was expressed in binary format: 1 – if member sold
more than 50% of his or her coffee production through PO, 0 – otherwise. From the estimated
probit model (Table 2.6) it can be seen that the size of member contribution in a public goods
game is positively related (on a 5% significance level) to the probability to sell the majority of
coffee produce through PO. The probit model indicates that individual decisions on the share of
coffee produce to sell through RPO to a certain extent can be explained by member contribution
in public goods games. However, because of the small number of observations, the model should
be applied with caution.
So far the results of public goods games analysis outlined two preliminary hypotheses: (i) of
negative relationship between diversity of members within an RPO and the amount of produce
sold through this RPO by members and (ii) of positive relationship between individual cooper-
ativeness and willingness to contribute to the common pool and the share of produce sold by
the individual through RPO. However, both hypotheses are yet to be tested with a sufficiently
large sample. It would be interesting to inspect the relationship between member contributions
in public goods games and RPO sales statistics, once the larger sample data is available.
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Table 2.6: Probit estimates on decision to sell most of the coffee through RPO
Dependent Variable = 1 if member sells more than 50%
of coffee produce through RPO, 0 – otherwise
coef se
Log10(Individual contribution) 6.002** (2.853)
Constant 2.988** (1.325)
LR-test 6.86***
Pseudo R-squared 0.4489
N obs 12
Source: Author, based on public goods game results
** implies a significance at 5%-level, *** – at 1%
2.5 Insights on farmers’ decision making
This section shortly provides insights on the factors influencing farm-level decision making
gathered from discussions with key informants and farmers from selected POs. The listed in-
sights were used during designing and structuring of the farm decision model (see Section 3.4).
Production There are three types of planting material available: seeds (beans), seedlings and
cuttings. Seeds can be obtained for free from UCDA, therefore, farmers, who established their
own nurseries do so. The rest decide between seedlings and cuttings. Most farmers prefer seed-
lings, because of the lower price and because seedlings can better sustain droughts and trans-
portation. On the other hand, cutting is easier to manage after planting. In general, seedlings
are more or less always available in DC or local nurseries, while cuttings could be scarce.
Production decisions are usually determined by input availability and production habits of
farmers. For fertilization, coffee farmers generally choose between mineral fertilizers (CAN
and NPK, separately or jointly) or manure and coffee husks. The common rate of application of
mineral fertilizer is 100 kg per acre (which is lower than the 220 kg recommended by COREC)
or 1.5 ton of manure per acre.
Most of the interviewed POs (six out of the seven that were asked this question) prefer to inter-
crop with plantains once their coffee trees reach maturity. Young coffee is usually intercropped
with maize, beans or cassava. On coffee/plantain plots intercrop ratios and plant densities vary
between POs, but within one PO they remain the same. So farmers do not decide upon ratio
and spacing individually, but rather follow the practice which is well-established for the PO. The
usual number of coffee trees per acre is 400-450, and the number of banana plants varies from
0 to 200 per acre. In general (at the current price levels), intercropping is more beneficial than
monocropping as it provides a higher margin from plot and a constant income from bananas (see
the partial budget comparisons of Van Asten et al. (2011)).
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Credit There are some general problems with credit access. Few POs (four out of ten) are
linked to financial institutions. Four out of six POs without this link regularly take short-term
credits from local traders. These credits have to be repaid with coffee after harvest. For the
repayment of such credit contracts farmers spend up to 40% of their coffee produce (respondents’
estimate).
Labor Labor scarcity depends on the location of the PO. Four out of eight POs who had
answered the question said that labor is not scarce in their village at any period of time, two
out of eight reported that labor is scarce in general, the remaining two said that labor scarcity
depends on the season (e.g. labor is scarce during land preparation and planting, because laborers
have to work in their own fields, and abundant in the coffee harvesting period). All interviewed
farmers tend to hire additional labor at least for harvesting in order to be able to sell their coffee
sooner, thus minimizing the risk of coffee theft. In general, household members of coffee farms
do not work as casual laborers on other farms. Off-farm employment occurs when a member
has a permanent job elsewhere. In most cases, farm duties are not allocated according to gender.
Men and women together perform such activities as land preparation (traditionally a male activ-
ity) or weeding (traditionally a female activity) and other work as well. Usually labor is paid per
workload, but not per hour. Therefore, wage differences are defined only by the different labor
capacities that the workers have.
Sales channels There are two options in terms of coffee sales between which a household can
select: PO/DC channel (as dry, shelled, ungraded coffee beans – FAQ) and local traders (as wet
or dry cherries). PO members reported to generally prefer selling their produce through DC,
mainly because it is able to offer higher prices (because of extra value addition). However, in
reality POs are facing a strong competition for member produce from local middlemen traders
and, despite the price incentive, farmers often choose to sell through middlemen. The main
reasons (more detailed in Section 3.10.1) for taking such a decision are:
• Lack of operational capital and low credit availability: Forces farmers to make informal
future contracts with middlemen in order to obtain cash before the harvesting season.
• High time preference: Waiting for the DC sale takes time (up to several weeks), while
traders could be accessed immediately.
• Small trader margins: The prices that middlemen offer are highly competitive.
• Unexpected cash needs: Farmers have to take the discussed informal contracts or sell
unmilled or even wet coffee to traders in order to get cash quickly in case of emergency.
Farmers sell their other crop produce individually, mostly to local traders (small share to
village inhabitants). These sales are characterized by low farmer bargaining power when dealing
with traders, because of the absence of alternative sales channels.
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Risk adversity When investing in coffee production, the farmers consciously expose them-
selves to certain risks: price risks (export price dropdown), production risks (coffee wilt disease)
and financial risks (inability to cover liabilities as a consequence of a bad harvest). Because of
these risks and household nutrition security reasons, and despite the fact that coffee (according
to farmers and experts) is by far the most profitable cropping activity, farmers follow risk-averse
strategies and allocate parts of their land resources to other activities (plantains, maize, cassava,
etc.). During group visits, 30 farmers were asked about their willingness to invest in coffee
(maximum share of land they would allocate for coffee production) under the current price ex-
pectations (positive for all respondents), Table 2.7 summarizes the responses.
Table 2.7: Willingness to invest in coffee
Mean Min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Max
Land share, % 62.8 40.0 50.0 50.0 62.5 70.0 80.0 80.0
Source: Author, based on farmer interviews
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Chapter 3
Structure and parameterization of the
bio-economic model
As mentioned in the earlier chapters, for computer simulations this study employed MP-MAS,
which is a multi-agent software package for household-based economic decision-making (for an
in-depth description of the software, see Schreinemachers & Berger (2011)). The purpose of
this software package is identification (through scenario-based analysis) of the effects of tech-
nological, environmental, policy and other changes and interventions on the studied population
and the related resource pools (natural, labor, financial, technical etc.). This chapter explains
the structure of the MP-MAS application, which was set up by the author specifically for this
research, and describes integrated sub-models and discusses their empirical parameterization.
3.1 The MP-MAS Uganda application
The MP-MAS framework was originally designed by Berger (2001) to analyze the diffusion of
technological innovations in Central Chile. Later, the team of MP-MAS developers constructed
several country-specific versions of the software and applied them for different scientific pur-
poses in a number of developing countries: Uganda (Berger et al. 2006, Schreinemachers et al.
2007), Ghana (Wossen et al. 2010), Thailand (Schreinemachers et al. 2010, 2009) and Vietnam
(Dang Viet 2012).
The simulation models of the MP-MAS framework build upon the empirical and theoretical
parameterizations of natural environments, populations of farm households, markets for agri-
cultural commodities, and biophysical and social interactions. MP-MAS applications belong to
the family of models called multi-agent systems applied to land use/cover change (MAS/LUCC)
(see Parker et al. (2003), Janssen (2003)). The MAS of this type combine two major parts: (i) a
landscape model represented by cellular automata and (ii) a model replicating decision-making
of agricultural enterprises represented in an agent-based way. Integration of the two compon-
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ents is implemented through the interactions and interdependence between the agents and the
landscape.
The landscape-related part of the MP-MAS version applied in this research (MP-MAS Uganda
application) has a three-level hierarchy:
• Pixel: Is a cell of a raster grid map. It is the smallest spatial unit in the model. For this
study the pixel size was set to a quarter of an acre, since it is the size of the smallest
land plot in the study area according to the IFPRI (2010) survey records. Each pixel
contains information about land ownership, soil properties (available nutrients, organic
matter content and acidity) and slope length factor. The state of soil property attributes of
the pixel define actual yields that are achieved when growing a certain crop on that pixel
(see Section 3.6).
• Soil vector: All pixels that belong to one agent form an agent’s soil vector. At the start of
the simulation, all pixels of one agent have the same soil properties, but that may change
in the next periods, depending on agent decisions on land use and fertilization with regard
to different pixels (the mechanism of soil property updating is explained in Section 3.6).
• Soil type: Mathematical programming (MP) calculations (see Section 3.4) required attri-
bution of expected crop yields to model pixels, hence, pixels were classified into a finite
number of soil types. At the start of the simulation agents expect same crop yields from
the pixels of the same soil type and later adjust their expectations based on their experience
(explained in Section 3.9). Such a mechanism is consistent with the empirical world, since
in reality farmers do not have perfect information about the soil properties. Therefore, a
soil type consists of several pixels that are similar to a certain extent. The classifying rule
of pixel allocation among the soil types was defined by taking into account the coffee focus
of this work: pixels were classified according to coffee yields that could be achieved on
them under the conditions of no mineral fertilization and unconstrained labor input.
The agent part of the simulation model has a two-level hierarchy:
• Agent: Represents a real-world farming household. Each agent is defined by a set of
variables. These variables are related to (i) land property rights (creating a link with the
landscape part), (ii) household composition (number of household members, their age
and sex), (iii) available resources (livestock herd, perennial crop plantations, cash) and
(iv) access capacities (access to fertilizers).
• Population: Corresponds to agent interaction and communication boundaries. Agents can
interact only with other agents from their population. In the applied model version all
agents belong to the same population, which reflect their membership in the same sub-
county level organization (Kibinge DC).
Because of the necessity to adapt MP-MAS for different study contexts, the structure of MP-
MAS software is modular (i.e. model components and features can be activated depending on
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the requirements of the particular research). The modules are either integrated or externally
coupled (examples are discussed in (Schreinemachers & Berger 2011)). Such structure makes
MP-MAS flexible and adaptive with regards to additional extensions, which is a big advantage
considering the aims of the current research: incorporation of RPO activities into the empirical
model.
Table 3.1: Structure of the MP-MAS Uganda application
Layers Components
Population Demography model
Networks RPO-decision model
Property rights
Asset registry
Factor endowment
Land use
Agent decision model
Crop growth model
Soil quality Soil nutrient model
Source: Author
The simulation of behavior of economic agents and complex networks in MP-MAS starts
with biophysical properties of agricultural plots. From the plot level it scales up all the way to
the level of the studied population. Table 3.1 shows layers and respective components that are
activated in the respective MP-MAS application. The developed simulation model makes use of
biophysical modules of crop growth and soil dynamics, as well as of livestock and demographic
modules (building on the study of Schreinemachers et al. (2007)). Each of the model components
listed in Table 3.1 follows annual time resolution: every component is recomputed and updated
once per modeling period that represents one calendar year in the real-world. MP-MAS integ-
rates its components by calculating and updating the respective coefficients (crop yields, prices,
etc.) and right-hand side values in the agent-specific MP-tableaus (see Section 3.4). Figure 3.1
displays the flow chart of the simulation model. After the MAS is initialized, the evolution of a
large number of variables and processes is simulated over time (such as soil properties, house-
hold characteristics, market prices, etc.). Respective calculations supply information for the next
steps and redefine variables, thus providing interactions between the various components of the
MAS.
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Figure 3.1: Simulation cycle of the MP-MAS Uganda application
Source: Author
3.2 Generating model agents from empirical data
The part which any MAS requires are the agents themselves (i.e. agent definition). The MP-
MAS Uganda application is a household-based model. Hence, the basic agent type in MP-MAS
Uganda is a farming household. The definition of agents was intended to be empirical, rather
than abstractive, which means that a one-to-one correspondence between model agents and real-
world households had to be ensured. In other words, every model agent represents an existing
real-world prototype. This way of setting up the MAS improves the practical applicability po-
tential of simulation results (Berger et al. 2006). But there is one complication related to such
implementation of the agents: often the respective data collection does not cover the full popu-
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lation that is being modeled. Like in the case of the current research, when (IFPRI 2010) project
survey covered only a 4% fraction of the study population, and therefore an extrapolation of the
survey sample fraction to the size of the study population was needed. Moreover, input sens-
itivity analysis and application of Monte Carlo techniques required a set of such extrapolated
populations (Berger & Schreinemachers 2006).
There is always a trade-off between close statistical match and heterogeneity. One obtains the
closest match, when simply multiplying agents from the sample survey, but looses all possible
values, that were out of the sampling fraction. Hence, the solution to the problem lies somewhere
between taking the model agents from the sample survey only and doing a complete random
generation (which leads to unrepresentative agents). Therefore any approach should go through
the following steps:
1. Estimation of distribution functions
2. Assignment of parameters to computational agents
3. Validation of statistical consistency
The research reported in this thesis used statistical methods (see Section 3.2), the application
of which for creating of agent populations for agent-based models is novel. The estimation of
multivariate distribution functions, and sampling from them, is common in financial economics
(for example, in assessment of financial risk), but currently is not used in population modeling.
The author recreated the full agent population for the simulation model by data sampling and
interpolation using multivariate distributions estimated from the project survey and described by
copula (this approach improves the original Monte-Carlo technique of Berger & Schreinemach-
ers (2006)).
The original approach of Berger & Schreinemachers (2006) operates with univariate empir-
ical distributions, and therefore does not capture correlations between the parameters endogen-
ously. However, such correlations may exist. Let us inspect whether they exist in the research
case. Table F.2 shows calculated values of Spearman’s rho and the results of the correlation
analysis of main relevant household variables and geographical properties estimated from the
IFPRI (2010) survey and the digital elevation model (DEM) of CGIAR-CSI (2011). From Table
F.2 it can be concluded that the number of coffee trees is strongly positively correlated with land
size (spearman coef = 0.719). Two other evident correlations, according to Table F.2, are (i)
land size and number of household members and (ii) number of household members and mean
age of a household. Classical Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlation coefficients fail in detecting
non-monotonic dependencies. Therefore, in addition to these coefficients the author also applied
a dcov test recently developed by Szekely (2007). This novel test, according to Szekely (2007),
can be used for detecting non-monotonic correlations between variables. Error scores of the
dcov test (error probability of rejecting the hypothesis of dependency between two variables)
are shown in Table F.3. As shown in Tables F.2 and F.3, several of the inspected variables are
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significantly correlated and, moreover, in many cases one variable is correlated with a num-
ber of others. It was important to preserve such the detected correlations when creating agent
populations, therefore multivariate probability distribution between the relevant variables were
estimated by the author.
For the representation of dependencies in multivariate distribution an empirical copula was
employed. N–dimensional copula (for every n ≥ 2) is an n-variate distribution function on
the d-dimensional unit cube [0, 1]n, whose univariate marginals are uniformly distributed on the
interval [0, 1]. Figure 3.2 gives an example of the empirical two-dimensional copula (depicted
by the sunflower plot) for bivariate distribution of available land and household size of Kibinge
DC member households. From this copula function the observed probabilities of various com-
binations of land and household size (represented by copula cells) can be derived (Table 3.2).
The precision of the copula and the respective probabilities estimation depends on sample size:
increasing the number of observations in the sample will increase the quality of the estimates
obtained. From Table 3.2 it can be seen that, for example, the smallest 20% of households are
unlikely to operate the largest land holdings, the probability to have the largest land holdings
increases with the land size, and so on. With the help of Stata software, multidimensional cop-
ula were similarly estimated (not only for land and household size, but also for other household
characteristics) from the empirical dataset, thus capturing the empirical joint distribution of vari-
ables. Then, as in the example, the author calculated probabilities corresponding to the cells of
this multidimensional copula. Using the estimated cell probabilities the variable combinations
(i.e. particular copula cells) were sampled.
Having sampled the combinations (cells) of variables, the values of variables from the cor-
responding univariate cumulative distributions were sampled. These univariate distributions,
in turn, were also estimated from the empirical data. Univariate distributions within the copula
were made continuous using linear interpolation. The example in Figure 3.3 shows the estimated
cumulative distribution function of land segmented according to the bins of copula that reflect
household size quintiles.
Table 3.2: Probabilities of copula cells. Example
Household size
Land
0–20 % 20–40 % 40–60 % 60–80 % 80–100 %
80–100 % 0.0141 0.0423 0.0282 0.0282 0.0986
60–80 % 0.0282 0.0282 0.0563 0.0282 0.0563
40–60 % 0.0423 0.0000 0.0704 0.0423 0.0423
20–40 % 0.0282 0.0704 0.0282 0.0563 0.0141
0–20 % 0.0845 0.0563 0.0141 0.0423 0.0000
Source: Own estimation, based on IFPRI (2010)
From the estimated copula and cumulative distribution functions the necessary number of
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Figure 3.2: Representation of joint distribution by copula. Example of land and household size
Source: Author based on IFPRI (2010)
population sets was randomly drawn using different random seeds. Table F.1 lists the variables
whose values were drawn in the applied case of this research. After the pseudo-random draw,
the values were transformed to MP-MAS input format. For example, size of coffee plantations
was drawn as a share of total land (to ensure consistency with land sizes) and later transformed
into pixels for the model input. The statistical representativity of populations generated for this
research with the described method of application of empirical copula is characterized in Section
4.2.1.
The result of the population generation procedure defines the initial state of asset registry,
which contains information on asset ownership of each model agent. The asset registry is up-
dated after each simulation cycle according to the results of various MP-MAS modules (invest-
ments, permanent crops, livestock, demography, soil dynamics, market dynamics). Assets have
a lifespan and MP-MAS handles the aging of assets. The lifespan is fixed for everything except
the household members, for whom life is simulated by the demography model (see Section 3.8).
The initial ages of household members were drawn from the empirical distribution (explained in
Section 3.8), initial ages of other assets were drawn by MP-MAS software itself using uniform
random.
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Figure 3.3: Segmented distribution function of land. Example
Source: Author, based on IFPRI (2010)
3.3 Generating soil properties from geospatial data
Soil quality is an influential factor for on-farm decision making. Despite the fact that the IFPRI–
IZA–UHOH research project did not record bio-physical characteristics of the farm plots, it
was possible to include the soil quality factor in the MAS. Soil properties were modeled using
econometric equations of Rhew et al. (2004), which estimated statistical relationships between
soil properties and spatial terrain parameters, namely:
• Elevation (ELEV )
• Slope (SLOP )
• Topographic wetness index (TWI), which is a topographic proxy for soil moisture content,
calculated as:
TWI = (ln(ACC + 0.001))/(tan(SLOP + 0.001)) (3.1)
where ACC stands for flow accumulation – topographic variable that equals to the square
of the upslope area for the current cell of the digital elevation model (DEM)
• Streampower index (SPI), a topographic proxy for water flows power:
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SPI = ACC × tan(SLOP ) (3.2)
The work of Rhew et al. (2004) suggests that these terrain parameters could be used as sig-
nificant predictors of soil chemical properties in cases when only topographic data is available.
Rhew et al. (2004) estimated their econometric equations (that are listed in Table 3.3) using the
measurements obtained in the study sites in Mayuge District (until 2000 a part of Iganga Dis-
trict): villages of Magada and Buyemba. According to the GIS-based stratification by Ruecker
et al. (2003), these villages and the study area of this research (Kibinge sub-county) (i) lie in
the same development domain, (ii) have similar agro-climatic and socio-economic conditions,
and (iii) have the same farming systems. Given the similarity of agro-ecological zones between
the original study sites of Rhew et al. (2004) and Kibinge sub-county, it is assumed that the
relationships estimated by Rhew et al. (2004) are likely to hold in the Kibinge setting as well,
thus justifying the applicability of the predictive soil models from Table 3.3 in the context of this
study. (More detailed characteristics of the common development domain can be found earlier in
Table 1.7, where the villages of Rhew et al. (2004) research are still included to Iganga District.)
Table 3.3: Estimations of initial soil properties
Soil Property Unit Estimated relationship
Nitrogen (N ) % −1.22 + 0.039(ELEV )0.5 − 0.087(SLOP )0.5
Potassium (K) mg/100 g of soil (0.748(ELEV )0.5 − 0.36log(SPI)− 21.17)2
Organic Matter (OM ) % (0.30(ELEV )0.5 − 0.79(SLOP )0.5 − 8.39)2
Acidity (pH) pH 6.47− 1.32(SLOP )0.5
Calcium (Ca) mg/100 g of soil −951.69 + 30.69(ELEV )0.5 − 104.69(SLOP )0.5
Sodium (Na) % exp(1.90− 5.73(TWI)−0.5)
Sand % 536.32− 13.7(ELEV )0.5 + 23.1(SLOP )0.5
Clay % −394.19 + 12.2(ELEV )0.5 − 3.12log(SPI)
Silt % 100− (Sand+ Clay)
Phosphorous (P ) ppm (0.003(Ca) + 0.21log(Na) + 0.13(K)0.5 − 0.02(Clay)− 1.15)2
Source: Estimated by Rhew et al. (2004) for sites in Mayuge district of Uganda based on 30 meter grid size
The author of this study created the input for predictive soil models of Rhew et al. (2004)
by analyzing the GPS measurements from the household part of the IFPRI (2010) survey and
the DEM of CGIAR-CSI (2011). Using ArcGIS software the author estimated the descriptive
variables of the soil models, namely ELEV , SLOP , SPI and TWI (see definitions above),
for the survey households. These properties of the survey households were distributed among
the full population of model households using the described copula-based method (see Section
ssec:agents). Because for each household only one GPS measurement was done in IFPRI (2010),
for the same land ownership, geographical properties were assumed to be homogeneous. There-
fore, later soil property predictions turned out to be homogeneous within the land holding of one
model agent as well.
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Soil chemical properties of the land of model agents were derived from the spatial variables
(ELEV , SLOP , SPI and TWI) using equations from Table 3.3 based on 30 meter grid size.
Table 3.4 summarizes geographical and predicted soil properties for households of Kibinge, for
which precise geographical locations were recorded by GPS in the IFPRI (2010) project survey.
Figure 3.4 shows the simulated distribution of soils of Kibinge households along soil texture
classes (classified according to FAO (2006) guidelines). Sandy clay and sandy clay loam are
expected to be the major soil classes in the research area.
Table 3.4: Predicted land characteristics of Kibinge households
Property Unit Mean Median Stdev
Elevation masl 1251.1 1246.0 34.5
Slope % 8.61 9.07 3.81
Nitrogen % 0.135 0.132 0.020
Potassium mg/100 g of soil 21.56 18.60 8.24
Phosphorous ppm 1.349 1.395 0.276
Organic Matter % 4.01 3.91 0.63
Acidity pH 6.10 6.07 0.10
Calcium mg/100 g of soil 104.1 101.5 16.3
Sodium % 1.021 1.233 0.444
Sand % 58.33 59.36 6.74
Clay % 31.04 29.61 9.54
Silt % 10.63 12.76 5.57
Source: Author, based on results of soil property prediction
Figure 3.4: Classification of soil texture
Source: Classified by author, based on results of soil property prediction
* classified according to FAO (2006) guidelines
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3.4 Representation of farmer decision making
Household decision making is modeled in MP-MAS using the MP methodology, which tackles
the problem of constrained optimization. The decision objective and constraints in MP-MAS
Uganda are represented by a set of simultaneous linear equations and inequalities, where some
of the decision variables can take only integer values. Therefore, the particular MP optimiza-
tion technique is called mixed integer linear programming (MILP). The objective function of
each agent is its expected household utility (U ), which has to be maximized subject to a set of
constraints, specified in the form of equations or inequalities:
max U(x) =
n∑
i=1
(pixi)
n∑
i=1
(aixi) ≤ 0
n∑
i=1
(bixi) = 0
xj ≤ uj
xk ∈ Z
x ≥ 0
x, a, b, p, u ∈ R;
(3.3)
In the above equations/inequalities set x denotes the decision variables, which can take only
non-negative values, p stands for numerical coefficients of an objective function, and a and b are
specific constraint coefficients. Constraints could be represented in the form of equations and/or
inequalities. Some of the variables (xj) are subject to exogenous upper bounds (u) and some
(xk) can take only integer values. For solving such optimization problems MP-MAS employs
the IBM Optimization Subroutine Library (OSL) that provides optimization algorithms based on
the simplex and interior point methods. The solution to the problem contains values for x with
whichU(x) takes the highest value possible to achieve without violation of specified constraints.
The optimization problems in MP-MAS are formulated in a way that their results describe the
individual decision-making that actually takes place in the real world (i.e. positive modeling),
rather than prescribe the best use of available household resources (i.e. normative modeling).
This is achieved by the incorporation of behavioral constraints and decision rules that define
households’ bound rational behavior (for more details see Schreinemachers & Berger (2006).
For the sake of convenience, optimization problems can be recorded in the form of a MILP-
tableau. Table 3.5 gives the concise representation of the agent’s optimization problem as imple-
mented in the MP-MAS Uganda application. The full MILP of the MP-MAS Uganda application
contains 2785 activities and 544 constraints. MILP integrates activities related to household in-
vestment, production, marketing and consumption behavior. Implemented constraints reflect
household resource limitations, nutrient demand of household members, crop rotation require-
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ments, livestock and poultry production requirements, credit obligations, and so on. MP-MAS
makes the decision problem agent-specific by changing right- and left-hand side coefficients
and fixing solutions for certain columns in the respective standard format of the tableau (con-
cise form in Table 3.5). By solving the agent-specific MILP problems MP-MAS replicates the
decision-making of the modeled farm households from the agent population.
Table 3.5: Concise representation of MILP-tableau
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Maximize P -P P -P -P -P -P -P P
Land A 1 = R
Labor -1 A A ≤ R
Investments -A A A ≤ R
Input -1 A A ≤ 0
Output 1 1 -A -A ≤ 0
Future output -A -A 1 ≤ 0
Feed -A A ≤ 0
Manure A -A ≤ 0
Land balance 1 A -A ≤ 0
Income P -P P -P -P -P -P -P -1 = 0
Liquidity P -1 P P P P ≤ R
Consumption model A A -A = 0
*P – vector of market prices and costs; R – agent-specific right hand side values;
A – agent-specific technical coefficients;
In the original approach of Schreinemachers & Berger (2006), the decision making of farm
agents in MP-MAS was originally split into three sequential steps: investment, production, and
consumption. Such segmentation of decision-making is required to reflect the resource alloca-
tion and timing of activities (e.g. liquid assets that a farmer uses for long-term investments at the
start of a cropping season cannot be used in production activities throughout the season). The
steps are implemented by recursive solutions of agent MILP: each decision step involves optim-
ization of a particular MILP and transferring certain parts of the solution vector to the MILP of
the next step. Such recursive scheduling is a convenient alternative to the multi-period program-
ming in positive modeling (see Berger (2001), Schreinemachers et al. (2007)). Each agent MILP
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is specified such that, when taking an investment decision, an agent already plans for produc-
tion and consumption; and, when taking a production decision, an agent plans for consumption,
respectively. For this research, the a marketing decision was incorporated as an additional step
of agent decision-making in order to simulate household crop sales through RPOs. Figure 3.5
plots the sequence of household decisions, and Table 3.6 compares the respective four sequen-
tial stages of decision making. The implementation of household marketing decisions and its
linkage with the model of RPOs is discussed later in Section 3.10.
Figure 3.5: Optimization sequence
Source: Author
Table 3.6: Stages of household decision-making in MP-MAS
Characteristic
Stage
Investment Production Marketing Consumption
Timing beginning of the
period
beginning of the
period
end of the
period
end of the
period
Yields expected in
future
expected in
current period
actual actual
Resource supply expected in
future
expected in
current period
actual actual
Prices expected in
future
expected in
current period
expected in
current period
actual
Fixed decision variables none none land and input
use
land and input
use, sales
volumes
Source: Author
3.5 Production and investment alternatives
The universe of household production and investment alternatives represented in the decision
model is a result of collaborative work of the author and MP-MAS development team (Woelcke
2000, Schreinemachers et al. 2007, Latynskiy & Berger 2012a). The collection and paramet-
erization of alternatives was based on literature reviews, expert opinions, participatory research
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and analyses of empirical data. There are around 2,500 production and investment alternatives
available for household agent choice in MP-MAS Uganda. This results in the nearly infinite
number of linear combinations of agent choices of production and investment behavior and re-
source allocation. The implemented alternatives correspond to different farm enterprises: crop
production, livestock farming, animal feed production, manure production, etc. This section
provides an overview of the alternatives and explains their practical implementation.
3.5.1 Crop growth, production functions and alternatives
MP-MAS Uganda endogenously models crop yields based on the classical Mitscherlich equation
describing yield responses to increases in limiting factors. Mitscherlich theory based on von
Liebig’s Law of the Minimum assumes yield to be bound by the maximum or potential yield
(Ypot). Constraining factors (F1...Fn), whose availability are defined on [0;1] interval, limit the
potential yield to the actual crop yield (Yact):
Yact = Ypot × F1 × ...× Fn (3.4)
From the above equation it can be seen that the maximum yield can only be reached, when all
yield defining factors are abundant. Increase in availability of each factor has a positive impact
on actual yield. This impact is moderated by the availabilities of all other factors. Theoretically,
the Mitscherlich equation was assumed to apply the factors that limit plant growth, such as soil
nutrients, water, temperature, light, pests, crop management, etc. These factors can be either
natural (i.e. bio-physical) or human-controlled. In the case of MP-MAS Uganda, availabilities
of natural factors are explicitly modeled with integrated Tropical Soil Productivity Calculator
(TSPC) developed by Aune & Massave (1998) (see Section 3.6).
Human-controlled factors are represented in MP-MAS Uganda by the rate of labor applica-
tion that is simulated, when solving agent-specific MILP problems. Agents can decide how much
labor to apply, when growing different model crops. The rates of labor application coming from
solutions of agent MILP are transferred by the MP-MAS code into the crop management factor
of TSPC (MAN in Equation 3.7). Also, agents can control fertilizer application, which influ-
ences TSPC calculations (Section 3.6) as well. Other possible human-controlled factors such as
spacing, quantity of planting material, as well as pest and disease treatments were assumed to
be constant over the entire population. The yield effects of pests and diseases, as well as those
of pesticide application, were explicitly included in the TSPC in the form of relative yield loss
adjustments. These adjustments were roughly estimated based on the description of Ugandan
agriculture compiled by Mukiibi (2001) and on the model input data of Schreinemachers (2006)
(Table 3.11). The effects of other crop management factors that may be relevant are implicitly
captured during the estimation of potential crop yields. The use of draft power is generally not
practiced in the study area (as was reported during the field visits – see Chapter 2), because of
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the narrow tree spacing in the coffee/banana production system. Therefore, its application was
not considered.
Yield response to labor input was implemented in agent MILP using piece-wise linear ap-
proximation of the estimated partial (yield-labor) Cobb-Douglas production function. The es-
timation of production functions for all model crops except coffee (estimation for which is ex-
plained in Section 3.5.2) was done by Schreinemachers et al. (2007) based on the IFPRI (2001)
data assuming a Cobb-Douglas form of the production function. Three levels of labor use (min-
imal, medium and maximal) were made available for agent choice. The minimal level of labor
application reflects the smallest amount of labor input required in order to receive any yield from
the corresponding crop production alternative. At the maximal level the yield is unconstrained
by labor. It is assumed that farmers always follow common fertilization practices (100 kg per ha)
when applying mineral fertilizer. Hence, only one intensity level for each type of fertilization
was implemented, given that manure is distributed uniformly across all plots. The fertilization
types in the decision model are: (i) fertilization only with manure available on the farm, (ii) farm
manure and nitrogen phosphorus potassium (NPK) fertilizer (NPK rating – 15–15–15), (iii) farm
manure and calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer (NPK rating – 24–0–0). Table B.8 of the
Appendix presents the MILP-implementation of crop management alternatives for a single crop.
(Examples of implementations of other decision problems can also be found in the Appendix.)
In total, nine different crop management practices per crop are available for agent choice. These
combinations are further disaggregated by the five model soil classes to introduce different yield
expectations according to soil quality.
Production alternatives of MP-MAS Uganda comprise ten arable crops. According to their
MILP-implementation, these crops could be divided into four groups: seasonal, annual, aggreg-
ate and perennial. Model crops and their classifications are listed in Table 3.7. Physical char-
acteristics, planting densities (TSPC parameters) and seed rates (MILP parameters) for model
crops were collected by (Schreinemachers 2006) from agronomic literature.
Table 3.7: Model crops
Seasonal Annual Aggregate (seasonal) Perennial
Beans Cassava Fruits Coffee
Groundnut Plantain Vegetables
Maize
Sorghum
Sweet potato
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS input
The length of one modeling period of the farm decision model, as well as of other parts of
MP-MAS Uganda is one calendar year. Since there are two distinct cropping periods in the study
area, the modeling of production decisions required having separate production alternatives for
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each season. Practically, this was implemented in a way that for seasonal crops all growing
activities from Table B.8 were further differentiated by seasons. Such pragmatic and simplified
implementation was based on the assumption that a household takes a simultaneous production
decision for both seasons at the start of the year, which also required differentiation of land and
labor endowments by seasons via transfer activities in MILP (see Table B.2). (For all crops, ex-
cept perennial ones, labor requirements were analogously disaggregated further on a two month
basis.) Alternatively, two different season-specific decision and biophysical models could have
been constructed.
A perennial crop is a crop that stays on a field for several years. Yield and input requirements
of such crops vary during its lifespan. Therefore, perennial crops required a specific implement-
ation in the model (explained in Section 3.5.2). Although cassava, plantains and fruits from the
botany perspective are perennial crops, coffee is the only crop in the MP-MAS Uganda applic-
ation that was implemented as perennial. Cassava and plantains were treated as annual, since
they are typically harvested within the first year.
Potential yields of coffee, seasonal and annual crops were set to 90-percentile observed
yields. The potential yield of coffee was estimated from the IFPRI (2010) project using data
from the Masaka District of Uganda. Yields of seasonal and annual crops were estimated from
UNPS (2010) national survey using the data for Central and Eastern regions of Uganda. The
estimates of potential yields are provided in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Potential yield estimates
Crop 90% yield unit 90% Confidence interval
Beans 1,482.6 kg/ha/season 889.6 1,751.0
Cassava 5,987.6 kg/ha/year 5,135.6 9,094.1
Coffee 2,390.7 kg/ha/year 1,810.7 3,147.7
Groundnut 1,235.5 kg/ha/season 1,009.8 1,482.6
Maize 2,381.2 kg/ha/season 1,976.8 2,965.3
Plantain 9,266.5 kg/ha/year 7,346.9 13,839.7
Sorghum 1,408.5 kg/ha/season 988.4 2,325.0
Sweet potato 9,884.2 kg/ha/season 6,428.2 16,631.59
Source: Own estimations, based on UNPS (2010) and IFPRI (2010)
The farms in Uganda normally contain fruit and vegetable gardens located around the farm-
stead. In these gardens, households usually grow crops such as jack fruit, passion fruit, paw paw,
dodo, cabbage, tomato, etc., for home consumption (IFPRI 2010). Because of the absence of ex-
perimental data, the cultivation of fruits and vegetables was implemented as an aggregate activ-
ity, attributed with median yields and median labor requirements (estimated by Schreinemachers
et al. (2007) from IFPRI (2001)). Fruits and vegetables are typically grown on small areas and
fertilized with kitchen waste (Schreinemachers 2006). Therefore, the cultivation of fruits and
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vegetables is not considered in TSPC calculations.
Crop rotation is a basic technique of soil management. Alternating crops that are grown in
a single plot prevents disproportional depletion of soil nutrients and, therefore, improves soil
fertility. These crop rotation considerations constrain farmers’ choices of cropping patterns. A
straight-forward MILP-technique of modeling crop rotation constraints is implementing them as
a maximal share of total land that could be occupied by the crop (e.g. if beans are grown on the
same plot only once in two consecutive seasons then the maximum land share allocated for bean
growing activities is 0.5). Table 3.9 summarizes rotation constraints of the MP-MAS Uganda
application.
Table 3.9: Crop rotation constraints
Crop Bean Cassava Groundnut Maize Sorghum Sweet potato
Max land share 0.393 0.256 0.181 0.531 0.125 0.236
Source: Calibrated values of Schreinemachers (2006)
Growing two or more crops in close proximity (i.e. intercropping) through optimization of
nutrient efficiency, erosion protection and provision of shade may result in more efficient land
use on the farm. As discussed earlier (Sections 1.3.3 and 2.5) for robusta coffee farmers in
Uganda it is common to intercrop coffee with banana. Apart from coffee/banana intercropping,
the following combinations of model crops are commonly observed to be mixed intercropped in
the lake-shore production system in Uganda: (i) maize and beans, (ii) maize and cassava, (iii)
maize and groundnut (Woelcke 2004). For these combinations, intercropping activities were al-
lowed in MILP (yield premiums of these intercropping activities are provided in Schreinemach-
ers (2006)).
3.5.2 Coffee growing and management
The production function for coffee with respect to labor input was estimated from IFPRI (2010)
household survey. The production function was specified as Cobb-Douglas in logarithmic form:
lnY = β0 + β1lnLAB + β2ID + β3FD + γ1D1 + ...+ γnDn (3.5)
where Y – yield per hectare of coffee plantation; LAB – labor use per hectare of coffee plant-
ation; ID – dummy variable for intercropping of coffee with plantain; FD – dummy variable
for application of inorganic fertilizers; γ1D1 + ...+ γnDn – vector of district dummies.
The estimation of fertilization intensity and intercropping ratios from IFPRI (2010) was prob-
lematic, since the survey captured data on the plot level, but not on the crop level. It is very
common for Ugandan farmers to grow several crops on one plot (up to four different crops per
agricultural season). The survey lacks data on land use shares of different crops, therefore, the
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application of mineral fertilizers and intercropping with plantains were included in the model in
the form of dummy variables. The fertilization dummy reflects whether or not mineral fertilizers
were applied on the coffee-containing plots during the preceding calendar year. The intercrop-
ping dummy reflects whether or not the coffee-containing plots also contained plantain plants.
District dummies control for the differences in agro-ecological conditions. The labor application
in person hours was calculated from IFPRI (2010) using average daily labor supply factors of
Schreinemachers (2006).
Table 3.10 presents the estimated production function for robusta coffee. This function serves
for modeling of the human-controlled labor factor of crop growth that enters the Mitscherlich
yield equation (Equation 3.4) in MP-MAS Uganda. As seen in Table 3.10, labor use is the
significant determinant of coffee yield. Mineral fertilization and intercropping with plantains
turned out to be insignificant, most probably because of the previously mentioned inaccuracies
of fertilizer and intercropping estimates. The district dummies that reflect the differences in
agro-climatic conditions are significant, as well as the constant term. The estimated production
function was implemented in MILP through its linear approximation (see Figure 3.6). Basing
the calculation of labor use for coffee plantations on average daily labor supply resulted in an
overestimation of the actual labor requirements of coffee. Therefore, in order to make the es-
timated production function fit the observed data better, Schreinemachers (2006) introduced a
specific adjustment factor into TSPC for coffee. In the model set-up applied for this study, the
average value of Schreinemachers (2006) specific LP calculations of this adjustment were used
for single farm households.
Figure 3.6: Linear approximation of production function
Source: Author
A coffee plantation is a durable asset, therefore MP-MAS keeps information on its size and
age in a household asset registry. In order to be able to grow coffee, an agent has to possess a
coffee plantation. The soil class on which coffee was initially planted and the originally planned
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Table 3.10: Production function for robusta coffee
Dependent variable = Ln(Coffee
yield), kg per ha
coef se
Ln(Labor use), hours per ha 0.420*** 0.049
Inorganic fertilization -0.069 0.131
Intercropping with plantain -0.164 0.125
Masaka -2.045** 0.857
Mpigi -1.649* 0.900
Mityana -1.952** 0.870
Mubende -2.809*** 0.868
Bushenyi -2.046** 0.867
Kamuli -2.263*** 0.853
Wakiso -1.818** 0.869
Constant 6.015*** 0.893
F-test (10, 326) 11.01***
R-squared 0.2524
N obs 337
Source: Own estimation from IFPRI (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
management practice are also recorded in the registry. Input data of MP-MAS specify yields
and labor requirements for different soil classes, management practices and ages of the planta-
tion lifespan (42 years for coffee). The perennial crops module of MP-MAS inserts the respective
coefficients into the agent periodical MILP according to the characteristics of their coffee plant-
ations (age, soil, management practice). To ensure that an agent considers future returns of a
perennial crop, the annuity of its expected returns is added to the objective function through an
additional future selling activity containing expected future prices in the function coefficients
row. This activity operates with the annuity of discounted expected future yields of the crop,
which are inserted into agent MILP by MP-MAS. The expected future returns are excluded from
the calculation of financial results of the modeling period (see simulation cycle in Figure 3.1),
since they are accounted for in later modeling periods.
Different management practices and soil types on which coffee can be grown translate into 50
coffee growing activities in MILP. From year to year agents can switch the management practices
of coffee plantations, changing the labor intensity and fertilization practices. The yield effect of
the new management practice is immediate; the inter-annual yield impacts of different practices,
however, are not considered. A perennial crop permanently occupies a land plot on which it
is planted, therefore MP-MAS reserves land parcels under perennial crops for the duration of
their lifespan. Therefore, switching between different soil classes is not allowed. There are
450 switching combinations (i.e. from practice x to practice y) in the model, each of them
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represented by a separate MILP activity.
Based on the insights from the fieldwork, that household agent MILP were implemented
such that agents cannot cut their coffee trees, meaning that they are always maintained unitl
the pre-defined end of their productive life. Therefore, coffee plantations in MILP require at
least some minimal amount of labor input. This requirement was implemented through putting
equality signs to the respective constraints. In case of labor scarcity, agents can always switch
(via switching activities in MILP) to the specified lowest input management practice, that give
minimal yields (see Figure 3.6).
The practice of intercropping coffee with plantains was modeled through a specific con-
straint. Since coffee plantations in the study area mostly also contain banana plants (IFPRI
2010), the respective MILP-constraint ensures that agents who grow coffee also allocate at least
a certain proportion of their land to plantains. The plantain/coffee intercropping ratio in accord-
ance with field observations was set equal to 1/5 (i.e. 20% of each ha of mixed plantation is
occupied with plantains).
Table B.12 provides a tableau displaying MILP-implementation of coffee cultivation and
management.
3.5.3 Livestock
There are four types of livestock and poultry species in MP-MAS Uganda: cattle, goats, chicken
and pigs. Chicken and pig production were implemented following the stationary equilibrium
approach of Hazell & Norton (1986), which means that the characteristics of the production were
expressed in annual average terms. In terms of inputs, chicken and pig production require feed,
labor and cash (e.g. for supplements, vaccination etc.), as well as the procurement of animals for
raising and breeding. Chicken production provides two marketable products: chicken and eggs;
pig production provides either pig weaners or finishers for sale. Additionally, animal production
provides manure, which is an internal farm product used for fertilization (explained in Section
3.5.1). The maximum number of chicken and pigs that different households can manage at
one time was derived from the IFPRI (2010) survey; this data translates into additional MILP
constraints. Table B.9 shows the MILP-implementation of chicken production. From this tableau
it can be seen that model agents have options to sell chickens or to keep them as laying hens. Laid
eggs, in turn, could be consumed, sold or hatched. Therefore, agents can also decide whether to
buy chicks or to raise them from eggs on the farm. Table B.10 displays the MILP-implementation
of pig production. As this pig rearing example tableau shows, in agent MILP, production is
divided into three stages: at the first stage piglets are raised to weaners; at the second stage
weaners are either raised to finishers or sows; and at the third stage, breeding sows are maintained
to produce piglets. Thus, agents may buy weaners and sows or raise them from their own piglets.
Parameter values for chicken and pig production were estimated from the project survey (IFPRI
2010), national panel survey (UNPS 2010) and national livestock (UNLC 2008) and agricultural
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(UCA 2009) censuses or taken from other MP-MAS models (Dang Viet 2012, Schreinemachers
2006) and literature (Kirunda et al. 2010, Zinunula 2009, Ssewannyana et al. 2008, NAADS
2005, Kyarisiima et al. 2004, Ishagi et al. 2003).
The rearing of cattle and goats (which may stay on a farm over several years) was modeled
with a special livestock module of MP-MAS. The livestock module is similar to the perennial
crops module in that livestock input requirements and output quantities have to be specified for
each year of the livestock lifespan. The input data (lifespan, input requirements, liveweight, and
amount of provided output products) vary according to the sex of livestock. Similar to pig and
chicken production, raising cattle and goats also require feed, labor and cash inputs. Both male
and female livestock provide meat and manure, while female livestock additionally provide milk
and offspring. Therefore, the size of a livestock herd can be maintained or increased through the
purchase of new livestock units (explained in Section 3.5.4) and the raising of own offspring.
Meat is provided only when livestock is slaughtered (its amount equals the liveweight of a live-
stock unit and its offspring in a given period), while other products are provided constantly on
the annual basis. The implementation of durable livestock in the MILP is shown in Table B.11
with the example of nanny-goats (a lifespan of two years is used in the example to simplify the
representation). The multi-periodic implementation of livestock displayed in this table allows
agents to sell livestock units before the end of their productive lifespan, at the beginning as well
as at the end of the modeling period. Parameter values for production of cattle and goats were
estimated from the IFPRI (2010) project survey and were calculated using the spreadsheets of
(Schreinemachers 2006) updated with data from the literature (Lagu et al. 2012, FAO 2004,
Nsubuga 1994).
3.5.4 Investments
From an economic point of view, an investment is a purchase of goods that are not consumed but
used to generate future returns. Investment decisions differ from current production decisions
in that they involve a longer planning horizon of a decision-maker, since investments generate
returns for a period that is longer than one production cycle. In MP-MAS Uganda, investment
goods are the ones that produce outputs for longer than one year. Hence, in MP-MAS Uganda
there are two types of investment goods: (i) coffee plantations and (ii) durable livestock (cattle
and goats). Each investment in MP-MAS is represented by an entry in the agent asset registry
and a separate activity column in MILP. The asset registry contains information about the size
and age of agents’ durable assets. It is updated after every simulation period based on investment
decisions taken by agents.
Optimization of household investment decisions is done by comparing expected future and
annual returns of different resource use alternatives. When solving the investment stage of the
decision process (Table 3.6), MP-MAS code calculates and inserts respective annuity cost and
output coefficients to agent MILP. Table B.1 shows the MILP-implementation of investment
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problems for coffee. When making an investment plan, an agent also considers consumption
preferences and requirements since consumption requirements are included in the investment
MILP (see Table B.1). Therefore, the trade-off between future returns and current consumption
is taken into account.
3.5.5 Risk, expected returns and consumption security
Risk management is an important aspect of farming. Because of market price volatility and
uncertainty about natural conditions and crop yields, farmers have to make their investment
and production decisions based on risk-return trade-offs. This issue is especially relevant in
the case of subsistence-oriented agriculture in developing countries, where the household food
and nutrition security is often at stake and farm livelihoods might be seriously endangered. For
example, according to Hill (2006) 90% of the coffee farmers in Uganda were unable to satisfy
their basic needs during the period of low coffee prices in 2000-2003. In another example,
cassava is less attractive to farmers because it has a highly variable yield and is susceptible to
pests and diseases (Mukiibi 2001). Regarding livestock, households have an additional incentive
to keep goats, since they are more drought-resistant than cattle and, therefore, are a more secure
income source (Ocaido et al. 2009). Hence, risk considerations are expected to be an influential
factor for decision-making of agricultural households in rural Uganda as a whole and in the study
area in particular. Farmers, when planning their enterprises, may consider not only the expected
returns from their production activities, but also the expected variation of the returns.
MP-MAS Uganda adjusts agent decision-making given the risk considerations by the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
• Certainty equivalents: Adjust the expected returns of the current period. Table B.3 provides
an example of implementation of certainty equivalents in agent MILP. A higher value of
certainty equivalent (Eq) means a higher risk-associated discount for the expected return.
These coefficients are only applied when modeling household investment and production
choices. They are not considered during the marketing and consumption decisions, which
are taken with actual results of production (see Table 3.6 for the comparison of decision
stages). The values of certainty equivalents in MP-MAS Uganda were estimated during
model calibration (see Section 4.1).
• Valuation coefficients of future returns: Adjust the expected returns of future periods
(MILP implementation in Table B.3). Reflect farmer preferences assigned to future in-
comes with respect to current incomes. A higher value of the coefficient (V ) would cause
agents to allocate more resources to enterprises that generate income in the future (like
livestock rearing), which would smooth the consumption over periods and reduce the risk
of food insecurity. Also with these valuation coefficients agent attitudes towards future
price and production risks may be tuned. Valuation coefficients of future returns were
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also estimated during model calibration.
• Liquidity reserve factor: Models household preferences towards consumption security.
This factor (R) defines the amount of liquid assets agents reserve (i.e. do not use for
financing of their investment and production activities) to secure household consumption.
The agent-specific amount of liquid assets (Lres) to be reserved is calculated by MP-MAS
as:
Lres = R× Cmin ×HS (3.6)
where Cmin – minimal annual consumption requirement in ugx per gigajoule (estimation
explained in Section 3.7.5); HS – household size in gigajoules.
Reservation of liquid assets for consumption is implemented in MP-MAS by reducing the
corresponding right-hand side values of investment and production MILP of an agent by
this amount (Lres). In the case of marketing and consumption MILP, full liquid assets
are available. The R factor was assumed to be equal to 25% of the respective minimal
annual consumption requirement of the model households, which translates to securing
consumption for three months.
3.6 Simulating crop yields and soil dynamics with TSPC
Crop yields are one of the main parameters in any production-related agricultural model. Pre-
cision of yield estimates in MP-MAS Uganda defined its capabilities in modeling production
decisions. For computation of crop yields and simulation of soil property dynamics MP-MAS
Uganda used Tropical Soil Productivity Calculator (TSPC) of Aune & Massave (1998). It
was specifically parameterized and calibrated for Ugandan agro-ecological conditions by its de-
veloper J. Aune within the work of Schreinemachers et al. (2007).
TSPC is a built-in module of MP-MAS. Theoretically, TSPC is based on Mitscherlich’s relat-
ive yield theory. Therefore, it assumes yield to be limited by potential yield. Several constraining
factors reduce the yield potential to calculate the actual crop yield. The yield function is specified
as:
Yact = Ypot ×MAN ×NAV × PAV ×KAV × SOC × pH (3.7)
In this equation, Yact stands for the actual crop yield and Ypot for the potential crop yield,
which is reduced by the six yield-determining factors defined on [0,1] interval:
• Crop management practice represented by the level of labor application (MAN )
• Available amount of nitrogen (NAV )
• Available amount of phosphorus (PAV )
• Available amount of potassium (KAV )
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• Soil organic carbon (SOC)
• Level of acidity (pH)
Plot management practices influence soil fertility, which in turn determines future yields.
Changes in crop yields over time influence farmers’ decisions with regards to the choice of plot
management practices. The integration of the TSPC equations with the farm-level production
module in MP-MAS Uganda allows for the simulation of such a human-environment interaction
cycle.
TSPC is a recursive model: it updates soil chemical properties based on the history of applied
land use practices. TSPC calculations of soil property dynamics go through five mathematical
phases (equations can be found in Schreinemachers (2006)):
1. Calculation of yield determining factors: The five natural determinants of crop yields that
TSPC considers (NAV , PAV , KAV , SOC and pH) are computed from maps with plot
chemical characteristics.
2. Calculation of crop and residue yields using Equation 3.7.
3. Explicit adjustment of crop yields. (Function adjustments for pest and disease effects,
harvest and post-harvest and other losses are provided in Table 3.11.)
4. Calculation of soil property dynamics: Maps with chemical properties are updated to
create the input for next the period yield calculations.
5. Evaluation of dynamics in balance equations: Plot level nutrient and acidity balances are
calculated. Based on the outcome of these computations, land use processes are evaluated.
Table 3.11: Yield adjustments for negative effects
Effect
Crop Magnitude Adjustment to
yield function, %
Bean Medium -30%
Cassava Strong -50%
Coffee Small -20%
Groundnut Small -20%
Maize Medium -30%
Plantain Strong -50%
Sorghum Medium -20%
Sweet potato Strong -50%
Source: Author’s rough estimates, based on
Mukiibi (2001) and Schreinemachers (2006)
TSPC calculates yields based on solutions of agent production MILP, which are being solved
with the expected yields, and inserts actual yields into marketing and consumption MILP (see
89
Figures 3.1 and 3.5 and Table 3.6 for details). Apart from grain yield, some plants also produce
crop residues or stover yields, which comprise a certain percentage of the total crop yield and
are used in MILP for livestock feeding (see Table B.11).
3.7 Consumption preferences
Considerations of food security and own consumption requirements have a certain influence
in decision making of farmers in developing countries, where the agriculture is to a large ex-
tent subsistence-oriented. Therefore, modeling of household consumption received a particu-
lar focus in MP-MAS Uganda. Allocation of generated income for expenditures and savings
is the last stage of agent decision making (see Table 3.6), and it is being considered during the
earlier decision-making stages of investment, production and marketing. For modeling of house-
hold consumption, this study used the extended and adapted methodology of Schreinemachers
et al. (2007), which in turn is based on theoretical concepts of Working (1943), Leser (1963),
Deaton & Muelbauer (1980) and Sadoulet & De Janvry (1995). Savings and expenditures were
defined by a stepwise budgeting process, represented in Figure 3.7. Through this decision pro-
cess a household (based on the size of its income) splits the current income between savings,
expenditures on different types of food, and other expenditures. Implementation of such income
allocation in MP-MAS Uganda was done in accordance with the respective regression models
estimated from UNPS (2010) and IFPRI (2010) surveys.
Figure 3.7: Concept of household budgeting
Source: Concept of Schreinemachers et al. (2007)
3.7.1 Savings
As follows from the budgeting concept (Figure 3.7) savings (S) is a function of income (I). Let us
assume that the proportion of income that is saved increases with income. Therefore, considering
the effects of household size (HS) and household location (D1...Dn – district dummies), the
savings function can be specified as:
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S = β0 + β1I + β2HS + γ1D1 + ...+ γnDn (3.8)
This savings function was estimated from the IFPRI (2010) household data. Household
savings were represented by a survey variable containing respondents’ estimates of how much
he or she was able to save in a ”good month”. Annual farm income was calculated and used as an
income proxy. According to the IFPRI (2010) survey, a substantial share of households did not
make any savings. This fact created a kurtosis in the distribution of the dependent variable S.
Therefore, the model (Equation 3.8) was estimated only for households with non-zero savings.
Table C.2 contains the regression output. From this table it can be seen that the squared term
of farm income is close to zero. Therefore, it can be concluded that the savings function has a
linear shape on the observed levels of income. Household size and most of the district dummies
were insignificant.
Practical implementation of the savings function in agent MILP required it to be defined on
all income levels. Hence, the regression model of savings as a function of farm income from
Table C.2 was converted to the simple linear form with no constant term (Table C.3). A direct
transition from monthly savings to annual savings was done, assuming households to have three
”good months” in the calendar year. A distinction between saving and non-saving households
was introduced by the estimation of a logit model from the same independent variables as the
original savings function: I , HS, D1...Dn. Results of the logit estimation are shown in Table
C.1.
The logit model was used in MP-MAS Uganda for the assignment of propensity to make sav-
ings based on agent’s income and household size. From the logit estimates, the agent-specific
bounds for income, from which agents start to make savings, could be computed. In this disser-
tation, this bound is referred to as Ψ.) A dependent variable in the logit model is a probability in
log-odds (Plog) of an agent to make any savings. Normal probability can be derived from it as:
P = 1/(1 + ePlog) (3.9)
By comparison of normal probability with uniform random number on (0;1) interval (R)
non-saving agents could be identified. An agent makes savings if:
P ≥ 1−R (3.10)
Substituting P with the right-hand side of Equation 3.9 results in the following condition of
making savings:
Plog ≥ −Ln(1/(1−R)− 1) (3.11)
Replacement of Plog by the regression equation of the logit model (see Table C.1 gives:
β0 + β1I + β2HS +D ≥ −Ln(1/(1−R)− 1) (3.12)
91
where β0, β1, β2 – regression coefficients of the estimated logit model; D – corresponding
regional dummy.
Finally, solving the inequality for income, provides an income bound for savings behavior.
Assignment of agent-specific random numbers provides a distinction between saving and non-
saving agents. An agent makes savings if:
I ≥ (−Ln(1/(1−R)− 1)− β0 − β2HS −D)/β0 (3.13)
The term at the right-hand side of Inequality 3.13 is an income bound for savings behavior
(Ψ). MILP-implementation of the savings component of budgeting process is explained in Table
B.4. From the displayed tableau it can be seen that different income sizes and Ψ values of
individual agents made the savings model agent-specific.
3.7.2 Food and non-food expenditure shares
Expenditure budget partitioning between food and non-food expenditures was represented by
the Working-Leser model (Working 1943, Leser 1963). Unlike Schreinemachers et al. (2007),
who used the modified version of the Working-Leser model, in this work an original form of the
model was applied. The model defines a share of total household expenditure spent on food (η)
as a function of total expenditure (E), household size (HS) and a vector of dummy variables
(D1...Dn). The function has a log functional form, which is called to reflect a decrease in the
share of food expenditures with the rise of total expenditure budget:
η = β0 + β1lnE + β2HS + γ1D1 + ...+ γnDn (3.14)
The regression model specified by Equation 3.14 was estimated for Uganda from the UNPS
(2010) national survey. Table C.4 presents the regression estimates.
Transfer of the non-linear food expenditure partitioning function (Equation 3.14) to the MILP
(which requires a linear set up) was done through division of the function to a number of linear
segments according to the size of the expenditure budget. Figure 3.8 shows linear representation
of the expenditure part (β1lnE) of the function (calculated for the average household size). Table
B.13 demonstrates how the function was implemented in the agent MILP-tableau. MP-MAS
makes the tableau agent-specific by inserting the respective household sizes of individual agents.
MILP coefficients for the expenditure part of the function for linear segments (Υ) are calculated
using average expenditure of this segment:
Υn = β1ln((En+1 − En)/2) (3.15)
where En – segment lower bound (expressed in total expenditure); β1 – expenditure regres-
sion coefficients of estimated Working-Leser model (Equation 3.14).
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Figure 3.8: Food expenditure function
Source: Author (expenditure function estimated from UNPS (2010))
3.7.3 Food product categories
In the last stage of the budgeting process (Figure 3.7) a household decides on how many items to
consume from different food categories. A food category is an aggregation of products accord-
ing to their substitutability. Products within the same food category, therefore, are assumed to
be perfect substitutes. For the MP-MAS Uganda application eight food categories were defined
(listed in Table 3.12). Monetary values, energy and protein contents for units of different food
categories were calculated as averages weighted by shares of particular products in the house-
hold consumption expenditure for the given food category (estimated from UNPS (2010)). For
estimation of monetary values, price records (medians for rural agricultural households) of IF-
PRI (2010) for Masaka district, to which the study area belongs, were used. Energy and protein
content of foods were taken from USDA (2011) database.
A household choice between food categories that a household makes can be explained by
the application of an almost ideal demand system by Deaton & Muelbauer (1980), where ex-
penditure shares spent on different food items depend on relative prices and on a measure of real
income. For the empirical applications it is practical to use a linear approximate of the system
(Alston & Chalfant 1993). There, shares of particular food categories (σi) in the household food
expenditure (FE) are defined by k equations of the form:
σi = β0,i + β1,i(ln(FE/HS))/PI + β2HS + εi,1lnUV1 + ...+ εi,klnUVk + γ1D1 + ...+ γnDn
(3.16)
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Table 3.12: Aggregation of food categories
id Food category Main products Mean budget
share, %
Energy,
GJ/kg
Protein,
kg/kg
Mean unit
value, .00
ugx/kg
1. Plantains plantain 15.95 0.00378 0.00963 5.00
2. Tubers sweet potato, cassava,
irish potato
18.31 0.00445 0.01321 3.96
3. Cereals millet, sorghum, rice,
maize
13.62 0.01418 0.08411 7.53
4. Legumes and
bakery
beans, groundnut, peas,
sesame, bread
12.75 0.01565 0.22140 22.21
5. Additives sugar, salt, cooking oil,
ghee
9.52 0.01863 0.00038 28.24
6. Animal
products
beef, chicken, mutton,
pork, fish, milk, eggs,
butter
15.06 0.00591 0.16295 28.95
7. Fruits and ve-
getables
sweet banana, passion
fruit, tomato, cabbage,
onion, jackfruit, dodo
8.49 0.00160 0.01065 8.05
8. Food luxuries infant food, restaurant
food, soda, juice, tea,
coffee, beer, tobacco
6.30 0.00523 0.03302 29.27
Source: Own calculations from UNPS (2010) and IFPRI (2010); unit values are given in 2010 real prices;
calculations of energy and protein contents are based on USDA (2011) data
where i – food category index; k – number of food categories; HS – household size in
gigajoules; UV – unit value of food category; PI – Stone’s geometric price index calculated as
a product of unit values and category expenditure shares (PI =
k∑
1
UVk ∗ σk); D1...Dn – vector
of dummy variables.
In order to be consistent with a theory of consumer behavior, the estimated regression coef-
ficients of the regression models (Equation 3.16) have to satisfy the following conditions:
• Sum of shares of all categories equals to one:
i∑
1
β0,i = 1 (3.17)
• Budget constraint:
k∑
1
ε1,k =
k∑
1
ε2,k = ... =
k∑
1
εi,k = 0 (3.18)
• Symmetry of the price coefficients:
εi,k = εk,i (3.19)
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Like the Working-Leser model of food expenditure, the demand system was estimated from
the UNPS (2010) national survey. Prior to the model estimation the sample was corrected using
the two-stage Heckmann procedure (Heckman 1979) for the cases when a household is not con-
suming products from particular food categories. Only the non-zero shares (σi) were considered
in the estimation of the demand system. The estimation of the system (Equations 3.16 - 3.19)
was done through application of seemingly unrelated regression of Zellner (1962). Tables C.5 -
C.12 demonstrate the estimated linear approximation of the demand system.
From the demand system specified by Equations 3.16, income elasticities (ξd) for different
food categories can be derived as:
ξd = 1 + β1,i/σi + σi (3.20)
Table 3.13 presents the income elasticities at average level of income as estimated from
UNPS (2010). Categories 1 (plantains), 6 (animal products) and 8 (food luxuries) have income
elasticities greater than one, which means that demand for the food from these categories rises
more than proportionally with respect to income. It is an expected result the in case of animal
products and food luxuries. Plantains are an important staple food in Uganda; the results of the
elasticity calculation suggest that with rising income, households prefer it over the other staples
(categories 2, 3 and 4).
Table 3.13: Income elasticities at average level of income
Food category id 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Income elasticity 1.18 0.93 0.79 0.75 0.84 1.31 0.71 1.61
Source: Own estimations from UNPS (2010)
Compensated price elasticities for food categories could be derived from Equations 3.16 as:
Own price elasticity: ξk,k = −1 + εk,k/σi + σi (3.21)
Cross price elasticity: ξi,k = εi,k/σi + σi (3.22)
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 report price elasticities at average level of income as estimated from
UNPS (2010). As expected, all own price elasticities have a negative sign (i.e. demand for
all food categories falls with the increase in price for the categories). Most of the cross-price
elasticities have a positive sign. That is also an expected result: demand for a given food category
rises, when the price of the different food category increases.
The non-linear relationships of σi shares and household food expenditure were translated to
agent MILP in a similar way as the food expenditure part – by division of the function to linear
segments for different food expenditure levels. Table B.14 exhibits a MILP-representation of the
demand system. Segment-specific food category expenditure coefficients (Ωn,i) were calculated
using average segment food expenditure:
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Table 3.14: Own price elasticities at average level of income
Food category id 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Own price elasticity -0.84 -0.63 -0.65 -0.61 -0.57 -0.60 -0.66 -0.46
Source: Own estimations from UNPS (2010)
Table 3.15: Cross price elasticities at average level of income
Food category id 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.10
2 0.17 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.05 0.00
3 0.24 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.11
4 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.08
5 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.01
6 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.06 -0.13
7 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.03
8 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.06
Source: Own estimations from UNPS (2010)
Ωn,i = β1,i ∗ (ln((FEn+1 − FEn)/2)− ln(HS)− ln(PS)) (3.23)
where FEn – segment lower bound (expressed as total expenditure spent on food); β1,i – real
per capita food expenditure regression coefficient from the estimated demand system (Equations
3.16–3.19).
Agent consumption of purchased food products was valued with mean unit values (see Table
3.12). Consumption of crops produced by household was valued using median market prices
for rural agricultural households (estimated from IFPRI (2010)). In the case of crops grown in
the study area exclusively for home consumption (sweet potato, cassava, groundnut, sorghum),
median market prices reduced by a percentage defined during model calibration (see Section
4.1) were used. This reduction was incorporated, since the value of such crops for households
is defined by the opportunity cost of their production. The values of home-grown fruits and ve-
getables, which were implemented in the model as aggregate crops (described in Section 3.5.1),
were also subject to calibration.
3.7.4 Food consumption requirements
In the MP-MAS Uganda application, required food energy intake (energy demand) was used as
a proxy for household requirements of food consumption. An agent’s energy demand is quanti-
fied in MP-MAS as a sum of individual demands of household members, which vary based on
their sex and age. Sex- and age-specific human minimum energy demands were calculated by
Schreinemachers et al. (2007) based on the respective parameters of James & Schofield (1990),
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who estimated these demands from basal metabolic requirements and physical activity related
requirements. Figure 3.9 displays the levels of minimal annual energy demands as they were
set in MP-MAS Uganda. Agent minimum energy demand entered agent MILP as an additional
constraint. Therefore, it was assumed that households have an absolute preference for satisfying
their minimum energy demand, which is consistent with the basic motivation theory of (Maslow
1954). In other words, households at first try to meet their food needs and only then maxim-
ize their income. Table B.15 provides an example of MILP-implementation of household food
consumption requirement. The high negative value attributed to the food energy deficit makes
agents prefer current food consumption over future incomes until the point where food energy
requirements of the agent are met. Based on the food items household agents choose to con-
sume, MP-MAS Uganda also calculates food protein supply (implementation in Table B.15).
Alternatively, one can also similarly include protein requirements as a constraint in agent MILP.
Figure 3.9: Annual energy demand
Source: Calculations of Schreinemachers et al. (2007) based on James & Schofield (1990)
Thus, the consumption part of agent MILP calculates the allocation of agent income between
savings and food and non-food expenditure based on econometrically estimated models, and
optimizes household food consumption in monetary terms. For different types of food, an agent
decides whether it’s beneficial to produce the food on their own farm or to purchase it on the
market.
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3.7.5 Cash flow and liquidity reserve
Liquidity constraint is an important factor that limits investment opportunities of smallholder
farmers in developing countries and undermines the profitability of input applications (Dorward
et al. 2004, Kydd & Dorward 2001). Lack of liquidity may also create a need to produce food
for subsistence. Therefore, the liquidity aspect was included in the farm decision model of
MP-MAS Uganda. It ensures that expenditures of model agents on production inputs and own
consumption purposes do not exceed the amount of cash available at the period of time when
these expenditures are made. The MILP-tableau from Table B.5 shows the implementation of
cash flow and liquidity constraints in the MP-MAS Uganda application. In this implementation,
current liquidity constraints of household agents are imposed for planting time and after harvest.
The remaining cash at the end of the year is recorded in the solution of the specific MILP activity.
MP-MAS code saves this value and uses it as a starting liquidity of the next period. The liquidity
of the initial period was set to 150% of the estimated liquidity requirement (liquidity that is
required to achieve the recorded production pattern) of IFPRI (2010) survey households.
For modeling agent preferences on consumption security, MP-MAS Uganda additionally has
a parameter of a minimal annual consumption requirement, which defines the liquidity reserve
of an agent (mechanism explained in Section 3.5.5). The value of this parameter was set to
the 10th percentile of total household consumption expenditure per annum per household size
expressed in gigajoules. The value was estimated from UNPS (2010) national survey, taking
into account the expenditure of rural agricultural households in the Central Region of Uganda.
In 2010 real terms, the minimum consumption requirement of model agents constitutes 109,929
ugx per gigajoule of household size per annum. In the MP-MAS Uganda application, agents
would keep (if possible) 25% of this value for every gigajoule of their household size as their
cash reserve, in order to secure their consumption in case of crop or market failures.
3.7.6 Remittances
Empirical evidence from various Sub-Saharan African countries (Davies et al. 2009, Mazzu-
cato et al. 2008, Azam & Gubert 2006) shows that local and foreign remittances constitute an
important source of household income. Remittances finance farm operations, provide additional
investment capital and support household consumption, thus contributing to rural development
as well as to alleviation of poverty and malnutrition. The IFPRI (2010) survey conducted in
rural Uganda reported that 23.4% of all survey households and 28.2% of Kibinge households
received remittances. Therefore, this important income inflow was introduced in the MP-MAS
Uganda model. The amounts of received remittances in the model are agent-specific and constant
throughout simulation periods. These amounts were distributed among model agents using the
copula sampling approach (discussed in Section 3.2) jointly with other household characterist-
ics as consist with the empirical data of the IFPRI (2010) survey. Figure 3.10 plots remittances
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received by Kibinge households as recorded in the IFPRI (2010) survey and implemented in
MP-MAS Uganda. MILP-implementation of remittances is presented in Table B.6.
Figure 3.10: Received remittances
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
3.8 Demography and population dynamics
Uganda has a rapidly growing population. The latest statistics of CIA (2012) estimated the an-
nual population growth rate of Uganda at 3.58%, making it the third fastest growing country
in the world. In the last ten years this indicator increased from 2.93% due to significant im-
provements in health and mortality indicators. Between 2001 and 2011, life expectancy at birth
increased from 43.37 to 53.24 years, infant mortality decreased from 91.3 to 62.47 deaths per
1,000 births, and the death rate decreased from 17.97 to 11.71 per 1,000 persons (CIA 2012).
Uganda’s total fertility rate has remained high and now constitutes 6.69 children born per woman
(the second highest in the world) (CIA 2012). Fast population growth, on one hand, provides
an additional labor supply to the economy, but on the other hand, it results in increased demand
for natural resources and population pressure on ecosystems. Therefore, long-term economic
forecasting and modeling should consider the demographic factor.
The initial structure of the model population is defined by pseudo-random generation of
model agents (see Section 3.2). In this procedure, the number of persons in each age-gender
group is assigned for each model household. Later, the exact age of the household member
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within the age group is randomly assigned by the MP-MAS code. Age groups, not exact ages
were used in copula sampling in order to keep the ages, which were not recorded due to the small
size of the IFPRI (2010) survey sample, probable. Table 3.16 describes the age groups used in
the copula sampling. (For male and female members the bounds are identical.) The bounds of
age groups were defined from the IFPRI (2010) survey such that the number of persons in each
group were equal, 99 full years was assumed to be the maximum possible age.
Table 3.16: Age group bounds
Group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Lower bound, full years 0 5 7 11 13 15 17 19 23 33 46 59
Upper bound, full years 4 6 10 12 14 16 18 23 32 45 58 99
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS input
The demography model of MP-MAS Uganda simulates population dynamics by calculat-
ing annual new births and deaths for household agents given the age specific probabilities of
mortality and giving birth. This calculation is done before the end of each modeling period
(see Figure 3.1). After the probabilistic modeling of survived and newborn household members
in a given simulation period is finished, MP-MAS updates the respective information on agent
household composition in the asset registry. In this research, the probabilities for the demo-
graphy model were estimated using several sources of data: UDHS (2007), World Bank (2012)
and CIA (2012). UDHS (2007) country-wide survey contained information on fertility rates in
Uganda aggregated by regions, urban/rural residence and certain age groups.
Table 3.17: Age-specific fertility rates in Kibinge sub-county, 2010
Mother’s age at birth Births per 1,000 women
15–19 141
20–24 279
25–29 275
30–34 233
35–39 170
40–44 83
45–49 28
Source: Own estimation, based on UDHS (2007) and CIA (2012)
Table 3.17 presents results of the author’s calculations of birth rates from the UDHS (2007)
survey for Kibinge sub-county (adjusted to 2010 according to CIA (2012) data on annual birth
rates). For the calculation of age specific fertility rates for the study area, this data was linearly
interpolated (in accordance with Feeney & Zaba (2001), for the estimation of the fertility curve
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Figure 3.11: Demography model. Fertility curve
Source: Author, based on UDHS (2007) and CIA (2012) data
in Uganda the fertility was defined to be greater than zero on the age interval from 12 to 52
years). Figure 3.11 displays the respective age-specific fertility curve.
Table 3.18: Age-specific mortality rates in Kibinge sub-county, 2010
Deaths per 1,000 persons
Person’s age at death Women Men
0 75.3 95.3
1–5 55.3 66.0
15–9 3.3 2.5
20–24 4.7 4.3
25–29 7.4 7.3
30–34 11.2 11.3
35–39 12.9 15.1
40–44 12.7 20.4
45–49 13.7 20.8
Source: Own estimation, based on UDHS (2007), CIA (2012)
and World Bank (2012) data
UDHS (2007) survey also provided statistics on death rates in Uganda. Table 3.18 contains
results of the author’s calculations of mortality rates from this survey (adjusted to 2010 according
to CIA (2012) data on annual death rates). For estimation of the age specific mortality rates the
data was also linearly interpolated. Unfortunately, the UDHS (2007) survey, as shown in Table
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Figure 3.12: Demography model. Survivorship curves
Source: Author, based on UDHS (2007), CIA (2012) and World Bank (2012) data
3.18, assesses only mortality information for the particular age segments and, therefore, does not
provide the full picture of mortality during a person’s lifetime. (Data on mortality after the 49th
year was missing.) As one of the country demographic indicators, World Bank (2012) estimated
the probability of a person to survive until the age of 65 (47.76 % and 45.19 % for women and
men in Uganda, respectively); this data was used for further interpolation of the mortality rates.
The mortality schedules for the remaining years (65 and older) were predicted by using Brass’
relational model lifetable (Brass 1971). The resulted survivorship curves for the study area are
shown in Figure 3.12.
The migration of labor out of rural areas is another important demographic factor to be con-
sidered. Dorosh & Thurlow (2009) simulated an average annual in-migration rate (number of net
migrants as a share of total labor force) from 2005 to 2015 for the rural areas in the southern part
of Uganda at the level of -0.24%. Since the empirical age-specific data on migration in Uganda
was not available, it was drawn from the simulated value of Dorosh & Thurlow (2009) weighted
by the model labor supply estimates and survivor proportions (assuming equality of migration
rates by gender). Labor supply by age and gender was empirically estimated from IFPRI (2001)
by Schreinemachers et al. (2007). Figure 3.13 presents baseline age-specific migration rates in
MP-MAS Uganda, expressed as the probability of a person to take a migration decision in a
given year.
Validation of the demography model is discussed in Section 4.2.6.
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Figure 3.13: Demography model. Migration
Source: Author, based on UDHS (2007), CIA (2012) and World Bank (2012) data
3.9 Agent expectations
Table 3.6 shows that decision-making of model agents is based on expected values of market
(prices, input costs) and natural (crop and stover yields) factors. MP-MAS Uganda models the
development of agent expectations through different model periods, assuming that expectations
of model agents are adaptive. Adaptive expectations imply that agent expectations about what
will happen in the future are exclusively based on what has happened in the past. In this case,
expected values (EV ) of the current period are calculated from actual (AV ) and expected values
of the preceding period. Actual values of the preceding year are adjusted with the λ-share of the
difference between expected and actual values of the preceding period:
EVn = EVn−1 + λ× (EVn−1 − AVn−1) (3.24)
Having λ-parameter equal to 1 makes agents to expect in the current period the actual value
of the preceding period (naive expectations), λ equal to 0 implies constant expectations.
From the definition of adaptive expectations (Equation 3.24), it follows that the expectations
of the starting period (initial expectations) have to be explicitly defined. Initial expectations
on prices and costs in the MP-MAS Uganda application were set equal to the ones recorded
by IFPRI (2010). Initial yield expectations for model crops, at first, were manually calculated
in MS Excel using TSPC equations. These calculations were performed for each of the model
soil classes separately. The transition from soil-specific to agent-specific (due to the uniqueness
of agent soil properties) expectations is done by MP-MAS, which recursively updates the ini-
103
tial expectations during model spin-up periods that precede normal simulation periods. During
spin-up periods, only the agent expectations are updated, while household physical and finan-
cial assets, soil properties and population demography remain constant. Yield expectations are
formed by crop and by plot, i.e. for the same crop on the same plot, but grown with a different
practice, an agent would expect the same trend in yield. Several spin-up periods were needed
to form stable initial yield expectations, which are agent- and soil- specific. For the baseline
scenario, λ parameter for yields was set to 1: agents expect yields of the preceding period. Mar-
ket price expectations are formed by commodity and in the baseline scenario were constant to
the initial prices (estimated from IFPRI (2010) (since the baseline scenario is performed with
constant market prices). For expectations with regard to RPO payments, and for scenarios with
changing prices, the lambda parameter of 0.5 was applied (if not stated otherwise).
3.10 Modeling coffee marketing with MP-MAS
Coffee marketing is the main focus of this research. Its modeling required a major extension of
MP-MAS Uganda. Corresponding changes could be logically split into two parts: (i) additions
to the household-level model and (ii) introduction of a new agent type. This section discusses
the implementation of both.
3.10.1 Extending the household decision model
As the author revealed during his field visits to the RPOs of Kibinge sub-county (see Chapter
2), the choice of marketing channels for most of the RPO-members is limited to two options: (i)
individual sales to local middlemen traders and (ii) collective sales through the RPO-channel.
Hence, first of all, the selling activities for coffee in the household MILP were split to account
for these channels. The irreversible decision over marketing channels was added to the sequence
of household-decisions (see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.6). This decision is made at the end of the
simulation period given the received yields, actual resource allocation, and contract and credit
obligations. The prices in the case of RPO-channel, however, remain expected, since they are
dependent on the quantity of produce sold through the RPO, which is uncertain for the household
at the point of time when the decision is taken. (Derivation of RPO prices is explained in Section
3.10.2.)
As the interviewed farmers reported, the DC/ACE always offers a higher price to farmers
than traders do. This was expected, given the lower per unit transaction costs, value addition
done by the organization, and higher bargaining power of collective sales. However, during
the field visits RPO-members reported selling up to 50–70% of their coffee produce to traders.
Also, according to IFPRI (2010), only 52.1% of the coffee produced by RPO-members is sold
through the RPO-channel, while the remaining 47.9% is marketed through local traders. These
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facts suggest that non-price incentives also have importance for farmers, as the profit margins
with which traders operate are small (Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009). Therefore, we may expect
non-price considerations to play an important role in defining farmers’ marketing behavior. For
modeling the choice between the coffee marketing channels, it is essential to understand these
considerations. Hence, they are outlined below:
• Informal money lending: Because of a lack of formal credit institutions in rural areas,
coffee farmers often take informal credits from local traders at the beginning of the season
that have to be repaid with coffee at harvesting time (Latynskiy & Berger 2011).
• Time preference: Selling through RPOs involves a certain delay in payment (due to the
coordination of the collection of individual produce, product transformation and banking
operations), while when selling to a trader coffee growers are paid on the spot. Given the
high rates of time preference of farmers in Sub-Saharan African countries (Holden et al.
1998), even small time delays may significantly discount the values of future payments,
thus discouraging farmers from using the RPO-channel for their coffee.
• Coping with emergency: Unexpected needs for cash (because of funerals, illnesses, food
shortages etc.) may set the time preferences to approaching infinity, in such circumstances
selling through traders is an emergency coping strategy.
• Cooperativeness, trust and social responsibility: An RPO is a self-organized cooper-
ative entity, hence, from the perspective of the theory of collective action, issues of indi-
vidual attitudes, trust, reputation, member responsibility and commitment may apply (Os-
trom 2004). Indeed, analysis of the results of public goods games conducted in Kibinge
(see Latynskiy & Berger (2011)) suggested that the volumes of coffee that a member sells
through their RPO was correlated with their game contributions (proxy for trust to other
members and social responsibility).
The author, according to the insights gained from his fieldwork in Uganda, saw the first
two incentives as prevailing factors influencing the choice of the sales channel. Therefore, they
were both introduced to household agent MILP in MP-MAS Uganda. Their implementation is
described in this section.
Informal money lending Village coffee traders also act in the study area as informal money-
lenders providing short-term loans (Latynskiy & Berger 2011). Usually such loans are provided
in the form of an informal futures contract. Debtors have to repay the loan with a part of their
coffee harvest. Typically, the informal loans have no pre-arranged interest: the interest is rather
hidden in the price margin the traders obtain. Interviewed farmers roughly estimated the in-
dividual credit limit up to which traders are willing to lend money as 50% of the value of the
expected coffee harvest of the debtor, but usually not more than 100,000 ugx. This limit was
introduced into the model. Table 3.19 contains the MILP-representation of informal money
lending conditions.
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Table 3.19: MILP-implementation of informal loans
Grow Collect Sell coffee Informal Hire Buy
coffee coffee RPO trader credit labor inputs
Maximize P1 P2 -C1 -C2
Upper bound
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(for solution)
Land 1 ≤ Land
Labor L -1 ≤ Lab
Capital -1 C1 C2 ≤ Cash
Coffee plantation 1 ≤ Cof
Inputs I -1 ≤ 0
Yield balance -Y 1 ≤ 0
Coffee output -1 1 1 ≤ 0
Credit repayment -P2 1 ≤ 0
Credit limit -P2 ∗ Lim 1 ≤ 0
* Pi – expected market prices; Ci – production costs; Si – household soil endowments;
Land, Lab, Cash – household land, labor and capital endowments; Cof – coffee plantation size;
L – labor requirement; I – input requirement; Y – expected yield;
Lim – credit limit, expressed as a share of expected revenue from coffee sales;
Incorporation of individual time preferences Focus group discussions in Uganda facilitated
by the IFPRI–IZA–UHOH project outlined delays in payment for the produce delivered by RPO-
members as one of the main factors discouraging producers from selling through the organization
(Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009). Hence, a block of questions related to the members’ behavior in
the case of payment delays was included in the project baseline survey (IFPRI 2010). First, a
hypothetical situation was introduced to the interviewed farmers: ”Imagine you are going to be
given a gift worth 5,000 ugx. You will receive it either tomorrow or in one month. If you wait
one month you will receive more.” Then, the respondents were asked whether they would prefer
to receive 5,250 ugx after one month or 5,000 ugx tomorrow. If the respondent refused to wait
one month, then he or she was offered a better deal with 5,500 ugx of delayed payout. If this deal
was also declined, then the offer was increased to 6,000 ugx. Finally, if the respondent declined
this deal as well, he or she had to give the own value of payout, which he or she was willing
to receive in order to wait for one month. Table 3.20 reflects the related responses of Kibinge
farmers expressed as monthly rates of time preference.
Table 3.20 shows that in the study area the rates of time preference vary significantly from
0–5% to over 100% in monthly terms. Therefore, the author decided to introduce them into
the model as an additional agent characteristic. The assignment of time preferences to agents
was done by copula-based method (explained in Section 3.2, which assured the creation of a
representative agent population in the model. (For households that had accepted one of the
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Table 3.20: Time preferences of Kibinge households
Monthly rate of time preference Frequency Percent
0–5% 15 21.4
5–10% 7 10.0
10–20% 11 15.7
20–50% 5 7.1
50–100% 17 24.3
> 100% 15 21.4
Source: Author from IFPRI (2010)
offered values, the discrete data on time preference was made continuous by linear interpolation
prior to the assignment.)
The incorporation of time preferences into the household decision model means discounting
the revenues of delayed sales (the incorporation of risk preferences can be undertaken analog-
ously by discounting the revenues from risky activities). For this end, the calculation of an
agent-specific penalty coefficient (Pen) from the agent’s monthly rate of time preference (TP )
was implemented in MP-MAS code:
Pen = 1− 1/(1 + TP )t (3.25)
where t - time from delivery till payment in months.
This penalty coefficient was applied to discount (penalize) the revenues of the delayed activ-
ities in agent MILP (see Table 3.21).
Table 3.21: MILP-implementation of time and risk penalties
Grow Sell coffee Sell future coffee PO-sale penalty
coffee RPO-channel trader RPO trader current future
Maximize P1 P2 Pf1 Pf2 -P1 -Pf1
Land 1 ≤ Land
Coffee plantation 1 ≤ Cof
Yield balance -Y 1 1 ≤ 0
Fut. yield balance -Y f 1 1 ≤ 0
Penalty Pen -1 ≤ 0
Fut. penalty 1 Pen -1 ≤ 0
* Pi – expected market prices of this year; Pfi – expected market price of future years;
Land – household land endowment; Cof – size of coffee plantation; Y – expected yield of this year;
Y f – annuity of expected yields of the remaining years of the plantation;
Pen – agent-specific penalty coefficient;
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3.10.2 Rural producer organization as a new agent type
Decision making of RPOs and other cooperative entities can also (as previously described house-
hold decisions) be represented in form of the optimization problem. Therefore, RPOs were in-
troduced to the modeling framework as a specific agent type, in addition and different from farm
household agents as in the original MP-MAS version of Berger (2001). The activity of this agent
is also simulated by solving the respective MILP.
In the context of this case study, an agricultural RPO is a company and a business entity.
Therefore its objective from the perspective of economic theory is profit (Π) maximization,
which could be written as:
MAX : Π = (P − V C) ∗Q− FC (3.26)
where P – sales price; Q – quantity sold; V C – variable costs; FC – fixed costs.
Mathematically, the optimization problem of the RPO is similar to the one of the farm house-
hold agent (described by Equations 3.3), with the exception that RPOs maximize profit while
households maximize utility. This problem can also be represented in the format of the MILP-
tableau: Table 3.22 contains a simplified example of the MILP-formulation of the RPO optimiz-
ation problem. Similar to MILP of household agents, the displayed MILP can be extended with
various optimization constraints, such as RPO liquidity, transport and processing capacity, etc.
The right most activity of the MILP-tableau from Table 3.22 calculates the profit of the RPO,
i.e. the value of the objective function is also recorded as a solution of this activity. This extra
calculation is done to simplify the implementation of RPO-household interactions (explained
below) in MP-MAS source code. To allow for negative profits this activity was allowed to also
have a negative solution.
Table 3.22: MILP-formulation of RPO profit calculation
Collect Transport Process Fixed Sell Profit *
produce produce produce cost processed
Maximize -C1 -C2 -C3 -1 P
Raw quantity 1 ≤ Q
Collected quantity -(1-R1) 1 ≤ 0
Transported quantity -(1-R2) 1 ≤ 0
Processed quantity -(1-R3) 1 ≤ 0
Fixed costs 1 = FC
Profit -C1 -C2 -C3 -1 P1 -1 = 0
*solution of this activity is allowed to be negative;
Ci – variable costs per unit; P – market price of current year;
Q – available quantity; FC – fixed costs; Ri – weight reduction coefficients;
Since RPOs work with farm households in many ways (see Chapter 2), the RPO agent in
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the MP-MAS also interacts with farm household agents. Farm agents that are RPO members
send their produce to the RPO agent, as well as their membership fees and inquiries for inputs,
which serve as exogenous variables for the decision-making module of the RPO agent. The RPO
agent in turn feeds back to its RPO member agents the sales prices and per unit costs, which
then influence their decision-making. Figure 3.14 schematically displays the interaction process
between the two agent types. In this way, RPO agents and farm household agents influence each
other’s behavior.
Figure 3.14: Interactions of farm agents and RPO agents in MP-MAS
Source: Author
Since RPOs (DC, ACE, etc.) are effectively non-profit organizations, the entire profit they
make is transferred back to the producers. Hence, the payment for the delivered produce, or the
farm-gate price that farmers receive (p), equals the profit margin of the RPO:
p = Π/Q (3.27)
or
p = P − V C − FC/Q (3.28)
From Equations 3.27 and 3.28 it can be seen that the price that household agents receive for
products marketed through the RPO agent depends on the solution of the RPO agent optimization
problem, which in turn depends on the total quantity of products sold through the RPO. RPO
optimization enters the sequence of agent decision problems between the decisions on marketing
and consumption (see Figure 3.5). MP-MAS calculates the total quantity of products delivered
to the RPO (Q) from the marketing MILP of household agents and inserts this value to the
right-hand side of the respective constraint in the RPO MILP (Table 3.22). After solving the
RPO MILP, the price (p) is inserted into the consumption MILP of the household agents, thus
implementing an interaction loop (see Figure 3.14). The described mechanism of interlinking
the results of RPO and members’ performance can be applied to various types of cooperative
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activities, for example certification or grading. Incorporation of several marketable products to
the MILP of an RPO-agent could be done by disaggregating the profit calculation according to
the enterprises. Table B.16 shows this with the example of basic and certified products. In this
case, for the certified product the size of the per unit certification premium would be calculated
by MP-MAS and transferred to MILP of household agents.
Following the discussed implementation, the MP-MAS Uganda application simulates the
behavior and interactions of the Kibinge DC and its member households. The DC is represented
by the separate agent of the RPO-type.
Cost structure of the producer organization The sustainability of marketing RPOs and their
independence from external funding can only be achieved in the situation in which the RPO-
generated total value added covers its fixed costs. From Equation 3.26 follows:
(P − V C) ∗Q ≥ FC (3.29)
An increase in the RPO sales quantity (Q) would reduce the fixed costs per unit sold – the so
called fixed cost degression effect and, therefore increase the group’s profits. That would result
in the improvement of sustainability of the organization and its ability to absorb external risks
(e.g. a fall in the selling price).
Modeling fixed cost degression with MP-MAS requires understanding of RPO cost struc-
tures. Business structures of Ugandan RPOs were captured by the project survey (IFPRI 2010).
The broader understanding of the structure of the studied organization (in Kibinge DC) was
achieved during the author’s field work (see Chapter 2).
Fixed asset ownership According to IFPRI (2010), Kibinge DC does not own immovable
property, processing machinery or vehicles, and possesses only a few assets that are quite low in
value (motorcycle, computers, telephones, bicycles). This fact may explain the reluctance of the
DC to make long-term investments, a recognized problem of RPOs and other cooperative firms
in general (Chibanda et al. 2009, Nilsson 2001). It is caused by the limited planning horizons
of RPO members (limited to the proximate duration of membership) and the administration
(limited to the length of their elective terms). Issues of mutual mistrust and transparency may
also hinder the willingness to invest in common property. Since the number and value of DC-
owned fixed assets is small compared with the reported running costs, and their exact value was
not provided in the IFPRI (2010) survey, the depreciation of these assets was not considered in
the cost calculation.
Fixed costs Table 3.23 presents the calculation of annual fixed costs based on the data provided
by the DC administration to IFPRI (2010). As the table suggests, management salaries form the
major part of the fixed costs. The rental and storage costs were not reported by the administration:
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these estimations were derived using the responses of other robusta DC from the IFPRI (2010)
survey.
Table 3.23: Annual fixed costs (Kibinge DC)
Item Cost, th. ugx
Management salaries 20,280
Rent 417
Storage 365
Electricity 1,200
Telephone 305
Member meetings 1,150
Total fixed costs * 23,717
Source: Own estimations from IFPRI (2010)
* not including depreciation
Variable costs The marketing costs of the Kibinge DC are considered in the price that the DC
receives (IFPRI 2010, Latynskiy & Berger 2011): buyers gather the coffee from the DC storage,
and transportation costs are deducted from the price directly. The DC operates with a fixed pool
of buyers (all are exporters), therefore, currently there are no search costs involved. Buyers al-
ways pay on the spot, neither advancing nor delaying the payment (IFPRI 2010). Variable costs
of milling (70 ugx per kg of FAQ coffee (Latynskiy & Berger 2011)) and delivery to the DC
storage facility (17 ugx per kg of kiboko coffee) are considered in the price that is transferred to
members.
The information in the above paragraphs was translated to the MILP-form (see Table 3.22 for
the generalized example), and the Kibinge DC was included in the MP-MAS Uganda model as an
RPO-agent (the estimated costs of the DC were later corrected for the relative model prediction
error for members’ delivery).
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Chapter 4
Calibration and validation of the empirical
model
Previous chapters showed that the MP-MAS Uganda application is a complex tool for empirical
analysis. Like any model it simplifies reality to a certain extent. Its components (soil property
and yield equations, production functions, consumption model, etc.) approximate observed re-
lationships by describing them in terms of mathematical functions. These approximations lead
to deviations of model prediction from the observed data (i.e. prediction errors). Also, estim-
ations of MP-MAS Uganda components were mostly derived from household surveys, the data
from which was often derived from farmers’ self-assessments and recall values, which are likely
to be inaccurate. Moreover, survey respondents often linked their responses to imprecise units
(e.g. ”a big bunch of plantains”, ”a large sack of maize”), interpretation and conversion to met-
ric units was tricky and required certain assumptions. Parameterization of the crop growth and
livestock modules substantially relied on aggregate data, expert rough estimates and assumptions
(Chapter 3, Schreinemachers (2006)). The big sources of model uncertainty are farmers’ valu-
ation of home consumption, their expectations on prices and yields, and certainty equivalents. In
order to compensate for the errors in model predictions caused by the discussed simplifications,
uncertainties and data inaccuracy, the simulation model had to be calibrated. Calibration is a
process that furnishes model behavior and prepares it for practical application. The calibration
of agent decisions was done against the data of IFPRI (2010) survey, which contained the results
of the production decisions of study area farmers.
Before the practical application, the model also has to go through a system of checks, test
simulation runs and preliminary output analysis that ensure the model’s consistency and assess
its predictive and descriptive capabilities. In the literature this process is called model valida-
tion. A valid simulation model builds on two important aspects: (i) valid results and (ii) valid
mechanisms and concepts with which the results were obtained. The respective validations are
called (i) operational – for results and (ii) conceptual – for concepts. Validation is an important
part of empirical analysis. At this stage the model’s ability to replicate processes within the real
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world is estimated, model robustness is checked and prediction errors are recorded. Neverthe-
less, the recent survey of Heath et al. (2009) revealed that only 20.3% of ABM in economics
developed between 1999 and 2008 were both conceptually and operationally validated, while
29.1% were not validated at all. Only 2.5% of ABM in economics incorporated statistical val-
idation techniques (Heath et al. 2009).
The simulation model went through both conceptual and operational validation using stat-
istical and qualitative methods. Assessment and discussion of model validity is done in Section
4.2. During the validation the author relied on statistical as well as qualitative methods.
4.1 Calibration process
Calibration is the last step in the process of model construction, which results in a functioning
and valid model baseline. In the context of this work, calibration is the iterative process of
varying uncertain parameters of the model within theoretically and/or arbitrary acceptable ranges
until model results have a closest match with an observed data. As shown in Figure D.2 of the
Appendix, in the case of MP-MAS Uganda, application calibration was associated with the large
loop of data and file management, therefore, the time needed for the preparation and running of
the model was an essential factor that influenced the choice of structure and logic of the whole
calibration process. Of course, it only makes sense to engage into a cumbersome and time-
consuming calibration process when a model is free from conceptual and implementation errors.
Therefore, prior to calibration, multiple debugging loops (Figure D.2) were required to identify
and correct such errors. Also, before engaging in calibration the author and other members of
MP-MAS development team ensured conceptual validity of the simulation model. (This issue
is discussed more thoroughly in Section 4.2.)
The MP-MAS Uganda application uses several components or sub-models, which are in-
tegrated sequentially (i.e. output of certain components serve as an input for others). Figure
D.1 schematically displays the sub-models’ integration within one modeling period (with no
multi-period interactions).
Considering the sequence of the organization of model components, the calibration also had
to be organized in a sequential way. This rationale led to a stepwise sequence of sub-models’
calibration that had to be adhered to when calibrating the simulation model:
1. Estimation of soil properties
2. TSPC (yield simulation)
3. Random asset assignment
4. Consumption preferences
5. Household decision
6. TSPC (soil updates)
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7. Livestock herd dynamics
8. Population dynamics
As described in Chapter 3, construction of the version of MP-MAS software that was used
in this research was partially based on the earlier works of Schreinemachers (2006), Rhew et al.
(2004) and Aune & Massave (1998). When their research efforts, data, time and resource lim-
itations are taken into account, a number of “shortcuts” were taken while calibrating MP-MAS
Uganda for this research case:
• Predictive soil property equations were estimated and validated by Rhew et al. (2004) for
the similar area of Uganda. In the absence of new field measurements prediction of soil
properties was done with equations as provided in Rhew et al. (2004). The applicability
of equations for the study area is justified in Section 3.3.
• The equations of TSPC were specifically estimated and validated for tropical soils by Aune
& Massave (1998). Furthermore, one of the TSPC creators, J. Aune, specifically calibrated
TSPC for the agro-ecological conditions of Uganda for the research of Schreinemachers
(2006). Therefore, the calibrated TSPC parameters for yield simulations and soil property
updates were taken from Schreinemachers (2006) and Schreinemachers et al. (2007).
• A dynamic calibration of agent investment and disinvestment behavior in the MP-MAS
Uganda application was not possible, since there were no panel datasets for the study area
available. Hence, the calibration and validation were based on simulation results for a
single simulation period. Therefore, the livestock model was calibrated so that observed
household herd/flock sizes could be sustained with agent resources and current income
and consumption incentives.
The equations describing household consumption preferences were empirically estimated
from the project (IFPRI 2010) and national (UNPS 2010) surveys (see Section 3.7). It means
that the parameters defining agent consumption preferences in the simulation (regression coeffi-
cients) already had the best fit (optimized for least squares) with the benchmarks (IFPRI (2010)
and UNPS (2010)). Therefore, the list of sub-models subject to calibration could have been
further reduced by this model component. The respective regression statistics (R-squared, test
scores) served as a validity mark of consumption preference models.
The simulation model was subject to indirect calibration (according to Windrum et al. (2007)
taxonomy). It means that during the calibration process micro-level calibration parameters were
chosen so that the model was able to reproduce a set of empirically observed facts (benchmarks)
at the macro-scale. For the calibration of the simulation model the author used different empirical
benchmarks depending on the model part that was subject to calibration. These benchmarks are
listed in Table D.1. Table D.2 reports the parameters that were used to calibrate the model
components for the benchmarks. The parameters listed in Table D.2 could have taken only
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the values within the defined ranges of acceptability (e.g. long term prices for meat products
may deviate by 25% from the estimates from IFPRI (2010) survey data). Choice of calibration
parameters and their ranges defined model degrees of freedom. Calibration parameters do not
include all model parameters, but only those whose estimations were likely to be imprecise.
The definition of calibration parameters had to be done with caution (without giving too many
degrees of freedom), since there was a danger of overfitting the model to the observed data,
which may harm its performance out of sample (Fagiolo et al. 2007, Marks 2007).
Figure 4.1: Satisficing calibration strategy
Source: Author
Calibration experiments with random asset assignment against the IFPRI (2010) dataset were
done in Stata software. For the calibration of other components, MS Excel spreadsheets and
VBA-macro, Stata and MP-MAS software were used. In order to isolate the effects caused by
the random asset assignment and for reasons of time efficiency, an alternative model population
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was constructed. This population included only the sample fraction of households from the study
area that were covered by the IFPRI (2010) project survey (n=71), instead of using the full study
population (n=1716). This ”small“ model, as well as single MILP of model agents, were used
for preliminary calibration of other model components. With these tools, rough estimates of the
calibration parameters were made. The model with full agent population was later applied to
further fine-tune the calibration parameters estimated with the ”small“ model.
Conceptually, the process of calibration followed a satisficing (i.e. satisfying a set of suffi-
ciency criteria) strategy. This strategy, as opposed optimization, which attempts to find a com-
bination of calibration parameter values that would result in the highest model precision possible,
aims for precision that would meet a certain subjective acceptability threshold. The satisficing
calibration strategy is a pragmatic alternative to the optimizing calibration, taking into account
the financial and temporal constraints of the research. Both factors put considerable costs on the
time spent on calibration. Figure 4.1 contains the flowchart explaining the concept of satisficing
calibration strategy on the example of model with two components that subject to calibration.
When revising results of a model component, a model designer has to answer two questions:
(i) whether results meet the chosen acceptability threshold and if not, (ii) whether it is possible
to calibrate the model in an amount of time that allows the threshold to be met. Based on the
answers to these questions, a model designer has to either continue calibrating the model for the
current threshold or lower the threshold. Answering the second question requires an understand-
ing of model behavior with respect to changes in calibration parameters. Such understanding
may be obtained by experimenting with the model, analyzing and documenting its results. Cer-
tainly it makes sense to set very strict thresholds in the beginning and then gradually lower
them as needed along the iterations of calibration process. In this research the results of the
model calibration experiments were analyzed with respect to the imposed thresholds using vari-
ous graphical and numerical statistical tools available in Stata and MS Excel software products.
(Highlights from the final analysis of model validity are provided in Section 4.2.)
4.2 Assessment of model validity
Generally, there are five broader types of validity that economic simulation studies must take
into account (Marks 2007, Richiardi et al. 2006, Stanislaw 1986). All together they contribute
to the overall model validity. These five parts are the validities of:
1. Underlying theories
2. Model representation of the theories
3. Computer software used for simulation
4. Incorporated indicators relative to underlying unmeasured properties
5. Simulated results with respect to empirically occurring facts
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With regard to the first of the listed validities, components of the MP-MAS Uganda applica-
tion were based on well-established and recognized theoretical concepts (such as Cobb-Douglas
theory of production). These theories are referenced in Chapter 3. The implementation of the
theories in the modeling framework are reported in the Chapter 3, as well as in the Appendix.
The mechanism of agent interaction was captured by participatory exercises with real RPO mem-
bers (explained in Chapter 2), whom were considered to be the proper experts to consult about
RPO.
The valid model representation of theories (second validity type) especially requires a proper
documentation of the conceptual approach, model equations, algorithms and assumptions. Dur-
ing the construction of the simulation model, these were recorded in the form of pseudo-codes,
numbered lists, flow charts, etc., in project reports, working documents, seminar presentations
and comments in input files. Detailed documentation of model construction allowed the MP-
MAS developers team to review, discuss and cross-check the conceptual models used in the
MP-MAS Uganda application. The model implementations were presented to the student and
academic audience during two regular modeling courses offered by Universitaet Hohenheim,
“Modeling techniques” and “Land use economics seminar”. At these courses the representa-
tions of theoretical concepts in MP-MAS were discussed and tested during course lectures and
software training workshops.
Other MP-MAS county application also included several from the MP-MAS modules ap-
plied in this research, and, therefore, were also tested by their developers and users. Tables 4.1
and 4.2 compare country applications of MP-MAS modeling framework. MP-MAS framework
was applied in several scientific projects in different parts of the world. The respective project
reports went through critical evaluations of such organizations as CGIAR centers (MP-MAS
applications for Chile, Ghana and Uganda) or DFG (MP-MAS applications for Thailand and Vi-
etnam). Research using MP-MAS produced a number of peer-reviewed journal publications and
conference contributions (listed at MP-MAS (2012)), which communicated modeling method-
ologies to a wider specialist community. Comments received from reviewers and readers were
considered, and model implementations were revised when necessary. Thus, MP-MAS Uganda
and other country applications of MP-MAS framework (that used common modules and con-
cepts with MP-MAS Uganda) had a large exposure to the specialized audience: users, modelers,
reviewers, project organizers, etc. This served as a face validation test (see Kluegl (2008), Garcia
et al. (2007)) for the model: the model looked valid to the vested interest and expert parties.
Successful replications of model concepts and implementations done in the different MP-
MAS country applications by different persons verified these concepts and implementations and
demonstrated their robustness. Replications result in examinations and re-evaluations of the
conceptual models, since replicators are motivated to understand the model and ensure its ap-
plicability for their use case. Hence, replications validate the original model (Wilensky & Rand
2007).
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Given the aforesaid, it is anticipated that the first two parts of overall validity (namely validit-
ies of underlying theories and their model representations) are on the high level in the MP-MAS
Uganda application.
Table 4.1: MP-MAS country applications
Model Region Focus Project
evaluators
Project
period
References
Chile Maule river
basin
water pricing and diffu-
sion of advanced irrigation
technologies
IFPRI 2004–2009 Berger et al. (2007,
2010)
Germany Swabian Jura climate change impacts on
agriculture
DFG 2009–2011 Berger et al. (2010),
Troost et al. (2012)
Ghana White Volta
basin
transition from rainfed to
irrigated agriculture
IFPRI 2004–2009 Birner et al. (2010),
Wossen et al. (2010)
Thailand Chiang Mai
province
impact of advanced fruit
tree technologies on agri-
culture
DFG,
NRST
2006–2012 Schreinemachers
et al. (2009, 2010)
Uganda 1 Iganga and
Mayuge
districts
impact of improved vari-
eties and credit access
on poverty and environ-
mental sustainability
IFPRI 2001–2006 Schreinemachers
& Berger (2006),
Schreinemachers
et al. (2007)
Uganda 2 Masaka
district
organizations of agricul-
tural producers
BMZ,
IFPRI
2009–2012 this thesis, Latyn-
skiy & Berger
(2012b)
Vietnam Son La
province
diffusion of soil conserva-
tion techniques
DFG,
MOST
2006–2012 Dang Viet (2012)
Source: Compiled based on MP-MAS (2012) and Schreinemachers & Berger (2011)
To ensure the third type of validity, the author constantly performed simulation runs for test-
ing newly implemented model features and did structural “walkthroughs” revising the input and
output of different modules of the model. MP optimization problems of model agents were tested
to give feasible results. Infeasible problems were analyzed individually with special Excel macro
written by the MP-MAS development team. Based on such analysis, the necessary changes to
MILP structures were made and/or the settings of IBM OSL solver were adapted. During the
test simulation experiments, the model behavior with respect to change in model parameters was
tested. Cases with unexpected “strange“ model results, which were the likely signals of an er-
ror, were investigated thoroughly. The MP-MAS development team is continuously revising the
snippets of the software code based on feedback and error reports supplied by users of various
MP-MAS country applications. Currently, the MP-MAS software contains several special test
modes, which help to identify likely errors and support the debugging process. These features
of MP-MAS were used to eliminate implementation errors, thus, increasing the overall validity
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Table 4.2: Replications of MP-MAS components
Component Model
Chile Germany Ghana Thailand Uganda 1 Uganda 2 Vietnam
Production and investment
decisions
x x x x x x x
Three-stage consumption
decisions
x x x
Perennial crops x x x x x
Durable livestock x x x x
TSPC x x x
Population dynamics x x x x
Adaptive expectations x x x x x x x
Source: Compiled based on MP-MAS (2012) and Schreinemachers & Berger (2011)
of the model.
The fourth type of validity has little relevance to the MP-MAS Uganda application, because
the model operates with standard quantitative indicators and parameters, which do not require
additional interpretation (as will be seen from the next chapter), such as per capita income, profit,
etc. However, since the model is largely based on the data from national (UNPS 2010, UNLC
2008) and project (IFPRI 2010, 2001) surveys, the author has concerns about the validity of
respondents’ recall estimates (especially on prices, production and consumption).
Concerning the fifth validity type, currently, there is little or no consensus among modelers
on whether and how agent-based economic models should be empirically validated (Fagiolo
et al. 2007, Windrum et al. 2007, Midgley et al. 2007, Richiardi et al. 2006). Fagiolo et al.
(2007) in their paper outline the main points of the ongoing discussion. Among them are:
• Role of empirical validation for acceptance or rejection of a model
• Choice of empirically observed facts that form a model benchmark
• Relationship of output traces of a simulation model to empirical facts and counterfactuals
• Alternative (to the reproduction of stylized facts) tests of empirical model validity
Due to the applied nature of this research and the need for its results to have practical rel-
evance, the demand for empirical validation of the simulation model was clear. Therefore, the
author agrees with Marks (2007), who stated that for a simulation model to be useful it must
be able to exhibit some properties of the real-world system that it was modeled after. Ideally,
the model outputs should be equivalent to the outputs produced by the real-world processes (i.e.
model results are accurate and complete). However, this certainly does not imply that if both sets
of outputs are not equivalent but intersecting, than the model is useless. Otherwise, we would
have to conclude that all the models are useless. Since a model is a simplification of reality and
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is usually meant to be so, we may expect it to be wrong to some extent. The function of empirical
validation here is to inform the researcher about model accuracy, completeness and differences
that its outputs have with the respective outputs of the real-world processes.
Later in this section the output of the constructed simulation model is empirically validated.
The validation was done in a way that is commonly practiced among the agent-based modelers
(Windrum et al. 2007, Fagiolo et al. 2007): by comparing model outputs with stylized facts
about the respective real-world system (agricultural system in the study area). Apart from that
the validity of the model’s initial conditions in relation to the observed properties of the real-
world system are assessed and the model’s reflection of real-world relationships, which were
resembled in the model by econometric equations, are discussed. For the empirical validation,
model components were run as standalone models and as MP-MAS Uganda as a whole. Various
quantitative and graphical statistical methods were applied during this part of the validation.
4.2.1 Initial household characteristics
Since the IFPRI (2010) project survey covered only 4% of the study population, the full pop-
ulation for the simulation model had to be generated by data sampling and interpolation using
multivariate distributions estimated from the project survey and described by the copula (the
approach is explained in Section 3.2). Hence, in order to justify the approach and, therefore, the
applicability of model results, it is important to assess the consistency of the generated model
agents with the real-world population. The generation of statistically consistent model popu-
lation was the target of methodological choice and calibration of implemented random asset
assignment. For ensuring the robustness of the approach with respect to the random seed, a set
of 50 generated populations was reviewed.
First of all, let us compare some common statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, per-
centiles) of survey and generated populations with respect to various household characteristics.
Table 4.3 compares the amounts of land available to households. This variable was directly
drawn from the empirical copula (see Table F.1). Table 4.3 shows that statistics of generated
populations concerning land availability closely match statistics of reference population estim-
ated from the IFPRI (2010) survey. Such a close match is a consequence of the fact that land
variable was directly drawn from the reference population (e.g. without further transformation
and/or aggregation). Slight deviations between populations are likely to be caused by data inter-
polation of values and imprecision of estimated copula that had to be employed because of the
limited number of survey observations for the study area (n=71). The deviations between survey
and generated populations are larger, but yet acceptable, in the case of characteristics related
to household size (Table D.3). Since the number of household members were drawn by age-
gender groups (see Section 4.2.6), totals of household members are aggregate characteristics.
Therefore, the deviations related to drawn age-gender specific variables in this case multiply.
Additionally, rounding to integers may increase the deviations. Therefore, larger deviations in
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the case of household sizes are observed in Table D.3, which compares populations statistics of
household sizes expressed in persons, male adult equivalents and persons per hectare. However,
as follows from Table D.3, deviations still remain relatively small, also in male adult equivalent
expression that captures age-gender structure of households, and in per hectare expression that
reflects the relation of household size to available land. Tables D.4 and D.5 show that statist-
ics of generated populations closely match those of the reference population in cases of coffee
plantations and livestock ownership as well.
Table 4.3: Household land availability
Characteristic Populations Mean Median Stdev 10% 25% 75% 90%
Available land, ha survey 2.43 2.02 1.67 0.81 1.42 3.24 4.45
generated 2.46 2.02 1.66 0.81 1.39 3.16 4.95
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** generated populations are represented by average values over 50 populations drawn with
different random seeds
Figure 4.2 graphically compares the distribution functions of household characteristics es-
timated for the survey and generated populations. The graphical comparison supports the previ-
ously derived statement of close replication of empirical univariate distribution functions in the
model.
The consistency of bivariate relationships was checked by looking into correlations between
variables in the survey and model populations. Figures D.3–D.6 of the Appendix display im-
portant correlations between household resource endowments. Figure D.3 displays relationships
between area under coffee plantations and available land, Figure D.4 – number of persons resign-
ing in household and available land, Figure D.5 – livestock stocking rates and available land and,
finally, Figure D.6 plots area occupied by coffee plantations and household size expressed in male
adult equivalents. Figures D.3–D.6 show that during the population generation the empirically
estimated correlations were transferred to the model and heterogeneous, statistically consistent
asset combinations at agent level were produced.
Tables and figures listed in this section support the applicability of the chosen method of
generating model agents (described in the Section 3.2). Based on the performed numerical and
graphical comparisons, it is concluded that the generated populations of model agents are good
representations of the real population of the study area. Therefore, the later use of the populations
generated by this method in simulation modeling is justified.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution functions of household characteristics
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* functions of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** functions of generated populations are representing 50 populations drawn with different random seeds
4.2.2 Underlying econometric equations
Estimations of soil properties, crop yield responses with respect to labor use, and household con-
sumption preferences for the MP-MAS Uganda model were econometrically derived from the
empirical data. The determination coefficients of underlying regression equations can provide
insights into the validity of the respective MP-MAS components, in which the obtained estim-
ates were incorporated. Table 4.4 summarizes how well the econometric equations applied for
parameterization of MP-MAS Uganda may explain the empirical facts, which is reflected by the
R-squared coefficients of the corresponding regression equations. The significance tests (F-test
or Wald Chi-squared test) performed on all listed regression equations showed their significance
at 1%-confidence level. Therefore, despite the low value of R-squared in cases of some equa-
tions, it is better to apply these models for agent-specific predictions than to use sample means
or expert estimates uniformly across the whole agent population. The production functions of
other model crops were estimated from Schreinemachers (2006). The R-squared coefficients of
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the respective equations were not reported in this literature source. However, Schreinemachers
(2006) provided results of Wald Chi-squared tests, showing that the relationships between actual
yields and applied labor inputs are significant at 1% level for bean, cassava, groundnut, maize,
plantains and sweet potato, and at 5% – for sorghum.
Table 4.4: Determination coefficients of underlying econometric models
MP-MAS
component
Equation Source Dataset R-squared
Adj.
R-squared
Predictive soil
properties
Acidity
Rhew et al.
(2004)
Ruecker
(2003)
– 0.11
Potassium – 0.21
Calcium – 0.32
Organic Matter - 0.07
Phosphorus – 0.07
Sand – 0.38
Clay – 0.43
Production functions
of labor
Coffee Author IFPRI (2010) 0.2524 0.2295
Consumption
preferences
Savings
Author
IFPRI (2010) 0.2929 0.2919
Food expenditure UNPS (2010) 0.2875 0.2856
AIDS (plantain) UNPS (2010) 0.2518 –
AIDS (tubers) UNPS (2010) 0.1340 –
AIDS (cereals) UNPS (2010) 0.0624 –
AIDS (legumes
and bakery)
UNPS (2010) 0.1449 –
AIDS (additives) UNPS (2010) 0.2318 –
AIDS (animal
products)
UNPS (2010) 0.1290 –
AIDS (fruits and
vegetables)
UNPS (2010) 0.0972 –
Source: Author’s compilation
4.2.3 Crop production
Replication of household crop production by MP-MAS Uganda model was validated by com-
paring the output of the model baseline simulation runs with estimates from the IFPRI (2010)
project survey. To minimize the effect of the initial allocation of livestock on crop production,
model results from five simulation periods following the initialization were considered. Soil
property updates and population dynamics were switched off. In doing the comparison, it had to
be assumed that the production patterns of the study area as a whole would remain stable under
constant bio-economic conditions (prices, soil fertility, market access, etc). Tables 4.5 and 4.6
compare estimated and simulated means of household production of selected crops. In order to
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estimate the robustness of the result with regard to the generated characteristics of agent popu-
lations and properties of their soils, as well as the random seed for model events, the baseline
simulation was performed with different seeds and populations. Table 4.5 shows that the average
RPO-member household from the study area produces 981 kg of green coffee per year. Such
low levels of cash crop production create the need to join RPO for marketing. Plantains are the
main staple crop in the area; the average household produces 3.4 tons of them annually.
Table 4.5: Average crop production (in 100 kg/year)
Crop
Population Random
seed
Bean Cassava Coffee Ground-
nut
Maize Plantain Sorghum Sweet
potato
Survey* N/A 2.09 1.43 9.81 0.14 3.68 34.14 0.04 0.88
Model** 1 1 1.57 1.72 9.86 0.17 3.70 34.98 0.04 0.68
Model 2 2 1.54 1.39 9.81 0.15 3.65 34.75 0.04 0.74
Model 3 3 1.52 1.01 10.02 0.17 3.63 35.06 0.05 0.77
Model 4 4 1.57 1.28 9.77 0.15 3.67 35.72 0.04 0.78
Model 5 5 1.54 1.08 9.92 0.18 3.70 34.53 0.05 0.76
Model 6 6 1.48 0.95 9.70 0.16 3.54 35.09 0.04 0.80
Model 7 7 1.50 1.78 9.87 0.16 3.56 34.54 0.04 0.69
Model 8 8 1.51 1.72 9.61 0.16 3.57 35.17 0.03 0.71
Model 9 9 1.48 1.62 9.84 0.17 3.55 34.34 0.04 0.68
Model 10 10 1.54 1.23 9.86 0.16 3.67 33.63 0.04 0.74
Model Average 1.52 1.38 9.82 0.16 3.63 34.78 0.04 0.73
Stdev 0.031 0.316 0.114 0.007 0.064 0.566 0.004 0.044
CV 0.020 0.229 0.012 0.045 0.018 0.016 0.107 0.060
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* expected production of survey population is estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model production is reported as annual means of 5 period simulation
Table 4.5 shows that the dispersion of results with respect to the random parameters of the
model is low for the production of beans, coffee, maize and plantains, which are, according
to IFPRI (2010), the most commonly grown crops in the study area. These crops are also the
only marketable crops; the remaining crops are grown exclusively for home consumption. For
these crops the coefficient of variation lies below 0.025. Other crops are produced in smaller
quantities and constitute lower shares of land use, therefore, they are more sensitive to model
randomness. Still, the coefficient of variation is quiet low for groundnut, sweet potato (for both
it lies below 0.1) and sorghum (below 0.2). Low dispersion of results is not surprising, given the
large number of agents (1716) in the model and their consistent generation (see Section 4.2.1).
Cassava is more sensitive to the model input in the chosen parameter setting with coefficient of
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variation equal to 0.229. However, it is, as well as sorghum, an inferior crop, which has a low
share in the farm output value (see Table 4.8). Therefore, the author generally concludes on the
robustness of the simulated crop production on study area level with respect to random seed and
initial agent population.
Table 4.6 provides the model prediction errors expressed by the absolute value percentage
difference between the model results and the author’s estimates from the survey. From this table
it is evident that the model replicates the production of crops fairly accurate with the average
errors laying below 27%. The goal that the author pursued throughout the model calibration
process was a close representation of coffee production, since, considering the research focus,
high precision in modeling coffee production is desirable. At the same time the errors for other
crops have to be kept at an acceptable level whenever possible. As a result, simulated produc-
tion volumes of maize and plantains lay on average within 2.5% from the survey benchmark
values (Table 4.6), while coffee production deviates from the benchmark by only 0.88%. The
maximum error for coffee from the 10 featured test simulations was recorded at 2.12% from the
benchmark. Prediction errors for groundnut, sorghum, cassava and sweet potato lay within 20%
of the benchmark on average; for beans – within 27%.
Table 4.6: Model prediction errors, absolute value percentage difference
Crop
Popu-
lation
Random
seed
Bean Cassava Coffee Ground-
nut
Maize Plantain Sorghum Sweet
potato
1 1 24.91 20.45 0.51 18.66 0.62 2.45 10.68 22.45
2 2 26.20 2.86 0.07 8.99 0.62 1.80 16.12 15.31
3 3 27.20 29.34 2.12 17.54 1.27 2.70 25.27 12.32
4 4 24.88 10.28 0.47 8.08 0.07 4.64 18.28 10.47
5 5 26.21 24.82 1.05 23.83 0.57 1.13 36.00 12.65
6 6 29.08 33.76 1.16 10.39 3.80 2.77 15.66 8.94
7 7 28.16 24.00 0.56 13.30 3.21 1.17 14.92 21.00
8 8 27.47 20.24 2.08 10.54 2.85 3.03 9.94 19.21
9 9 28.92 13.20 0.29 19.00 3.41 0.58 18.96 22.61
10 10 26.28 14.44 0.49 15.66 0.07 1.48 3.11 15.57
Average error 26.93 19.34 0.88 14.60 1.65 2.17 16.90 16.05
Maximum error 29.08 33.76 2.12 23.83 3.80 4.64 36.00 22.61
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
With regard to the simulated yields of coffee (Table 4.7), the model rather closely reproduces
the mean yield (1,317.0 kg per ha per annum in the survey and 1,259.5 in the model). However,
there is a higher variance in yields of the survey population (standard deviation of 1,153.5 kg
per ha per annum) than in the model (645.4). The simulated distribution of the achieved coffee
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yields is close to the observed in some parts (10th, 25th, and 75th percentiles), while in other
parts (the median, the 90th percentile) it deviates substantially. The high variance in observed
survey yields is likely to be caused by such factors as individual plant management skills and pest
and disease treatment. As follows from the yield simulation methodology of MP-MAS Uganda
application (explained in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.6), only aggregate magnitudes of these factors
were included, while in reality they are, of course, household specific. Therefore, the realized
approximation of the yield response led to the lower variance in simulated yields compared to
the observed ones. Nevertheless, the results displayed in Table 4.7 show that certain properties
of the real yield distribution are preserved. Unfortunately, the absence of crop level data from
the study area for other model crops in the IFPRI (2010) survey made the estimation of actual
yields for these crops and, therefore, yield validation not possible. Hence, for these crops the
author used only data on crop production volumes.
Table 4.7: Coffee yields
Mean Median Stdev 10% 25% 75% 90%
Survey 1,317.0 953.7 1,153.5 326.3 583.8 1,621.6 2,918.9
Model 1,259.5 1,419.5 645.4 412.2 574.1 1,621.9 1,672.7
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* yields of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model yields are reported as annual means of 5 period simulation
Figure 4.3 compares the distributions of production volumes of individual households for
crops that are most commonly grown by households in the study area according to IFPRI (2010):
beans, coffee, maize and plantains. The model distributions on this figure are reported as aggreg-
ate distributions of ten test model runs conducted with different random population and seeds.
As in the case of the study area total production, one can again observe a close match of the
model results with the reference survey data for coffee. The rather small sample size of the IF-
PRI (2010) survey (71 households), which was used to create a benchmark for validation, might
have caused higher deviations of model results from the benchmark values. Figure 4.3 shows
that some parts of the simulated distributions differ from the survey distributions, although gen-
erally, especially for beans, coffee and maize, distributions have similar ranges and magnitudes.
In the case of plantains, the model underestimates the number of smaller producers and overes-
timates the number of middle-size producers (Figure 4.3). Such errors in density functions may
smooth out on the aggregate level, as in the cases of coffee, maize and plantains (see Table 4.6),
whose aggregate production volumes are accurately represented with average prediction errors
of only 0.88%, 1.65% and 2.17% respectively. The deviations of model results from the survey
in the case of production of some crops (see Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3), which the author was
unable to eradicate during calibration without compromising the model quality or assumptions
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on ranges of calibration parameters, may signal that the designed production module is missing
additional production or marketing constraints. Conducting interactive modeling sessions with
stakeholders from the study area (as done in Berger et al. (2010)) may provide insights into these
constraints.
Figure 4.3: Crop production. Density functions
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* production volumes of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model production is reported as annual means of 5 period simulation
Even though the IFPRI (2010) project survey contained a limited amount of data that could
be used for validation of the model results, the comparisons of the simulation results with the
survey data showed that the model is capable of representing the coffee production in the study
area (as follows from Figure 4.3, and Tables 4.6 and 4.7), which has an importance for the
following analysis.
4.2.4 Livestock
Livestock was validated similarly to the crop production by comparison of the model output with
author’s estimates from the IFPRI (2010) survey, which served as a benchmark. For ruminant
livestock units (cattle and goats) as indicators of production the amounts of livestock kept on the
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farm were compared, while for other livestock (chicken and pigs) amounts sold or used for own
consumption were considered. Tables D.6 and D.7 compare estimated and simulated holdings
of various livestock types by survey and model households. Model results are again reported
based on ten test runs with the length of five periods performed with different random seeds
and populations. The results of model initialization period were not considered: therefore, the
effect of the initial allocation of livestock was minimized. Table D.6 reports that on average,
study households throughout the year own 2.46 units of cattle and 2.32 goats, and produce 4.59
chickens and 0.79 pigs for sale and own consumption. During the field trip to the study area, it
was observed that households typically own small numbers of diverse types of livestock.
As in the case of crop production, again one can see the low dispersion of model results
and their consistency though different populations and random seeds (Table D.6). The model
prediction errors (Table D.7) are rather small in the case of chicken (4.94% on average) and pig
(5.66%) production. The errors are moderate in the case of cows and goats, 15.51% and 12.54%
on average, respectively.
Figure D.7 compares simulated and observed distribution functions of farm livestock. As in
the previous comparison, cattle and goats in this figure are expressed by the amounts of units
kept on the farm, chicken and pigs – by the amounts of units sold or consumed. The distribu-
tion functions depict and locate inaccuracies of the model. These inaccuracies are likely the
consequences of the fact that the parameterization of the livestock module was largely based on
the aggregate country level data from external sources (see Section 3.5.3 and Schreinemachers
(2006)). Conducting a specific livestock survey, expert interviews or discussions with livestock
owners in the study area may improve the parameterization of the livestock module.
4.2.5 Goodness-of-fit and model efficiency
Goodness-of-fit statistics of a model and model efficiency coefficients are commonly established
assessment measures of how well model results fit a set of empirical observations. The advantage
of using these measures is that they aggregate different aspects of a model and provide unified
model validity scores. In this research these measures were applied to validate the model results
with respect to different aspects of the farm production system. The application of the measures
required that the results of the different farm enterprises were expressed on the same scale.
Therefore, they were standardized by multiplication with the monetary values of produce or
livestock units observed in the study area (Table 4.8). These values were estimated from the
IFPRI (2010) dataset; for ruminant livestock (cattle and goats), annuities were used. From Table
4.8 it may be concluded that the production of plantains and coffee are the most significant crop
growing activities in the study area. (Therefore, the production system in the area is usually
called “coffee/banana production system” (Ruecker et al. 2003).) Also, the calculations from
this table suggest that cattle is by far the most valuable livestock asset.
For the calculation of goodness-of-fit, at first the standardized model results on crop pro-
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Table 4.8: Standardization of results
Farm
enterprise Unit
Survey,
units
Model,
units
Unit value,
th. ugx
Survey,
th. ugx
Model,
th. ugx
Bean
100 kg
2.09 1.52 100.0 208.5 152.4
Cassava 1.43 1.38 29.8 42.6 41.0
Coffee 9.81 9.82 105.5 1,035.4 1,036.6
Groundnut 0.14 0.16 96.0 13.7 15.6
Maize 3.68 3.63 50.0 183.9 181.3
Plantain 34.14 34.78 44.5 1,519.2 1,547.7
Sorghum 0.04 0.04 47.5 1.7 2.0
Sweet potato 0.88 0.73 28.0 24.5 20.6
Cattle
heads
2.46 2.08 119.1 293.5 248.0
Chicken 4.59 4.56 6.0 27.4 27.3
Goats 2.32 2.03 11.6 27.0 23.6
Pigs 0.79 0.83 39.2 30.9 32.6
Source: Author, based on IFPRI (2010) and MP-MAS simulation results
* unit values were estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model results are reported as average over 10 test populations
duction were regressed on the respective estimates from the survey (standardized as well) us-
ing linear regression without an intercept. Again, the calculations were done using the results
from model simulations performed with different initial conditions and random seeds. Table
4.9 provides the regression statistics. The regression slope coefficient can then be interpreted
as a ratio of predicted results to observed ones, R-squared states for model explanatory poten-
tial (percent of the variation in the value of farm produce that can be explained by the model).
The values of the slope coefficient range from 0.9850 to 1.0218, which signals that the mean
values of farm output simulated by the model for the study area on average may be under-/over-
estimated in comparison with the real data from the survey by 1.5-/2.2-%, respectively. The high
value of R-squared statistics (0.9973 on average) suggests that the model predictions for partic-
ular farm products lie close to the fitted regression line. Both slope coefficient and R-squared
statistics vary slightly with respect to the initial model population and random seed (as Table 4.9
suggests) and stay within the subjectively acceptable ranges for each of the ten test model runs.
Figure 4.4 shows the derivation of the regression line for the average results and indicates point
estimates for the different farm activities with relation to it.
For the evaluation of model efficiency, a Nash-Sutcliffe model efficiency coefficient (NSE)
was calculated for all of the test model runs. The formula for calculating this coefficient is the
following (Nash & Sutcliffe 1970):
NSE = 1−
∑T
t=1(Q
i
o −Qis)2∑T
t=1(Q
i
o −Qo)2
(4.1)
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whereQio – observed value in i-case; Qis – value simulated by a model for i-case; Qo – mean
over all observed values.
An efficiency NSE = 1 would then stand for a perfect match between simulated data and
observed data. NSE < 0 would imply that an average over all observed values is a better
predictor than a model. NSE efficiency coefficients for the MP-MAS Uganda application are
reported in Table 4.9. It can be seen that for all of the test simulations the value of the coefficient
is close to one.
Table 4.9: Model fit and efficiency (by different populations and random seeds)
Model
and seed
Slope coef. R-squared NSE
1 1.0111 0.9985 0.9977
2 1.0038 0.9982 0.9974
3 1.0169 0.9983 0.9972
4 1.0218 0.9978 0.9962
5 1.0042 0.9987 0.9981
6 1.0065 0.9978 0.9968
7 1.0015 0.9982 0.9975
8 1.0054 0.9976 0.9966
9 0.9972 0.9984 0.9978
10 0.9850 0.9987 0.9979
Average 1.0053 0.9982 0.9973
Best 1.0015 0.9987 0.9981
Worst 1.0218 0.9976 0.9962
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* p-value in all cases is lower than 0.000
Calculations reported in this section showed that the simulation model has a good fit and
efficiency in terms of simulating outputs of crop and livestock production on the level of pop-
ulation averages. However, comparisons of distribution functions performed earlier in Sections
4.2.3 and 4.2.4) suggested that on the household level the accuracy of the model lowers in the
case of some farm activities. Therefore, one may want to avoid using this model to make precise
point predictions for particular farm households. This study is not intended to make such pre-
dictions, it is rather assessing directions and magnitudes of various treatments on the group of
households, producing patterns and simulating processes for meso-level analysis (see Chapter
5). But, such aggregate-level analyses are done by taking into account the heterogeneity of indi-
vidual farm households, captured by agent-based formulation of the MP-MAS Uganda model.
The model agents reflect characteristics of the real-world households (see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and
4.2.1), and based on these characteristics the model mechanism (explained in Chapter 3) simu-
lates household-specific responses to different treatments.
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Figure 4.4: Model fit. Average results
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* model results are reported as average over 10 test populations
4.2.6 Population demography
Population pyramids for the study area were drawn from the empirical copula (see Section 3.8)
estimated from IFPRI (2010) survey. Figure D.8 compares age pyramids of the survey and
model populations. The model pyramid represented in this figure is the average pyramid of ten
test populations. The limited number of observations for the study area in IFPRI (2010) survey
did not allow for the making of a detailed (one year age resolution) estimation of the survey
population pyramid. Hence, in the sampling procedure 12 equal age groups were used instead
of exact ages. The exact ages within these groups were later randomly assigned. This allowed
for the creation of a smooth population pyramid for the model from the rather ragged one of the
survey. The survey pyramid (and the model pyramids resulting from it) has a constrictive shape
that indicates lower numbers or percentages of younger people. It significantly differs from the
country population pyramid provided in UDHS (2007), which has an expansive shape with a high
proportion of youth. This pattern is a probable consequence of rural-urban migration processes
that occurred in the study area or of the resettlement of household members (e.g. finding housing
elsewhere).
For validation of the interpolated survivorship (Figure 3.12) and fertility (Figure3.11) curves
their predictions on average life expectancy and total fertility rates, respectively, were compared
with World Bank (2012) and UDHS (2007) data estimates for Uganda. Survivorship curves
implemented in the MP-MAS Uganda application predict an average life expectancy of 54.28
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years for women and 51.12 years for men, which is close to the corresponding estimates of World
Bank (2012): 53.68 for women and 52.49 for men. The fertility curve gives a total fertility rate
of 6.12 children per woman, which is in line with the 6.69 country average, given a relatively
lower fertility rate in Central Uganda, as observed by UDHS (2007).
The generated population structure together with the interpolated survivorship and fertility
curves define simulated population dynamics. The simulation model population produces an an-
nual growth rate of 2.82% per annum. The current population growth rate for Uganda, according
to World Bank (2012), is estimated at the 3.2% level; CIA (2012) estimated 3.576%. A growth
rate that is lower than the country average is expected in the model, since the total fertility rates
in the Central region, to which the study population belongs, are lower than in the county as a
whole (5.6 – Central region and 6.7 – whole Uganda (UDHS 2007)) and the net migration rate
is negative (see Figure 3.13).
4.2.7 Sensitivity of results to model initial conditions
The implemented approaches of generating model agents and soil properties (described in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3) allowed for the creation of many statistically consistent agent populations.
These alternative populations, as well as various model random seeds, were used to assess the
sensitivity of model results with respect to initial conditions. Some attention was already dedic-
ated to this issue in the preceding sections (4.2.3 - 4.2.5) of this chapter. This section supplements
the previous analysis by estimating the results sensitivity on the extent of 15-period simulation
run (a length that is later used in the applied model scenarios). The assessment was based on the
results of 20 test runs conducted with different initial conditions. In these simulations all model
components (including RPO-model, soil updates and population dynamics) were activated and
all model parameters were as recorded in the IFPRI (2010) survey. This model set up is later
referred to as the “baseline scenario”.
Figure 4.5 summarizes the results of the model simulations on sensitivity. The figure displays
the estimated variations in important model variables with respect to changes in initial conditions
and random seed. A variation here is characterized by a standard deviation of a variable divided
by an average value of that variable (relative standard deviation) over 20 test simulation runs.
The variables themselves were taken as averages over all agents in one population. Figure 4.5
supports conclusions from previous sections on low dispersion of the model results depending
on the initial model conditions and random seed. The simulated relative standard deviation for
each of the selected variables lies within a +/- 7% interval. Moreover, the figure shows that
the variations for most of the selected variables are almost constant over the model time, with
the exception of amounts of coffee sold through the RPO, whose variation slightly increases in
the later simulation periods. In general, the findings of this experiment prove the consistency
and robustness of model results. However, the existence of the estimated variations and their
magnitudes has to be considered when interpreting the results of the model simulations.
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Figure 4.5: Variation of baseline results
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* variations are reported as relative standard deviations from meta-averages over 20 test simulations
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Chapter 5
Simulation results
Previous chapters of this thesis discussed the design and development of the MP-MAS software
application for modeling RPOs in agriculture. This chapter describes the scenarios for which the
model was applied and analyzes the results of the respective simulation experiments. The choice
and set up of the scenarios for analysis were driven by the research questions of this particular
study (page 6), as well as by the objectives of the joint research project in which framework this
research was done (Section 1.3.1). The scenario-based analysis resulted in the conduction of
over 200 computer simulation experiments belonging to the following three sets:
1. System under current conditions (Section 5.1): The associated simulations meant to rep-
licate in the model a situation that is close to what is currently occurring in reality. The
results provide insight into what would likely happen in the study population over the
next few years, assuming that present economic and demographic conditions and trends
hold. Also within this set of simulation experiments the effects of RPO presence on study
area households were isolated. Influences of soil degradation and population growth were
assessed as well.
2. Sensitivity to external factors (Section 5.2): There are several external factors that are
likely to influence the behavior of modeled households. Prices for coffee and staple crops,
wages for seasonal labor, declines in crop yields (e.g. due to outbreaks of plant diseases)
or yield increases (e.g. due to provision of quality planting material or adoption of good
agricultural practices) are in the list of such factors. In order to capture household re-
sponses to possible external shocks (both negative and positive), the sensitivity analysis
was performed.
3. RPO-level interventions (Section 5.3): With this set of experiments the author simulated
the effects of potential development interventions at the RPO level. This was done in order
to estimate likely impacts of the interventions on the study population. Recommendations
for implementation of interventions can be derived from the results of this ex-ante im-
pact assessment. Tested interventions include (i) shortening of delays in payments for
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delivered coffee, (ii) organization of monetary motivation schemes for large sellers and
(iii) engagement of an RPO in a certification program.
The listed experiments were intended not only to provide additional knowledge on the stud-
ied system, but also to assess and demonstrate the potential of application of MAS models (and
MP-MAS framework in particular) for research on farm households and collective action organ-
izations.
MP-MAS Uganda application is a simplified representation of the real-world agricultural
system, hence certain characteristics, which are dynamic in the real-world, are static in the sim-
ulation model. It is worth noting that across all the simulation scenarios, land ownership and
sizes of coffee plantations were fixed over the runtime. Agents could change their management
practices (input and labor intensity, crop mixes of food crops) and replant coffee plantations, but
could not expand or reduce the land ownership or parcels used for coffee growing. Consumption
preferences of agents were assumed to remain constant.
All simulation runs were performed with the same initial population and random seed. In
the case of all scenarios, the simulation model was run for 15 normal simulation periods pre-
ceded by three spin-up periods and one initialization period, during which agents formed their
expectations and adjusted their liquidity reserves and initial livestock allocations. These four
extra periods at the start of the simulations are “technical” and serve for the correct initialization
of the model, therefore their results are not reported in this chapter.
As explained earlier (Section 1.3.4), the simulation model includes only the agents, whose
real-world prototypes are current RPO members. Therefore, simulation results reflect only the
behavior of current RPO members. Due to the absence of empirical data in the project survey
(IFPRI 2010), the other coffee-producing households (non-members of RPOs) were not simu-
lated. Hence, the membership in the RPO is fixed in the simulation model, i.e. the RPO agent
may neither attract new members, nor lose existing members. Of course, in reality the member-
ship is not fixed, but dynamic and certain factors and interventions might influence the dynamics
of membership. These considerations have to be kept in mind, when extrapolating model results
into the real-world situation.
5.1 System properties under current conditions
In terms of model set-up, scenarios reviewed in this section were simulated with constant poten-
tial crop yields and constant purchasing and selling prices and production costs. These factors
were set to observed levels of 2010. Scenario design assumed that the production alternatives
remain constant over the runtime (the next 15 years after 2010), which means no innovations
or technological changes were expected. Mortality and fertility rates remain as observed. The
RPO agent (in scenarios where it is present) performs only its regular functions of collecting,
processing and marketing of the coffee produced by farm agents.
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This section aims to describe the baseline state and the dynamics of the simulated system.
The analysis served as a benchmark to be used later in sensitivity tests and treatment assess-
ments. Also, it was intended to give the reader an overview of the behavior of the implemented
simulation model.
At first let us inspect the development of incomes of household agents depicted in Figure 5.1.
As this figure suggests, the simulated household income rises over time. There are two reasons of
this upward trend in the simulated household income: (i) recent high levels of producer prices for
robusta coffee (see Figure 1.7) and (ii) an increase in agent labor supply due to the simulated rapid
population growth and the aging of household members (many younger household members
become available for farm work). The income effect of population dynamics is closer inspected
in Section 5.1.2. The simulated income dynamics have a mean compound annual income growth
rate of 0.9%. Figure 5.1 shows that the rate of growth is similar in the lowest and highest income
terciles. When looking at the inequality measures (Figure 5.2), we see that income inequality
between model agents is indeed relatively stable over time. The Gini coefficient of 0.25 indicates
low income inequality. This is not surprising, since membership in the RPO implies a certain
degree of similarity between members. Despite the growth in simulated household income,
simulated income in per capita representation, due to the growing population, declines after
the fourth period. Figure 5.3 shows the development of simulated household income per capita
(adjusted according to the OECD adult equivalence scale).
Figure 5.1: Household income. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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Figure 5.2: Income inequality. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.3: Per capita income. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
As shown in Figure 5.4, agent equity capital remains stable over the long run. On the one
hand, agents have to make regular withdrawals for their own consumption and, since capital in-
vestment opportunities are limited, not much equity capital is being accumulated. On the other
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hand, agent household capital is not declining, which means that agent production patterns and
consumption levels are sustained over time. The livestock assets of model household agents in-
crease (Figure 5.5); the herd sizes are growing. Because of the declining soil fertility (explained
in Section 5.1.2), agents gradually increase livestock production and decrease crop production.
Figure 5.4: Farm equity capital. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Agriculture in the study area is subsistence-oriented, i.e. part of the farm produce is not
sold on the market, but used to cover household food requirements. The consumption module
of MP-MAS Uganda application simulates this behavior (see Section 3.7). Figure 5.6 shows
the simulated distribution of per capita food consumption (adjusted according to the OECD
equivalence scale). This graph is plotted based on the agent-specific 15 period average food
supplies. The daily food energy intake of 3000 food calories per adult equivalent per day is
currently used in Uganda as a national poverty line (MFPED 2012). This poverty threshold can
be transformed to 4.581 gigajoules per year. The threshold is plotted in Figure 5.6, showing that
25.1% of household agents from the model population lie below the national poverty line (left to
the red line on the graph). The statistics of World Bank (2012) estimate the poverty headcount
ratio for Uganda at the national poverty line at the level of 24.5%.
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Figure 5.5: Livestock ownership. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.6: Food consumption. Baseline scenario
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* distribution of average period from 15 period simulation
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5.1.1 Effect of RPO presence
In order to isolate the effect of the RPO presence, the baseline scenario from the section above
was run without the RPO agent, i.e. in this case, farm agents can only sell coffee through middle-
men. The results of both (with and without the RPO) simulations were compared. Figure 5.7
shows the impact of the RPO on agent revenue from coffee sales. The mean effect can then be
calculated as a difference between the red and blue lines on the graph: on average, in the scenario
with the RPO, sales revenues of farm agents are 11.0% higher than in the scenario without it.
Figure 5.7: RPO impact. Sales revenue
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Coffee is an important cash crop for the study area households. It is grown almost exclus-
ively for sale, while other crops are largely consumed on the farm. Consequently, coffee sales
constitute one of the main sources of cash. Therefore, positive RPO impacts on agent sales
revenue translates to higher cash earnings of household agents. Figure 5.8 compares simulated
agent cash earnings in situations with and without the RPO agent. The figure provides a disag-
gregated picture by comparing distributions of cash earnings from respective scenarios. From
the figure we can see a distinct increase in cash earnings for the large share of household agents
cased by the RPO activity. We can also observe a positive impact of RPO in terms of simulated
per capita incomes (Figure 5.9). The magnitude of the effect here is obviously smaller, since
coffee production is one of several income-generating activities in the model. The effect is also
noticeable in many parts of the distribution. Figure 5.10 compares dynamics of agent income
under both scenarios. As shown in the graph, the RPO has a positive effect on income in every
simulation period. Again, the difference between lines is calculated to assess the mean impact
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of the RPO: the income effect of RPO presence is simulated to constitute 2.8%.
Figure 5.8: RPO impact. Household cash earnings
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* distributions of average period from 15 period simulations
Figure 5.9: RPO impact. Per capita income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* distributions of average period from 15 period simulations
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Figure 5.10: RPO impact. Income dynamics
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
5.1.2 Dynamic effects of soil degradation and population growth
Increasing population pressure on land is a typical characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is
an important factor to be considered, therefore, it was implemented in the simulation model
(implementation discussed in Section 3.8). Figure 5.11 displays simulated population pressure
on arable land. The figure shows that current rates of population growth in Uganda are simulated
to tremendously increase the population density in rural areas. For assessment of the effect of
population growth, the results of the baseline scenario (with simulated population dynamics)
were compared with the artificial hypothetical scenario, where the aging of household members
was switched off, and fertility, mortality and migration rates were set equal to zero (i.e. no
population dynamics). As Figure 5.12 demonstrates, the simulated population growth negatively
influences agent per capita incomes in the long run. From Figure 5.12 we can see that on average,
in the starting years, agents benefit from population dynamics because of an increase in farm
labor availability. In later periods this effect is countervailed by population growth. Even with
population dynamics switched off, agent mean per capita income experiences a slight decline in
the later periods. This happens because (i) the benefits from high coffee prices are already fully
realized and (ii) the decline in soil fertility also negatively influences agent incomes.
The integrated TSPC module (see Section 3.6) simulated a decline of soil fertility (reflected
by negative nutrient balances) under agricultural practices chosen by model agents: as shown in
Figure 5.13, simulated stocks of soil organic nitrogen gradually decline. Nutrient losses cause
decreases in simulated crop yields and consequently, agent farm gross margins and incomes.
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Figure 5.11: Population pressure on land
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.12: Effect of population growth. Income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.14 shows the simulated income gap substantiated by the soil degradation processes. At
the period 15 the mean income gap constitutes 5.7% of the baseline average per capita income
(in adult equivalent calculation).
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Figure 5.13: Soil organic nitrogen
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.14: Effect of soil degradation. Income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to capture agent responses to possible external shocks, a sensitivity analysis was per-
formed. The first part of this section reports on the sensitivity of simulated household incomes
and poverty counts, as well as RPO profits with regard to changes in external factors that are
likely to be influential (e.g. market prices, production costs etc.). It was tested by running the
model using different levels of such external factors and comparing the respective simulation
outcomes. The second part of the section assesses the impact that the variability of coffee prices
may have on farm households and RPOs. This impact was captured through the comparison of
simulation runs performed (i) with prices that are constant to the historical average and (ii) with
prices subject to historical variability.
5.2.1 Sensitivity to changes in external factors
For this experiment, a number of factors were integrated into the Excel dataset that contains
parameters of the simulation model. All these factors are multipliers that change values of one
or several model input variables. In the baseline all factors are equal to one. For the sensitivity
analysis, eight levels of every factor were tested ceteris paribus: 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5
and 2. During the simulation run, the tested factor is kept constant at the initially chosen level.
(E.g. price factor of 0.5 would imply that all prices in all model periods are lowered by 50% in
comparison to baseline.) In total, six factors were incorporated in the analysis:
1. Coffee prices
2. Food prices (include cultivated crops, livestock and livestock products and food purchased
on the market)
3. Input prices (planting material for coffee, seeds and fertilizers)
4. Wages of seasonal labor
5. Coffee yields (no effect on price assumed)
6. Yields of food crops (also with no price effect)
Let us start with the analysis of sensitivity with respect to coffee prices. Figure 5.15 displays
the results of the simulation experiments that simulated income sensitivity related to coffee price
reduction or increase. The results show that with the reduction of coffee prices by 50% of the
2010 level, agent incomes in per capita expression reduce by 17.4% on average. Since house-
holds want to secure their food consumption, they diversify farm enterprises and their income
is never fully dependent on coffee production. Diversification of income sources through the
cultivation of other crops (plantains, maize, beans etc.) and livestock rearing, as well as remit-
tances from family members help to smooth the negative effects of price shocks. A 50% increase
in coffee prices from the baseline resulted in a rise in mean per capita income by 27.1%. The
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relative effect from coffee price increase of 50% is higher than from the coffee price decline
of 50%: 27.1%>17.4%. This is because higher sales revenues caused by producer price in-
creases provide additional cash earnings for farm agents. In current conditions of the modeled
system this leads to the relaxation of agent cash constraints, which opens more investment and
production opportunities that in turn result in additional income improvement.
Figure 5.15: Coffee prices and income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Coffee is an important income source and a food security provider. The decline of coffee
prices increases simulated poverty gaps and pushes more agents under the poverty line (Fig-
ure 5.16). For example, in the scenario with 50% lower coffee prices on average over 15 periods
33.2% of agents from modeled population are below the poverty line, while in the baseline scen-
ario this indicator equals 30.8%. In the scenario with 50% higher coffee prices, the percentage
of agents below the poverty line decreases to 25.4% on average.
In order to characterize the impact that coffee price changes create at the RPO level, let us
look at the development of RPO profit under different price scenarios. Figure 5.17 displays
simulated RPO profits at different coffee prices. According to the formulated definition of RPO
profit (see Section 3.10.2), the profit reported on the graph accounts only for fixed and variable
costs of the organization (does not include individual costs of coffee growing). This profit is
distributed among the agents and forms the simulated producer prices received when selling
through the RPO-channel. Figure 5.17 shows that in simulation with the general long-run level
of coffee prices equal to 50% of the baseline, the RPO is unprofitable (i.e. it is outcompeted
by local middlemen). Because of increasing returns to scale and strong producer incentives,
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Figure 5.16: Coffee prices and poverty
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
simulated RPO profit rises at a higher rate than the coffee prices (Figure 5.17). For example, a
50% increase in coffee prices lead to an increase in simulated RPO profit of 135.7% on average.
Figure 5.17: Coffee prices and RPO profit
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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Similar to coffee prices, five other factors listed above were tested and their impacts analyzed.
Figures 5.18–5.20 provide a summary and cross-comparison of sensitivities of simulated agent
incomes (Figure 5.18), poverty estimates (Figure 5.19) and RPO profit (Figure 5.20) with respect
to the selected factors. These figures plot simulated changes in the model result indicators against
relative changes in the selected external factors implemented in the model input data. Each dot on
the graphs of Figures 5.18–5.20 represents a result of a particular simulation run (dots connected
by linear interpolation). Graphs report simulated effects as relative changes in population means.
Figure 5.18: Sensitivity analysis. Income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* results reported as mean effects from 15 period simulation runs
As expected, simulated agent income statistics are positively correlated with coffee prices
and coffee yields (Figure 5.18). Yields of food crops and food prices are also positively correl-
ated with agent income, since model households also produce food crops in addition to coffee,
such as plantains (with which coffee is intercropped).
As shown in Figure 5.18, income is almost immune to changes in prices of production inputs
and seasonal labor wages: only a slight income decline is simulated, when either of these two
factors increase. Agents are not dependent on external production inputs: traditional planting
material is cheap and in many cases is produced on the farm, mineral fertilizers are rarely used.
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Figure 5.19: Sensitivity analysis. Poverty estimates
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* results reported as mean effects from 15 period simulation runs
Also, mostly own labor is involved in farming activities. Other indicators (Figures 5.19 and
5.20) also show low sensitivity to input prices and wages of seasonal labor.
Higher coffee and food crop yields and higher coffee prices were simulated to have a positive
impact on poverty in the study area: increases in these factors led to considerable declines in
poverty headcounts (Figure 5.19). Declines in these factors led to the aggravation of the poverty
situation. Predicting the poverty and food price relationship prior to the simulation was not
straightforward. Since households are not only sellers, but also buyers of food products, it was
not clear without performing simulation experiments, how their welfare would be affected by
an increase in food market prices. In this case, both household incomes and food expenditures
would rise. The question that was addressed with the model was whether the related increase in
income (Figure 5.18) is sufficient to cover the increase in food expenditure. Aggregate results
on simulated poverty statistics (top middle graph from Figure 5.19) show an increase in poverty
with increase in food prices. However, these statistics cannot provide a definite answer, since the
benefits of net food producers can compensate for the losses of net food consumers. The agent-
based nature of the model allows looking further to the household level of aggregation. As an
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Figure 5.20: Sensitivity analysis. RPO profit
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* results reported as mean effects from 15 period simulation runs
example, Figure 5.21 assesses agent-level impacts of 50% food price increase on household food
energy consumption. From this figure it can be seen that large numbers of agents are sensitive
to food prices, but the direction of influence can be both positive and negative. The fitted lowess
line shows that in terms of per capita food consumption wealthier agents in general suffer more
from the food price increase than the poorer.
After inspecting the simulated changes in RPO profit (Figure 5.20) it may be concluded that
the simulated size of the profit is highly dependent on coffee prices and coffee yields realized
by RPO members. Moreover, as it was discussed before, at a certain level of coffee prices RPO
agent become unprofitable. Also, simulation results show that food prices have a strong influence
on RPO profit (top middle graph from Figure 5.20). For example, according to model results,
the doubling of food prices causes a 32.3% decrease in simulated RPO profit. Such sensitivity
of RPO profit with respect to food prices is a reason for the reallocation of agent resources to the
production of food crops. With the increase in food price, both net food selling and buying agents
focus more on food production, because (i) the selling of food crops become more profitable and
(ii) a larger share of agent food requirements must be satisfied by own consumption, since food
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Figure 5.21: Impact of food price increase (disaggregated)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
** agents ranked in ascending order according to income in baseline scenario
purchases become more expensive. Changes in yields of food crops have an effect on simulated
RPO profit as well (bottom right graph from Figure 5.20). The direction of the effect is the same
as in the case of food prices, but the magnitude is noticeably lower, since the prices of crops
bought for consumption are not affected by yields.
Results reported in this section show that agent incomes and poverty statuses are highly
dependent on the market prices for coffee. The effectiveness of the RPO agent is largely defined
by these prices as well. The analysis showed that in certain price scenarios the RPO agent
appears to be unprofitable. Also, agent welfare is highly sensitive with respect to increases in
crop yields. Higher coffee yields also translate to higher profits achieved by the RPO agent.
5.2.2 Impact of price variability
As discussed in Section 1.3.3, the price for robusta coffee historically is subject to high variab-
ility. Based on the ICO (2013) data on producer prices in Uganda, it can be calculated that in
the recent past the nation-wide average price of Ugandan robusta paid to growers varied from
1.96 usd per kg in 1995 to 0.33 usd in 2001 and then back to 1.53 usd in 2008 (prices given
in 2010 real terms). Some basic statistics on the price variability can be found in Table 5.1.
(In the variability analysis, only prices as far back as1995 were used as before that time there
was a different coffee marketing system in Uganda and a period of transition.) The previous
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section showed how sensitive model households and RPO agents are to long-term changes in
coffee price, this section in turn aims to elicit the impact of interannual price variability around
the long-term average.
Table 5.1: Variability of producer prices for robusta coffee (1995–2010)
Mean Median Max Min Stdev Iqr Cv
Price, usd/kg 1.07 1.16 1.96 0.33 0.44 0.65 0.41
First difference effect, usd/kg -0.05 0.11 0.32 -0.76 0.32 0.44 -5.98
Source: Own calculations from ICO (2013) data
* in 2010 real terms
The analysis was undertaken by comparison of results from model simulations performed
with (i) variable coffee prices and (ii) prices constant to long-term average. The set up of the
experiments required the construction of a price pattern for model input that were consistent with
the historically observed variability and price levels in the study area. This issue was resolved
by the author as follows:
1. Uganda average nominal producer prices for robusta coffee (reported by ICO (2013) in
usd on the annual basis) were converted to real terms of 2010 using U.S. producer price
index.
2. Real term prices were normalized by the price of 2010, expressing prices of all years as a
share of 2010 price.
3. Study area prices of 2010 (RPO price for FAQ coffee and middlemen price for green
coffee) were multiplied with the shares obtained in the previous step, thus providing price
projections for the study area for years 1995–2009.
4. Dataset with yearly study area prices for the period 1996–2010 was used to generate the
necessary 15 year price patterns for the model input. Generation was done by random
resampling with replacement of 1996–2010 prices. Required number of 15-year price
patterns was drawn this way.
5. Prices for the run with a constant long-term average price were calculated by taking the
averages of the generated price variability patterns.
In order to minimize the effect of random resampling of prices, ”with variability” simulation
runs were performed using ten different generated price patterns. Then the results of these ten
runs and an additional run with prices constant to long term average (”no variability”) were
considered in the analysis.
Figure 5.22 assesses the impact of price variability from the perspective of agent income.
The figure plots the relative change in per capita income that every household agent experienced,
when facing coffee price variability, in comparison with the situation with constant prices. (For
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the ”with variability” scenario, agent-specific averages over ten conducted runs were taken.) The
fitted lowess line shows that in general the effect of price variability is moderate. On average, the
variability results in a 2.34% decline in agent income. However, the effect of variability varies
across the agents. The aggregate effect of variability is positive for agents with lower incomes,
because their benefits in periods with high prices overcompensate the losses in periods with low
ones. Periods of high prices open for them additional production and investment opportunities
by relaxing the liquidity constraint. For middle income agents, the aggregate effect is almost
neutral. Agents do not have a perfect forecast on market prices at the start of the simulation
period, when production and investment decisions are taken. Agents make these decision ac-
cording to their price expectations, which are formed based on agents’ past experiences (this
mechanism is explained in Section 3.9). Therefore, unlike the case with constant prices, in the
situation ”with variability” (because of inaccurate expectations) agent decisions may become
suboptimal. Suboptimal agent resource allocations that arise with price variability especially
harm high income agents: fitted lowess line shows a negative change in simulated income for
this group of agents in the aggregate.
Figure 5.22: Impact of price variability (disaggregated)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
** agents ranked in ascending order according to income in baseline scenario
The variability in coffee prices and, therefore, household incomes may have an effect on the
poverty structure. Potentially, a larger share of the population may fall below the poverty line
in years when prices are low, thus becoming more vulnerable. The author reviewed the results
of MP-MAS simulation to investigate whether the described effect takes place in the model
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results. Table 5.2 compares poverty estimates obtained from simulation runs with ”constant
prices” (no variability) and ”historical variability”. (Again, for ”historical variability” scenario
agent-specific averages over multiple runs were taken.) First of all, the table shows that the
model simulates high incidences of poverty in the agent population: only 25.04% of agents
never experience poverty over the course of simulation even in the scenario with constant coffee
prices. The large share of agents (70.87% in ”constant prices” scenario) are near the national
poverty line and appear below it in 1–12 out of 15 simulation periods. Only a small portion of
agents (4.09% in ”constant prices” scenario) are almost constantly (in 13–15 out of 15 simulation
periods) located below the poverty line. With regard to the impact of variability, it can be seen
that 0.88% fewer agents appear to never be poor. Agents mostly transit to the next category of
poor in 1–3 simulation periods, where the share of agents rises by 1.11%. So, generally speaking,
in terms of poverty structure, price variability shifts more agents under the poverty line. But,
as the values from Table 5.2 reveal, in general, the simulated magnitude of the variability effect
on poverty structure is small. Also, in ‘ the ‘historical variability” scenario, fewer agents appear
to be poor in 10–12 and 13–15 simulation periods (15.48% compared to 17.04% in constant
price scenario). So the poorest of the poor actually benefit from the variability (Figure 5.22 also
supports this conclusion).
Table 5.2: Impact of price variability. Poverty structure
Periods under Constant prices Historical variability
national poverty line % of hh agents cumulative % % of hh agents cumulative %
0 25.04 25.04 24.16 24.16
1–3 20.6 45.64 21.71 45.87
4–6 19.39 65.03 20.25 66.12
7–9 17.92 82.95 18.4 84.52
10–12 12.96 95.91 11.94 96.46
13–15 4.09 100 3.54 100
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
As the previous section revealed, the simulated size of the RPO profit is highly sensitive to
changes in market prices for coffee (see Figures 5.17 and 5.20). Therefore, interannual price
fluctuations are expected to cause fluctuations in RPO profit. The simulated dynamics of the
RPO profit under generated patterns of ”historical price variability” were compared with its
dynamics when facing ”constant price” (see Figure 5.23). The left graph from Figure 5.23 shows
that under a constant price level, the development of the RPO profit is smooth. The situation
with smooth dynamics of the RPO profit changes when prices vary between years (right graph
from Figure 5.23): the simulated profit varies strongly. Interestingly, one of the resampled price
trajectories causes a decline in profit, from which after a certain point the RPO agent cannot
recover (orange line on the graph) and consequently collapses. The collapse happens since the
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household agents, after experiencing a certain period of low prices, divert from intensive coffee
production and, therefore, do not deliver amounts of coffee to the RPO agent that are sufficient
for it to achieve the break-even sales volume.
Figure 5.23: Impact of price variability. RPO profit
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Agents’ coffee production and their sales to the RPO are pretty much determined by the
formation of their expectations about the future price (mechanism explained in Section 3.9). As
Figure E.1 in the Appendix shows, higher values of lambda-parameter for price expectations
(i.e. faster updates of agent expectations) lead to a greater number of cases with unsustainable
RPOs. The simulated likelihood of RPO failure during the next 15 years under historical price
variability in the setting with lambda equal to 0.3 constitutes 0 out of 10 cases, with lambda equal
to 0.5 constitutes 1 out of 10, and with lambda equal to 0.7 constitutes 4 out of 10. In other words,
the faster the agents adjust their behaviors according to the recently observed prices, the more
problematic it is for the RPO to achieve sustainability.
This section revealed that the historically recorded variability in coffee prices is simulated to
have impacts on model household and RPO agents. Impacts on simulated incomes of household
agents are diverse and can be both positive and negative. The poverty situation is negatively
affected by price fluctuations. In general, aggregate impacts in terms of agent incomes and
poverty are small. A much larger impact of price variability is simulated at the RPO level.
Simulation results show that price variability creates a hazard for the sustainability of the RPO
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agent. Results show that not only the long-term levels of prices matter, but also the short- and
mid-term dynamics.
5.3 Assessing the impacts of RPO-level interventions
By RPO-level interventions the author means the possible changes and improvements in RPO
functions that are likely to provide additional benefits to members of RPOs. Simulation experi-
ments with the MP-MAS Uganda model were conducted in order to assess (ex-ante) the impacts
of such interventions. The selection of interventions for testing with MP-MAS was done based
on the results of focus group meetings with RPO-members organized by the IFPRI–IZA–UHOH
project (Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009) and discussions with coffee farmers and key informants con-
ducted by the author (this methodology is explained in the Section 2.1).
Similar to the simulation scenarios in Section 5.1, scenarios reviewed in this section were also
run with constant (to the observed levels of 2010) potential yields, market prices and production
costs. This isolated intervention effects from changes in the natural and market factors. All
system dynamics, i.e. periodic changes in soil properties, population structure, livestock assets,
available liquidity and agent expectations were activated in the model.
5.3.1 Shortening delays in payments for delivered coffee
Focus group visits of the IFPRI–IZA–UHOH project (Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009) and the author’s
interviews with key informants (Chapter 2, Latynskiy & Berger (2011)) indicated the importance
of timely payments for the production of farmers from the RPO-side. Selling through the RPO-
channel implies a certain delay in payment (due to the coordination of collection of individual
produce, product transformation and financial operations), while when selling to middlemen
coffee growers are paid on the spot. Given the high rates of time preference of farmers in Sub-
Saharan African countries (Holden et al. 1998), even small time delays may significantly dis-
count the values of future payments, thus discouraging farmers from using the RPO-channel for
sales of their coffee. Shortening the time that farmers have to wait in order to receive their pay-
ments from the RPO, may therefore increase their willingness to market their produce through
the RPO, increase the RPO turnover and, finally, cause the RPO to benefit from fixed cost de-
gression. This would result in higher producer prices that the RPO could pass on to its member
farmers and a higher share of coffee produced in the study area to be sold for these better prices.
As shown earlier in Table 3.20, rates of time preferences with regard to payments for the
delivered coffee are expectedly high in the study area. Hence, the simulation model was used to
assess the sensitivity of coffee sales volumes and possible delays associated with selling through
the RPO-channel. With specific simulation experiments, the author tested the hypothesis that
shortening payment delays would have a positive impact on the sales volumes of Kibinge DC
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and assessed the impacts of this intervention at the household level.
Simulation results suggest that the quantity of coffee sold through the RPO-channel varies
significantly depending on the length of the payment delay (see Figure 5.24). The effect is
especially prominent when agents are paid on the spot (payment delay equals zero). For example,
by paying on the spot, the RPO agent could increase its turnover more than twice, when compared
to the situation of baseline seven days delay. As it can also be seen from Figure 5.24, payment
delays of four months and longer discourage all RPO member agents from selling through the
organization and, therefore, cause the RPO agent to be unable to cover their fixed costs (staff
wages, electricity bills, etc.). The follow-up insight is derived from Figure 5.24: shorter payment
delays through higher turnover improve the efficiency (cost to sales revenue) ratio of the RPO
agent. An increased efficiency ratio certainly implies increased sustainability of the RPO. The
amounts of coffee sold through the RPO agent (shown in Figure 5.24) are gradually increasing
over time. The growth in RPO profit happens because agents intensify their coffee production
and sell more coffee through the RPO. The production intensification is caused by several drivers:
(i) an increase in labor availability due to population dynamics (explained earlier in Section
5.1.2), (ii) an increase in livestock keeping (Figure 5.5) provides additional products for own
consumption, therefore agents can concentrate more on producing cash crops, (iii) more coffee
sold through the RPO results in better selling prices for the agents , which is a further incentive
for the intensification of production.
Figure 5.24: Payment delays. Sales of RPO agent
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
As Figure 5.25 shows, shortening payment delays translates into an increase in the selling
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price of RPO member agents. The price effect is relatively small, however, compared with the
quantity effect (Figure 5.24). In all cases depicted in Figure 5.25 the RPO agent is able to offer
better prices than middlemen traders (the middlemen price is equal to 1000 ugx per kg of kiboko
in all scenarios). Therefore, larger quantities being sold through the RPO agent at these better
RPO prices together with the price effect from Figure 5.25 condition an increase in the average
agent revenue of coffee sales (see Figure 5.26).
Figure 5.25: Payment delays. RPO prices
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
So far, we assessed the effect of the intervention at the levels of the RPO and an average
household agent. But the particular strength of MP-MAS is that it is capable of disentangling
the effects of interventions at the level of individual household agents. Figure 5.27 demonstrates
a disaggregated effect of shortening payment delays on agent sales revenue. The Figure shows
simulated changes in revenues from coffee sales of model household agents in the situation,
if payment delays observed in IFPRI (2010) were eliminated. One may be surprised by the
existence of points lying below 0% grid-line on this graph, but due to the way in which household
decision making is implemented in MP-MAS (explained in Section 3.4), an intervention may
cause agents to change their whole production and consumption patterns. Therefore, some agents
may actually decide to produce less coffee when facing an intervention. (For example, higher
revenue in the earlier periods of simulation may allow agents to buy a cow, for which they will
then allocate labor previously used for coffee.) In addition, minor agent-level random events
(e.g. definition of sexes of newborn livestock offspring) that cannot be controlled explicitly
cause variations in agent trajectories. The fitted lowess line suggests that, in general, the impact
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Figure 5.26: Payment delays. Sales revenue
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
on agent revenue is positive and its magnitude is higher for agents who are smaller sellers. A
positive impact on sales revenue results in higher cash earnings of household agents. Figure 5.28
compares simulated agent cash earnings in situations with current delays and with payments
organized on the spot.
Since the sale of coffee is one of the main income sources for households and model agents
in the study area , a positive income effect is also expected. Indeed, MP-MAS simulates an
increase in mean per capita income by 32,975 ugx or 4.25% (on average over 15 periods) caused
by the introduction of payment on the spot (Figure 5.29).
The high sensitivity to payment delays in MP-MAS can be attributed to both the high time
preferences of farm agents (see Table 3.20), and the small margins of local traders (Dejene-
Aredo et al. 2009, IFPRI 2010) (the prices these traders offer are highly competitive). The
simulation results are also in line with expert opinions gathered by the author during his research
in Uganda: several experts pointed out the importance of the provision of on the spot payment
for the successful performance of RPOs (Chapter 2, Latynskiy & Berger (2011)).
Simulation results reported in this section so far show that shortening the delays of payments
to RPO members is beneficial for the RPO agent as well as for the household agents. Table
5.3 reports the results of cost efficiency analysis of implementing the development intervention
associated with the provision of on-spot payments for the members of the RPO. The analysis was
done based on the output of the simulation model. Simulated change in household income was
considered as benefit. As implementation cost the estimated cost of provision of the simulated
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Figure 5.27: Payment delays. Sales revenue (disaggregated)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
** agents ranked in ascending order according to revenue in baseline scenario
Figure 5.28: Payment delays. Household cash earnings
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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Figure 5.29: Payment delays. Per capita income
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
working capital requirement was taken. The calculation was done using the real market interest
rate for borrowed capital provided in World Bank (2012): 11.48% percent. The working capital
requirement was simulated based on the Kibinge DC sales schedule recorded in IFPRI (2010)
and assuming a coverage ratio of RPO liabilities to members equal to 1.5. As key indicators of
efficiency, Table 5.3 provides equivalent annual net benefit (EANB), benefit-cost ratio (BCR) and
economic rate of return (ERR). In addition, the table quantifies previously displayed intervention
effects in terms of household income and revenue as well as RPO turnover and profit.
Table 5.3: On-spot payments. Results of cost efficiency analysis
EANB, mil.
ugx
BCR ERR, % ∆* Household
income, %
∆ Household
revenue, %
∆ RPO
turnover, %
∆ RPO
profit, %
174.86 2.54 29.21 4.25 17.20 119.13 121.88
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* relative difference with baseline
5.3.2 Producer motivation schemes
In order to encourage farmers to sell more output through the RPO-channel and, therefore, ex-
ploit fixed cost degression and increase the efficiency ratio of the organization, the administra-
tion of Kibinge DC considered experimenting with various monetary motivation schemes for its
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members (Chapter 2, Latynskiy & Berger (2011)). Two mechanisms of implementation of such
schemes were considered: (i) a one-time bonus and (ii) a proportional premium. The one-time
bonus is paid once an RPO-member sells more than a certain quantity (Q) of coffee through
the RPO during a given time period, while the proportional premium is paid for every kg above
Q. MP-MAS Uganda application has been used as a tool for the analysis of possible motivation
effects and especially to answer the question of how far the various schemes might encourage
farmers to deliver their coffee harvest to the RPO. MP-MAS results may inform the design of
motivation schemes from different perspectives, for example RPO turnover, RPO budgeting,
and member sales revenues. The implementation of motivation payments in MILPs of model
household and RPO agents are presented in the Appendix in Tables B.7 and B.16, respectively.
In this section, the example of applying MP-MAS for the analysis of motivation schemes
is provided. This is done by comparing the results from the baseline simulation described in
Section 5.1 (all model dynamics turned on) with the results of test simulations, in each of which
one motivation alternative was implemented. Scenario design assumed the motivation payments
to be fully financed from the DC budget (i.e. not an external financing) and to be paid on the
delivery date. In this setting the payments are aimed to encourage agents for selling through
the RPO-channel amounts greater than the specified quantity requirement Q. They may also
stimulate agents to produce more coffee in general.
The main part of this study illustrates the assessment of five different motivation schemes
(M1,..., M5), which were compared with the model baseline (B). Set-ups of these selected
schemes are described in Table 5.4. Other optional set-ups with MP-MAS Uganda model (40
in total) were also tested. The compilation of the respective results is provided in appendices
(Table E.1).
Table 5.4: Selected motivation schemes
Scenario Qualification requirement, kg Proportional premium, ugx per kg One-time bonus, ugx
B – 0 0
M1 250 100 0
M2 250 0 25,000
M3 250 50 5,000
M4 500 200 0
M5 500 50 50,000
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation input
As was assessed with MP-MAS, the motivation payments for higher quantities may have not
only positive, but also negative net effects on RPO agent turnover. This happens, when agents
that are targeted by the motivation scheme increase their sales to a smaller extent than those
agents on whose expense the scheme is actually financed. Under the self-financing condition
of motivation payments, which was implemented in the scenarios, the motivation payments are
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subtracted from the RPO profit, i.e. reduce regular payments to agents. Figure 5.30 displays the
turnover of the RPO agent for the selected scenarios. From this figure it can be seen that options
M1, M2, M3 and M5 have a noticeable positive net effect. However, in comparison with the
improvement discussed in the previous section (compare Figure 5.30 and Figure 5.24) the effect
is much smaller. According to Figure 5.30, option M4 has a substantial negative RPO-level
impact. Option M4 discourages agents to such an extent that the amount of coffee sold through
the RPO in this case is 38.2% lower than in the baseline scenario. At first glance this negatively
affecting option is not that different from the others in terms of the set-up (Table 5.4).
Figure 5.30: Motivation schemes. Sales of RPO agent
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
The sum of the product quantities that individual producers deliver to RPOs in the future time
periods is uncertain, and, therefore, the amount of premiums and bonuses that would have to be
paid is uncertain as well. MP-MAS Uganda application has been used for ex-ante estimation
of the annual budgets of the motivation schemes. The execution of higher budgets is likely to
set higher liquidity requirements, therefore, it is important to have precautionary information on
this topic. Figure 5.31 shows the estimated budgets for the selected motivation schemes.
Figure 5.32 shows the effect of the selected motivation schemes on agent revenue from coffee
sales. The figure shows that schemes M1, M2, M3 and M5 have no significant effect on the
mean revenue. So the small positive RPO-level impact observed in Figure 5.30 did not create
any considerable difference in terms of the mean agent revenue. However, negative impacts of
option M4 translated into a sharp decline in the agent revenue. Simulated effects of all tested
motivation schemes in terms of household agent revenue and income, as well as RPO turnover
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Figure 5.31: Motivation schemes. Annual budgets
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
and profit are quantified in Table E.1 of the Appendix.
Figure 5.33 displays disaggregated effects on agent sales revenue. The figure reports the
relative change in revenue from coffee sales of household agents when motivation option M3
is applied, compared with the baseline (B). From the figure it can be seen that the tested inter-
vention is expected to have diverse effects on the agent revenue. Although the mean effect of
scheme application (see Figure 5.30) is small, we can see that a number of individual agents
are significantly affected. As the fitted lowess line shows, on aggregate the model simulates a
slightly positive impact for smaller producers.
The results reported in this section indicate that the various schemes considered for producer
motivation are simulated to have contrasting effects. Some options stimulate an increase in the
simulated turnover of the RPO agent, which in turn increases the simulated profit margin of this
agent. On the other hand, some options may have a discouraging effect on household agents as
a whole, which results in the reduction of sales volumes of the RPO agent.
As in the previous section, based on the simulation output, the cost efficiency analysis of
implementing the development intervention was performed. Table 5.5 shows the results of the
analysis for the scheme with the highest EANB calculated (scenario M15). Since the number
and size of payments to be made may be highly variable, the working capital requirement was
simulated assuming a coverage ratio of 2.5.
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Figure 5.32: Motivation schemes. Sales revenue
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.33: Motivation schemes. Sales revenue (disaggregated)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
** agents ranked in ascending order according to revenue in baseline scenario
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Table 5.5: Motivation of large sellers. Results of cost efficiency analysis
EANB,
mil. ugx
BCR ERR, % ∆* Household
income, %
∆ Household
revenue, %
∆ RPO
turnover, %
∆ RPO
profit, %
28.29 7.99 91.74 0.46 1.18 12.58 8.92
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* relative difference with baseline
5.3.3 Group certification
The market for certified coffee is perceived as a promising opportunity for coffee growers, as it
may offer higher prices in comparison with the market for conventional coffee (e.g. NUCAFE
(2012) reported price premiums of 0.07–0.22 usd per kg of robusta coffee that UTZ CERTI-
FIED producers receive in Uganda). However, in order to reach the markets of certified coffee,
smallholder farmers, because of their low individual production volumes, have to unite and get
involved in certification as a group. Therefore, Kibinge DC is engaged in group certification
with UTZ CERTIFIED starting from 2008 (NUCAFE 2008, Verkaart 2008). Unfortunately,
going through the process of group certification in coffee RPOs is costly. It includes direct
costs associated with internal and external audits, farmer training sessions, provision of quality
inputs, and opportunity costs associated with compliance with restrictions of envisaged produc-
tion practices. Given the reluctance of RPOs to make long-term investments (Nilsson 2001),
the initialization of a certification process is often done with the help of external funding. For
example, the initial costs for UTZ certification in Kibinge DC were fully covered by NUCAFE
and various NGOs (NUCAFE 2008, Verkaart 2008). It is interesting to see, whether such certi-
fication attempts could be sustained over time, considering annual running costs of certification
schemes, and whether the DC could potentially repay the investment costs.
MP-MAS marketing and RPO-agent modules developed in this research (described in Sec-
tion 3.10) allow for the capture of certification-related activities (example in Table B.16). There-
fore, the author of this thesis constructed a set of modeling experiments for the simulation of
group certification with the example of UTZ certification in Kibinge DC. Accordingly, additional
data related to the costs of UTZ certification in Kibinge DC were requested from the producer
union (NUCAFE 2008, 2012) and used to parameterize the certification process in MP-MAS
Uganda. This section demonstrates how MP-MAS Uganda was applied for the assessment of
group certification and presents the results of the assessment.
For the group certification analysis, 96 simulation scenarios (Table E.2) were created that
reflect different situations and set-ups of UTZ group certification, plus the baseline scenario
with no certification happening. The scenarios differ by costs that the RPO agent has to bear.
Scenarios C1–C12 have no costs for the RPO, which means that all costs are covered by external
sources (e.g. government funding, NGOs etc.). Scenarios C13–C24 reflect the current financing
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of certification program in Kibinge DC, in which the RPO covers only the running costs of
certification, while the costs of initial investments are funded externally. In scenarios C25–
C96, the RPO has to repay the initial investment as well: in C25–C48 with zero interest rate, in
C49–C72 with risk-free interest rate, and in C73–C96 with market interest rate. Furthermore, the
scenarios with initial investment repayment (C25–C96) vary by the length of reinvestment period
(i.e. how often the initial investment has to be repeated). The share of RPO members included
in the certification program also varies, as does the share of coffee produce that members are
permitted to certify.
When analyzing the simulation experiments, the first outcome that was reviewed is whether
the certification enterprise of the RPO agent was simulated to be sustainable in the long run
(see the second column of Table E.3 of the Appendix). Sustainability there implies sustained
certification after 15th period of the simulation. The experiments suggest sustainability and,
therefore, positive profitability in all set-ups, where the RPO agent does not have to repay the
initial investment (C1-C24). In scenarios with the repayment of investment costs (C25–C96),
there are scenarios in which negative profitability occurs: these are the scenarios in which agents
are only able to certify a small share of their produce (e.g. C25, C29, C49 etc.). Due to the
negative profitability, certification is discontinued (i.e. is not sustainable).
As the next step, let us review more closely the scenarios reflecting the current certification
effort of Kibinge DC, where 22% of all members are certified and only the running costs have
to be covered by the RPO agent and its members. This part of the analysis refers to scenarios
C13–C24 and the baseline scenario (B). Figure 5.34 shows coffee sales of the RPO agent in
physical terms. A comparison of the results from scenarios C13–C16 (current share of members
involved; 25%, 75%, 50% or 100% of produce can be certified) tells that improving the share
of certified coffee in the total amount of produce of individual household agents also has an
amplifying effect on the total amount of sales done through the RPO-channel. Comparing Figure
5.34 outcomes of C14, C18 and C22 (50% of produce certified; current, half or full share of
population involved) shows that including more members in the certification program also is
simulated to increase the sales of the RPO agent in physical terms (despite the increasing running
costs). In general, engagement in UTZ certification shows a high potential for attracting members
to the RPO selling channel: in the most unrestricted case (C24) the turnover of the RPO agent
rises by 135.1% in comparison to the baseline (B).
Simulation results demonstrate that household agents prefer to sell their coffee through the
RPO agent as certified produce. Such preference is caused by the added value of coffee from
certification (see Figures 5.35 and 5.36, and Table E.3 of the Appendix). In the scenarios reflect-
ing the current certification program (C13–C24), this value is substantially higher than the price
of conventional coffee (the price in the baseline scenario is 2,486 ugx per kg of FAQ), therefore,
agents prefer to bear the certification-related costs, which in this case are the individual and or-
ganizational running costs of the certification. Simulated added values (Figures 5.35 and 5.36)
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Figure 5.34: Group certification. RPO sales
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
increase with larger member inclusion and improvement of certified coffee share as well.
Figure 5.37 displays income effects caused by the certification schemes with current member
inclusion (22.4% of members). This figure compares mean per capita incomes simulated in
scenarios C13–C16 (current share of members involved; 25%, 75%, 50% or 100% of produce
can be certified) with a baseline. The simulation experiments show a moderate aggregate impact
of the current certification program on simulated per capita incomes of model agents. Even if
agents are able to certify 100% of their coffee (C16), the mean income lies at a rather modest
4.0% above the baseline. If the share of certified coffee falls to 50% (C14), then the mean
income exceeds the baseline by only 1.6%. However, the potential impact of certification is
much higher. In order to assess the potential impact, Table 5.38 illustrates the development of
per capita income when all members are involved in certification and all coffee produce is able
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Figure 5.35: Group certification. Added value (1)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.36: Group certification. Added value (2)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
to qualify for certification (C24). In this case, the mean impact of certification constitutes 14.5%
of the baseline per capita income. Average income effects for all tested certification set ups are
reported in Table E.3 of the Appendix.
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Figure 5.37: Group certification. Income effect
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.38: Group certification. Potential impact
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
Figure 5.39 disaggregates the potential impact of certification in terms of per capita income.
This figure displays simulated income changes of all household agents. From the figure it can
be seen that the majority of agents benefit from the certification. The positive income effect
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is significant across all income sizes. The fitted lowess line suggests a larger relative income
change for the agents with the lowest baseline income, and a smaller change for the agents with
highest baseline income.
Figure 5.39: Group certification. Potential impact (disaggregated)
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* average result of 15 simulation periods
** agents ranked in ascending order according to baseline per capita income
In general, the simulation results show that engagement in UTZ certification gives the RPO
agent the potential to attract members to the RPO-sales channel and, therefore, increase the
turnover of the RPO agent, which also increases the profit margin of the agent. In a number
of scenarios, certification was simulated to add considerable value to the end product of the
RPO agent and, therefore, increase the incomes of farm agents. Inclusion of more agents and
increasing the share of coffee they can certify were simulated to increase the net effects of the
certification program.
Let us again calculate the cost efficiency based on the results that the simulation model pro-
duced. Table 5.6 reports the calculated efficiency indicators for six of the tested implementations
of the certification program. All scenarios in the table refer to the situation in which the initial
investment into certification has to be repeated every five years. In scenario set ups of ongo-
ing certification, agents have to finance only the running costs of certification, while investment
costs are funded externally. In scenarios with full self-financing, agents participating in certi-
fication also have to repay the initial investment financed by means of a fixed interest rate loan
provided with market interest. Both ongoing and self-financing set ups were simulated with the
current member inclusion into the certification program (22.4% of agent population) and with
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the alternative ”improved” inclusion (50% of agent population). In addition, for both programs
the maximum potential effect of certification was simulated by running the model with all agents
certified at the beginning of simulation. Also, maximum potential scenarios have no restriction
on the amount of produce that agents can certify, while in other scenarios in Table 5.6 each agent
can certify a maximum of 50% of its produce.
Table 5.6: UTZ certification. Results of cost efficiency analysis
Description Scenario
code
EANB,
mil. ugx
BCR ERR, % ∆* Household
income, %
Sustainability
Ongoing program C14 124.31 6.74 229.88 1.99 yes
Ongoing program,
Improved inclusion
C18 293.56 9.86 358.46 4.57 yes
Ongoing program,
Maximum potential
C24 955.67 16.82 647.68 14.54 yes
Full self-financing,
Current inclusion
C74 -3.36 0.33 -29.31 0.05 no
Full self-financing,
Improved inclusion
C78 198.53 7.54 266.60 2.92 yes
Full self-financing,
Maximum potential
C84 911.36 16.84 645.68 13.45 yes
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* relative difference with baseline
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and discussion
The results of the literature reviews, participatory assessments, and simulation modeling led
to several conclusions and practical recommendations for policy-makers, administrative bodies,
researchers, and RPO leaders and members discussed in this chapter. Possible extensions and
further uses of the model are also explored.
6.1 Summary of the subjective experience
In this section the author communicates and discusses the important aspects of his subjective
experience and insights concerning the organization of the research.
6.1.1 Evaluation of the methodology
In Section 1.2 the potential benefits of the chosen methodological approaches (participatory
assessment and agent-based micro-simulation) were discussed. In this section, conclusions are
made about the applicability and usability of the applied methodology ex-post. The advantages
of the combination of methodologies used in this research are explained, as are the disadvantages
and limitations.
Advantages and achievements
• The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods applied in this research provided
thorough insight into different aspects of the study. Using both types of research methods
facilitated the understanding of RPO and agriculture in Uganda. The results of the literat-
ure review, participatory assessments and simulation modeling complemented each other
and highlighted different aspects of RPO and provided different perspectives for the ana-
lysis. The interactive sessions with stakeholders and key informant interviews served as a
base for the model development and the design of simulation scenarios. This composition
of several methods enriched and deepened the research outcomes.
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• Visualization of stakeholder-provided information by means of collaborative mapping fa-
cilitated stakeholder involvement and improved the quality of the dialogue between the
respondents and the researcher. The application of the Net-map tool, which is easy and
inexpensive, was clearly beneficial for the research.
• MP-MAS framework allowed for the integration of different factors that influence farm
decision-making with sub-models of biological and demographic processes in one simu-
lation model. The flexible nature of the framework enabled its extension with household
decisions on product marketing and household time preferences. Thereafter, the incor-
poration of RPO-agent type to the model was accomplished. The resulting MAS is a
bio-economic model that systematically reflects numerous properties of the studied real-
world system, such as the heterogeneous population of farm households, different farm en-
terprises of crop and livestock production, biophysical properties of the landscape, house-
hold consumption preferences, organizations of coffee producers, etc. Thus, a holistic
integration of several modeling concepts was achieved.
• The simulation modeling approach made it possible to assess not only the current, but also
alternative states of the studied system. Consequently, investigation of the system under
current conditions was followed by a comprehensive testing in different parameter settings
(i.e. scenarios).
• The dynamic implementation of the model considered the development of agent and envir-
onment characteristics over time. This allowed tracing the long-run trajectories of selected
indicators. For example, this added the dimension of RPO sustainability to the analysis.
• The highly disaggregated agent-based nature of the model implied an extra level of ana-
lysis (i.e. agent level in addition to system level). Both levels were considered in the model
calibration, which improved the model’s quality and, therefore, its validity. Disaggrega-
tion of simulation results, in turn, provided additional knowledge about the system.
• The one-to-one correspondence between model agents and real-world objects simplified
the interpretation of the model results. E.g. effects on incomes, food consumption, RPO
profit, etc. could be directly located and assessed. There was no need for additional trans-
lation of model outcomes, which is often required in the case of equation-based models.
• Since the MP-MAS software package is a supported freeware product, there is a large po-
tential for reusability of the MP-MAS Uganda application. It can be further used either by
the author or other modelers with or without extensions and modifications. For example,
one could perform simulation experiments to estimate the impact of improved coffee plant-
ing material, once the relevant data are available.
Disadvantages and limitations
• The MP-approach of modeling farm decision making demanded the parameterization of
all possible decision alternatives. Therefore, a profound knowledge of the local production
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system had to be obtained prior to the model construction. Consequently, a large amount of
literature and data had to be searched and processed for setting up the model. The extensive
size of the MP decision problem sometimes made it difficult to check the correctness of
the model set up. These aspects of complexity considerably slowed down the research
progress.
• Since the model was constructed based on the empirical data from one sub-county, there
is a study area bias in the results. Therefore, one should consider the specifics of the case
study reported in this dissertation before making any inferences for other farms and RPO.
• The assessment of social and advocacy functions, for example, such as capacity building
or political empowerment, was not incorporated into the applied research methodology.
Also, the possible indirect effects on non-member households were not addressed in this
research.
• The influence of management capacity on the performance of the RPO and the associ-
ated management risks are not considered in the MP-MAS Uganda application. However,
the key informants distinguished it as an influential determinant of RPO efficiency (see
Chapter 2, Latynskiy & Berger (2011)). The importance of this factor is also often em-
phasized in the literature (Ragasa & Golan 2012).
6.1.2 Reliability of statistical data in least-developed countries
The simulation model constructed for this study largely relied on statistical data from national
surveys. This data was used during both model parameterization and calibration. The quality
of the data on agricultural production in such surveys is typically weak (Deininger et al. 2012,
World Bank 2010). Lack of appropriate capacity, funding and institutional coordination lead to
deterioration in quality of data collected by the national statistical services of developing coun-
tries (World Bank 2010). Statistical data from 19 SSA countries, including Uganda, received the
lowest aggregate quality grade of D in PWT (2008), the rest of the 24 SSA countries received
the second lowest C. Thus, significant challenges were faced when working with the raw data
from national surveys, which was rife with various recording errors: wrongly specified units,
typos in quantities, etc.
In addition, all the surveys used in this study, either national or project ones, were conducted
using respondent recall estimates. The accuracy of such estimates is questionable, since recall
errors may occur. Commonly, errors of the following three types occur in agricultural data: (i)
telescoping, (ii) recall decay and (iii) heaping (Beegle et al. 2012). Telescoping is related to
inaccurate remembrance of an event date, recall decay is forgetting event details, and heaping
refers to the coarseness of respondents’ rounding of quantitative information (e.g. “around one
acre” may in reality be either 1.3 or 0.7 acre.) In order to assess the magnitudes of the recall
errors, Deininger et al. (2012) in their experiment in Uganda compared the production records
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from farm diaries with the respective recall estimates obtained through a standard household
survey questionnaire. These authors found substantial discrepancies between diary and recall
data in terms of reported crop production quantities and their output values: the differences,
depending on the crop, might exceed 50%. Presumably, the low reliability of the recall data
impacted the estimations of model parameters in this thesis. Likewise, it may explain low values
of the determination coefficient in the case of some of the estimated equations (see Table 4.4 in
Section 4.2.2). Schreinemachers (2006) also had similar queries with regard to his estimations
of production functions, which were integrated to the simulation model applied in the current
research.
Another problem was the usage of local reference units and the lack of conversion tables for
those units in the survey datasets. Moreover, outputs of some crops like plantains, cassava or
sweet potato were mostly reported in bunches, bags or heaps without specifying the respective
weights in kg. In the (UNPS 2010) survey, which was used for the estimation of potential crop
yields, farmers reported crop harvests referring to different outputs. (E.g. some respondents ap-
parently referred to “dry maize grain” whereas others referred to “green maize cob with straw”.)
Hence the unit conversion was cumbersome and constituted another source of estimation impre-
cision.
Finally, some information was not specified at a suitable level of precision in the datasets.
For example, fertilizer use was recorded by plot, but not by crop, livestock ages and liveweights
were not specified, information on pests and pest treatment was not recorded, etc. Therefore, the
author had to base estimates of model parameters on the information available from secondary
literature, for example pest and disease effects on crop yields (explained in Section 3.6).
Without doubt, the quality and availability of input data is important for applied simulation
modeling. It is difficult to assess the impact that the described data issues had on the simulation
results reported in this work. Certainly, the availability of better data would improve the simula-
tion model. With this regard the author agrees with World Bank (2010), Just (2003), who stress
the need for agricultural economics researchers to have broad access to proper micro-level data-
sets that contain information on farm wealth, assets and liabilities structure, and that adequately
reflect production practices and cover other aspects relevant to conducting farm-focused eco-
nomic research.
6.1.3 Challenges in technical implementation and management
The described research required substantial computer literacy, more than anticipated, and ad-
vanced expertise in usage of certain software packages (MP-MAS, MS Excel, Stata). MS Ex-
cel was used for specification of the simulation model, formulation of simulation scenarios,
and transformation of input data to specific MP-MAS input format and debugging of agent MP
problems. Stata was applied for the estimation of model parameters from the empirical data,
creation of agent populations, processing of model output and analysis of simulation results.
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Because of the need to go through multiple cycles of debugging and calibration (see Figure D.2
of the Appendix), several processes had to be automatized by means of programming MS Excel
macros and Stata scripts. This automation task was challenging, but worthwhile as it eased the
subsequent repetitions of the modeling cycle.
One single run of the constructed simulation model itself required around 120,000 agent
MILP to be solved. On a modern desktop computer, it takes about 12 hours to complete.
Throughout the research many hundreds of the simulation runs had to be executed. (Not only to
get the final results, but also during testing, debugging, calibration and production of interme-
diate results for project reports.) It would not be possible to conduct the current research in the
same depth, without having the ability to use the computer grid system of the state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg (BW-Grid), on which the simulation runs were performed. Users may interact
with the BW-Grid front-end computer only through a command line interface. Therefore, the
basic knowledge of using Linux terminals and script writing had to be acquired.
The indicated time of one simulation run does not account for the transformation of input
files from Excel to the model format, and the conversion and merging of output files into a
statistical dataset ready for analysis. Because of the incompatibility of the instruments applied
(e.g. it was not possible to use MS Excel and Stata on the BW-Grid), the restricted amount
of disk space and the author’s limited skills in programming, this procedure could not be fully
automatized. At the end, these issues with input and output file management created a bottleneck
for a number of simulations that could have been performed. Thus, the holistic uncertainty
analysis and sensitivity testing (like that of Troost (2013)), that would result in the multiplication
of the number of simulation runs roughly by a factor of 100, could be done once this technical
limitation is breached.
Given the aforesaid, it has to be concluded that agent-based simulation modeling of complex
systems in agricultural economics requires a researcher to have a broad combination of vari-
ous knowledge domains and technical skills in information technology. Therefore, it may be
recommendable to conduct such technically challenging research in teams that include a quali-
fied IT-specialist, who can improve technical efficiency of a modeling cycle. Also, appropriate
hardware and software resources have to be at disposal.
From the obtained experience the author may conclude that application of simulation mod-
eling in Ph.D. studies not only foster the analytic capabilities and theoretical knowledge of the
students conducting such studies, but also improves the technical skills in computer informa-
tion processing and data analysis and the ability to self-learn different software packages. These
skills help to improve the quality of the research and use available resources more efficiently,
and may be beneficial in the following academic career as well.
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6.2 Practical recommendations and insights
This section derives practical recommendations based on the research experience and findings.
6.2.1 Rural development and empowerment of RPO
Coffee sales comprise around 23% of farm revenues (Hill 2010b) of coffee-growing households
in Uganda, therefore, reduction of transaction costs in coffee marketing through collective action
of farmers is considered to be a promising pathway of rural development (Markelova & Mwangi
2010, Bernard & Spielman 2009). The simulation modeling results reported in Chapter 5 sup-
port this anticipation. The results show that RPO contribute to the improvement of the welfare of
their members: RPO activities caused on average an 11% increase in sales revenue and a 2.8%
increase in income of household agents (page 141). The fieldwork revealed that besides the func-
tions of marketing and product transformation, Kibinge DC also serves as a distributor of coffee
planting material (Section 2.2). Also, in reality RPO are expected to positively influence the
terms of trade of rural farmers, since in situations without RPO, due to the reduced competition,
local middlemen traders would lower their buying prices (Dejene-Aredo et al. 2009, Markelova
& Mwangi 2010). This effect was not considered in the simulation model, which means that
the real impact of RPO is rather underestimated in the simulation results. Since results of the
simulation experiments reveal that RPO can create a positive difference, the author recommends
considering the engagement in collective marketing of other crops largely produced in the lake-
shore Uganda (such as plantains or maize).
The results of this work go beyond the assessment of impacts that RPO create. Based on
the research results, the author formulated several insights and recommendations concerning
possible rural development strategies in the study area. These are reported in the paragraphs
below.
Identification of effective RPO-level interventions The MP-MAS Uganda application al-
lowed for the simulation of the effects of RPO-level interventions and for the assessment of the
cost efficiency of their implementation. Table 6.1 provides a cross-comparison of the results
of cost efficiency analyses. This table shows that all three types of tested interventions, namely
on-spot payments, monetary motivation and group certification (ongoing program) can produce
a positive net benefit. Provision of on-spot payments yields the highest equivalent annual net be-
nefit (EANB), monetary motivation has the highest benefit-cost ratio (BCR), and ongoing UTZ
certification has the highest economic rate of return (ERR).
However, simulation results from Section 5.3.2 showed that the provision of monetary schemes
for producer motivation is not a straight-forward decision that can be implemented without a
solid ex-ante analysis. In general, with regard to the studied DC, the positive net effects of mo-
tivation schemes appear rather small: producers are already well motivated by the higher prices
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Table 6.1: Cost efficiency of development interventions
Intervention EANB,
mil. ugx
BCR ERR, % ∆ Household
income, %
Provision of on-spot payments 174.86 2.54 29.21 4.25
Monetary motivation of large sellers 28.29 7.99 91.74 0.46
Ongoing UTZ certification 124.31 6.74 229.88 1.99
Ongoing UTZ certification, Improved inclusion 293.56 9.86 358.46 4.57
Ongoing UTZ certification, Maximum potential 955.67 16.82 647.68 14.54
Fully self-financed UTZ certification, Current inclu-
sion
-3.36 0.33 -29.31 0.05
Fully self-financed UTZ certification, Improved inclu-
sion
198.53 7.54 266.60 2.92
Fully self-financed UTZ certification, Maximum po-
tential
911.36 16.84 645.68 13.45
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
that the RPO offers. The best of the tested schemes was simulated to cause only a 0.46% increase
in agent income on average. The improper design of such schemes, however, may result in the
discouragement of producers, which may significantly harm the performance of the RPO: 12 out
of 40 tested set ups of motivation payments actually led to a decline in average agent income (see
Table E.1 of the Appendix). Therefore, monetary motivation in practice is cumbersome and has
a considerable risk of mal-implementation. Additionally, price discrimination of small selling
farmers resulting from implementation of motivation of large sellers can create tension between
RPO members (see Section 2.3).
Because of its high net effects, the relatively straightforward realization and the egalitarian
character of treatment, the organization of on-spot payments is recommended for implementa-
tion. Setting up the arrangements with payments on the spot will require the provision of addi-
tional liquid assets for the RPO: in the case of Kibinge DC, a required increase in DC working
capital of 986 million ugx was estimated. The cost of providing this capital could, however, be
compensated by the intervention benefits in the ratio of 2.54 (BCR from (Table 6.1). The model
simulated the provision of on-spot payments to result in an increase of RPO members’ incomes
of 4.25% on average.
Simulation results on UTZ certification suggest that, in order to be sustainable and to create
a positive impact for the study DC, UTZ group certification has to either (i) be subsidized in the
form of coverage of initial costs (ongoing program) or (ii) ensure the inclusion of a high share
of members (in the case of full self-financing). But, as Kibinge DC administration reported to
Verkaart (2008), in any case the liquidity constraint of the DC has to be breached (for example,
by providing credit from development aid) in order to initiate the certification process, given
the relatively high costs of initial investment for UTZ group certification. In general, the sim-
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ulation results (Section 5.3.3) showed that engagement in UTZ certification has a potential for
Kibinge DC in terms of attracting members to the RPO-sales channel and, therefore, increasing
the turnover of the RPO, which would increase the profit margin of the organization and improve
its sustainability. Under adequate arrangement, the certification may add considerable value to
the end product of RPO (Table E.3 of the Appendix) and, therefore, increase the incomes of rural
farmers. As Table 6.1 suggests, there is great potential for improvement of the ongoing certi-
fication program. The simulated potential net effect of the ongoing certification is 7.69 times
higher than the simulated current effect. Based on the results of this study, it is recommended
that development authorities support the implementation of UTZ group certification in coffee-
producing RPO. For the Kibinge DC it might be most useful to work on improving the efficiency
of the ongoing certification process, which means including more farmers in the certification and
ensuring larger shares of produce to meet the certification requirements.
Need to cope with price risks Empirical studies of (Bussolo et al. 2006, Hill 2010b, Dein-
inger & Okidi 2003) identified the price of coffee as highly important for household incomes of
Ugandan farmers. The MP-MAS simulation results also showed the high sensitivity of house-
hold income with respect to domestic coffee prices (Section 5.2). These prices influence the
profitability of RPO as well. The prices are highly dependent on the state of the world coffee
market, that is transmitted from exporters to Ugandan traders and producers (Fafchamps & Hill
2008). Obviously, households and RPO have no control over these price formations. Therefore,
provision of safety mechanisms may be required, in order to dampen the negative effects of prob-
able future decreases in price. (According to Figure 1.7 from Section 1.3.3 between 2000 and
2003, producer prices for robusta coffee in Uganda constituted only 30–50% of 2010 level.) In
addition to the situation with low coffee prices, RPO profit may significantly decrease in periods
of excessively high food prices (i.e. food crisis). Hence, as with any other kind of business, RPO
have to monitor market trends and developments. Provision of precautionary market information
for the RPO, hence, may be required.
The volatility of domestic prices for coffee has a large impact on household welfare, because
in the absence of insurance schemes against this risk, it drives farmers to make suboptimal man-
agement decisions (Hill 2010b). Section 5.2 showed that the variability in coffee price affects
both coffee producing households and RPO. On average, the income effect of the price variabil-
ity is negative (2.34% lower income), but it varies across the population. The poverty headcount
is negatively affected by price fluctuations, although, the overall impact on poverty is small – it
lies within 1%. Also, simulation results showed that price variability harms the sustainability of
RPO. In the baseline setting, the price variability led to the long-run collapse of the RPO agent
in one out of ten simulated cases. Accordingly, for RPO not only the long-term levels of prices
matter, but also the short- and mid-term dynamics. The simulation experiments with agent ex-
pectations (page 155) showed that in order to improve the sustainability of RPO, measures for
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smoothing the effects of price fluctuations are required. An example of such a measure is a price
guarantee or price insurance for the coffee producers, that will enable long-term planning, which
in turn will lead to stabilization of the coffee supply that they generate, and consequently their
incomes. Also, the reduction of the variability of coffee price will reduce the vulnerability of
farm households and reduce their chances to appear below the poverty threshold. The role of
the development community is, therefore, to provide training on price formation and forming
right price expectations together with price risk insurances. (Similar measures are also advised
by Hill (2010b).)
Accounting, transparency, tractability and trust Participatory sessions with the DC admin-
istration and members of village-level POs (Sections 2.2–2.4) revealed a lack of understanding
regarding the functionality of the organization on the side of regular members, which leads to
mistrust. The reason is the absence of clearly communicated and transparent rules of reception of
DC services and allocation of earned benefits. Group discussions indicated that the information
sharing via annual member meetings is not sufficient. Therefore, introduction of more frequent
and formal reporting could create additional trust in the organization, which would motivate the
members to sell larger shares of produce through the RPO-channel and make long-term contri-
butions into the capital of the organization. The results of the public goods games (Section 2.4)
suggest that trust and cooperativeness within the members of village-level POs have an influence
on the amount of coffee sold through the PO.
Improvement of agricultural productivity The achievement of sustainable growth in SSA
agriculture requires an increase in total factor productivity in the sector (Asenso-Okyere & Je-
maneh 2012, Hazell 2005). Large yield gaps explained by low use of improved varieties, low
intensity of fertilizer application and lack of knowledge about appropriate agricultural practices,
suggest that the required productivity increase is attainable in SSA (Asenso-Okyere & Jemaneh
2012).
Simulation with MP-MAS described in this thesis helped to assess the likely impacts of pos-
sible productivity increases in the study area. In Section 5.2 agent incomes were simulated to
have a good response to increases in crop yields (either of coffee or staple crops). For instance,
a 50% increase in coffee yield resulted in a 26.6% increase in agent income. The income growth
resulting from the respective yield increase translated into the improvement of agent consump-
tion intakes and to the reduction of poverty headcounts in the model. This result indicates that
the provision of quality planting material and high yielding varieties, as well as improving ac-
cess to fertilizers and better crop management might have a highly positive effect on the welfare
of real-world households. Higher coffee yields would also translate into more effective RPO
dealing with marketing of coffee. In this regard, RPO networks could be used as vehicles for
reaching smallholder farmers and improving their access to quality inputs and agricultural ex-
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tension services (Hazell 2005). The involvement of RPO would also reduce transaction costs in
input procurement (Hazell 2005). The fact that fertilizers and planting material were the most
frequently mentioned problems during the group discussions with farmers (Table 2.2) shows that
there is a definite demand for input provision policy from the farmers’ side.
The integrated TSPC module of MP-MAS simulated a gradual decline in soil fertility in the
study area (Section 5.1.2). Losses of soil fertility have a depressive effect on farm gross margins
and incomes. As measures of dealing with the soil fertility decline on Ugandan farms, On-
duru et al. (2007), Nkonya et al. (2004) propose the stimulation of improved soil management
strategies and the reduction of farmer costs of related technologies. The promotion of mixed
crop-livestock production systems complemented by the provision of better access to livestock
input-output markets (Onduru et al. 2007, Nkonya et al. 2004), training and extension on ag-
ricultural practices and site specific technologies (Nkonya et al. 2004), capacity building for
substituting natural capital with other forms of capital (Nkonya et al. 2004) – all these measures
are expected to be beneficial in terms of sustainable land use and increased agricultural land
productivity.
Motivation of PO leaders As was determined during the fieldwork in Uganda, in the RPO
from the presented case study (Kibinge DC) the important function of village-level PO leaders
was disparate with the remuneration that they receive. This resulted in low contributions and
commitment by PO leaders. Therefore, the development of the system that would motivate PO
leaders might be beneficial for the RPO as a whole, given the leaders’ importance (discussed
in Section 2.3). Such a motivation system could be monetary or service-based (i.e. leaders get
paid or get preferences in reception of RPO services).
Challenges of population growth The simulation experiments with population dynamics (Sec-
tion 5.1.2) demonstrate the decline in per capita income under current population growth. This
result suggests that the income-related driver for rural-urban migration will increase, when yields
and prices remain at current levels. Therefore, rural development policies in Uganda should in-
clude the provision off-farm employment opportunities and strategies for long-term reduction of
population pressure. This recommendation is also shared by Pender et al. (2004), Nkonya et al.
(2004).
Rural road infrastructure When discussing enhancing market access of smallholder farmers
in Uganda, improvement of the road network and infrastructure should not be forgotten (Balat
et al. 2009, Ashraf et al. 2009, Pender et al. 2004, Deininger & Okidi 2003). Public investments
here will result in a decrease of transportation costs and consequently, better commercialization
of rural farmers and will also improve farmer access to quality inputs and financial services.
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6.2.2 Related knowledge gaps and recommendations for research
The previous section identified measures of RPO support that are likely to be beneficial and
effective. However, the appropriate mechanism for provision of the support on the large scale
is yet to be found. More research is needed for the evaluation of various types of institutional
frameworks (public and private) with regard to their ability to assist the formation, functioning
and securing sustainability of RPO.
Currently, little is known about the impacts that RPO have on other actors in agricultural
supply chains of developing countries. Impact assessments are required in order to understand
the potential of private sector involvement in RPO support. The incentives for the private sector
to invest in RPO still needs to be investigated.
Current research efforts in the field of RPO are limited to case studies (Ragasa & Golan
2012). Depending on the local specifics, these case studies (Bernard & Spielman 2009, Bernard
et al. 2008, Shiferaw et al. 2008, Chibanda et al. 2009) present varied evidence and come to
different conclusions. Therefore, a broad cross-country analysis is needed to identify the polit-
ical, legal and socioeconomic environments in which RPO are likely to succeed. Also, studies
have to reveal which of the many existing types of RPO (see Section 1.1.2) are most effective in
different environments.
As discussed in the previous section, the equipment of RPO with financial instruments to
help them to withstand price volatility and the associated risks will improve their long-term sus-
tainability and economic performance. However, as Poulton et al. (2010) argue, so far viable
and sustainable models of insurance provision for smallholder agriculture are missing. There-
fore, the role of future research should be to continue searching and empirically testing various
experimental designs of the respective risk insurance schemes.
6.3 Possible extensions of the model
The developed simulation model is a complete product with the MS Excel-based user interface
and commented input files. Hence, the current specification of the MP-MAS Uganda application
can be used by other researchers in the future. Moreover, the flexibility of MP-MAS allows for
the creation of certain extensions of the model without additional changes in the source code.
Modeling cooperativeness and trust in RPO The analysis of the results of public goods
games conducted in ten village POs suggested that the share of coffee produce that a member
decides to sell through the RPO can be explained by his behavior in a public goods game (Section
2.4). Therefore, the author could hypothesize that it is related to the individual’s trust in other
RPO-members and their cooperativeness and willingness to contribute to the common pool,
which was represented by member public goods game contribution. However, the econometric
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models estimated in Section 2.4 are imprecise due to the small number of observations for the
dependent variables.
In the current specification of MP-MAS Uganda, the MP-optimization approach is used to
model the household marketing decisions (see Section 3.10). The agent decision on selling chan-
nels is subject to the constraints captured during the fieldwork. However, modeling of marketing
decisions can be done by implementing an econometric approach. (For example, in the case of
modeling household consumption decisions, econometric models were successfully integrated
into the MILP format (see Section 3.7).) Such alternative implementation, of course, requires an
estimation of a stable econometric relationship between household characteristics and the share
of coffee that is sold through the RPO, where one of the household characteristic is its contri-
bution in the public goods game (or some other proxy for trust and cooperativeness). A step
towards estimation of such a relationship would be conducting social experiments in a larger
sample and collecting data on coffee production and sales from experiment-participating RPO
members.
Simulating innovation diffusion As discussed previously in Section 6.2.1, the provision of
access to technological innovations (for example, improved high-yielding varieties) may im-
prove the agricultural productivity in the study area. However, as we know from Rogers (1995)
“Diffusion of Innovations” theory, the access to innovation does not necessarily lead to its suc-
cessful diffusion among the population. According to Rogers (1995), the diffusion of innovation
is defined by several factors, such as characteristics of innovation or properties of the social
system in which it diffuses.
Berger (2001) implemented in MP-MAS the frequency-dependent process of innovation dif-
fusion based on the Rogers (1995) theory (simulation mechanism explained in Berger (2001)).
Therefore, MP-MAS Uganda application can be used for simulation experiments with respect to
innovation diffusion. These experiments may reflect development policies aimed at supporting
the processes of innovation diffusion and adoption. The simulation model could then deliver
quantitative information for the assessment of such policies and the exploration of economic po-
tential of innovative technologies. Implementing this extension would require (i) an empirically-
based categorization of households into groups of adopters according to Rogers (1995) (i.e. in-
novators, early adopters, early majority etc.) and (ii) an estimation of thresholds to adoption (see
Berger (2001)).
Modeling the dynamics of RPO membership The project survey (IFPRI 2010) covered only
the households that were RPO members at the time of the survey, while data from other producers
were not collected in the study area. Consequently, the simulation model did not include any
non-member agents and agent membership in the RPO was fixed during simulation. However,
the model is capable of inclusion of non-member agents, once the respective missing survey data
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are available. Such an expansion of the agent population would make it possible to simulate the
dynamics of RPO membership through the implementation of agent decisions of whether to pay
membership fees. This would, in turn, enable the possibility of testing interventions timed and
targeted to support RPO formation and its inclusion of new members.
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Appendix A
Participatory assessment
Table A.1: List of key informant interviews
Occupation Company, Institution
1* Two researches in agricultural economics IFPRI
2 IFPRI (2010) survey coordinator freelancer
3 Development project manager Ssemwanga group (extension services provider, IFPRI
subcontractor in development interventions)
4 Executive director NUCAFE
5 Facilitator, extension agent, Ph.D. student Ssemwanga group, University of Pretoria
6 Postdoc, agricultural scientist University of Leuven
7 Market analyst UCDA
8 Field assistant, facilitator, IFPRI (2010) survey
enumerator
freelancer
9 Systems agronomist IITA
10 Manager on commercial and operations Ibero Ltd (coffee exporter)
11 Economist UCA
12 Agronomist COREC
13* Administration of Namayumbe DC (covered
by IFPRI (2010) survey)
NUCAFE
14* Members of Biyinzika PO (covered by IFPRI
(2010) survey)
NUCAFE
Source: Author
* indicates interviews with a group of informants
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Table A.2: Key informant interviews: Matrix of topics
Topic Interview number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Casual labor x
Certification and quality incentives x x x x
Coffee pests and diseases x x x
Coffee price formation and trends x x x x x x
Coffee-banana intercropping x x x x x
Cooperative savings x x
External development interventions x x x x x
Factors determining coffee yield x x x x
Factors for RPO sustainability and success x x x x
Farmer problems and constraints x x x x
Group decision-making and actions x x x x x x
Harvesting of coffee x x x
Incentives to act as a group x x x x
Information channels x x
Institutional framework x x
Investments in new coffee plantations x
Planting material for coffee x x x
Production inputs x x x x
RPO functionality and services x x x x x x x
RPO leadership x x
RPO problems and constraints x x x x x x
Sales channels x x x x x x x x x
Transportation x x
Source: Author
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Table A.3: List of variables used in factor analyses
Variable Type
Year of foundation integer
Was founded on own or external initiative? binary
Number of members integer
Ever received external help? binary
Price decision is taken by members or administration? binary
Receives payment on delivery? binary
Provides inputs? binary
Organizes transportation? binary
Involved in processing? binary
Involved in certification? binary
Provides market information? binary
Has storage facility? binary
Provides credit? binary
Source: Author
Figure A.1: Scatter plots of statistically dependent variable pairs
Source: Author, based on public goods games results
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Table A.4: PO selection
PO name Cluster Distance to centroid Sales data available? Pick?
Magando Twekembe 1 0.807 1 0
Kyetume farmers group 1 0.888 1 1
Kalunduka NUCAFE farmers group 1 0.896 1 0
Tusitukire wamu farmers group 1 1.015 1 0
Kijampiki farmers group 1 1.535 1 0
Maleku farmers group 2 0.625 1 1
Mitugo farmers club 2 0.636 1 1
Kisojo farmers group 2 0.786 1 1
Buligita farmers group 2 0.865 1 0
Kabulanda farmer group 2 0.930 1 0
Serinya Twekembe UTZ kapeh group 3 0.429 1 1
Kamanda coffee farmers group 3 0.743 1 1
Kalybaya farmers group 3 1.475 1 1
Bunyenya farmers group 4 0.562 1 1
Kiryasaka farmers group B 4 0.625 1 1
Katoma coffee farmers group 4 0.694 1 1
Kisojo farmers group B 4 0.731 1 0
Bbaale coffee farmers association 4 0.807 1 0
Kalisizo coffee farmers 1 0.736 0 0
Agali Awamu coffee farmers group 1 0.787 0 0
Makukulu NUCAFE farmers group 1 0.942 0 0
Kyambogo NUCAFE farmers group 2 0.475 0 0
Misanvu farmers group 2 0.540 0 0
Mpalampa coffee farmers group 3 0.522 0 0
Mitugo coffee farmers association 3 0.783 0 0
Budda farmers group 3 0.850 0 0
Katolerwa farmers group 3 0.852 0 0
Tala farmers group 3 0.855 0 0
Kyabiiri coffee farmers group 3 0.981 0 0
Twezimbe farmers group 3 0.990 0 0
Lukenke NUCAFE farmers group A 3 1.073 0 0
Mitugo coffee farmers cooperative 4 0.300 0 0
Kiryasaaka NUCAFE farmers group A 4 0.699 0 0
Kyamabale coffee farmers association 4 0.732 0 0
Mirambi Tusitukire Wamu group 4 1.155 0 0
Lukenke NUCAFE farmers group A 4 1.230 0 0
Source: Own analysis, based on IFPRI (2010) data
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Table A.5: Characteristics of visited POs
Bunyenya
farmers
group
Kalubaya
farmers
group
Kamanda
coffee farm-
ers group
Katoma cof-
fee farmers
group
Kiryasaka
farmers
group B
Intercropping: coffee
trees per acre
450 450 n/a 450 n/a
Intercropping: banana
trees per acre
50 200 n/a 50 0
Fertilizers and pesticides
with coffee
CAN, NPK,
manure,
herbicide
CAN, NPK,
manure
manure NPK, ma-
nure
n/a
Access to inputs yes yes yes yes yes
Planting material from
DC
yes yes yes yes no
Coffee sold through DC,
%
50 80 85 70 100
Mean willingness to in-
vest in coffee (max land
share), %
50 61 n/a 58 n/a
Labor scarcity no no scarce during
land prepara-
tion
no n/a
Labor specialization no n/a n/a no n/a
Access to SACCO or
VSLA
no yes yes yes yes
Credits from traders yes no no no no
Bulking at PO level no no no no yes
DC credit approval
scheme
3 members chairperson +
2 members
n/a all members chairperson
Cash on delivery yes yes yes partially no
Notes had vis-
its from
Fairtrade
own store, or-
ganize trans-
port by them-
selves
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Table A.5 (cont.): Characteristics of visited POs
Kisojo farm-
ers group
Kyetume
farmers
group
Maleku
farmers
group
Mitugo farm-
ers club
Serinya
Twekembe
UTZ kapeh
group
Intercropping: coffee
trees per acre
n/a 75% 400 400 n/a
Intercropping: banana
trees per acre
n/a 25% 100 150 n/a
Fertilizers and pesticides
with coffee
manure manure NPK, urea,
manure
manure CAN, ma-
nure
Access to inputs no no yes no yes
Planting material from
DC
yes no yes yes yes
Coffee sold through DC,
%
0 n/a 30 75 65
Mean willingness to in-
vest in coffee (max land
share), %
n/a 65 72 71 n/a
Labor scarcity yes n/a scarce,
except har-
vesting
period
no yes
Labor specialization n/a no no yes no
Access to SACCO or
VSLA
no no no no no
Credits from traders no yes yes yes no
Bulking at PO level no no no yes no
DC credit approval
scheme
references +
business plan
all members n/a chairperson individual
enquiry
Cash on delivery no n/a n/a no yes
Notes sell to Kam-
pala buyer
occasionally
recieved
help form
NAADS,
exposed to
coffee thefts
recieved
seedlings
from UCDA
Source: Author, based on Net-Map results
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Appendix B
MILP-implementation of decision
problems
Table B.1: Investment decisions
Invest Grow Sell Sell Consume Buy
in coffee crop coffee future crop crop food item
Maximize -Cc -C Pc P1 P2
Land 1 1 ≤ Land
Labor Lc L ≤ Lab
Liquidity Cc C P3 ≤ Cash
Maximum coffee 1 ≤ Maxcof
Balance coffee -Y c 1 ≤ 0
Balance crop -Y 1 1 ≤ 0
Food requirement F1 F2 = Food
* Cc – annuity of investment costs in coffee plantation; C – input costs;
Pc – expected coffee price of future years; Pi – expected market prices of this year;
Land, Lab, Cash – household resource endowments; Maxcof – upper bound on size of coffee plantation;
Food – household food consumption requirements; Lc – average labor requirements of coffee production;
L – labor requirements of crop production; Y c – annuity of expected yields over coffee plantation lifespan;
Y – crop yield; Fi – food content;
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Table B.2: Transfer activities
Grow seasonal crop
Grow annual crop
Transfer
Season 1 Season 2 Land Labor
Total land 1 ≤ Land
Total labor 1 ≤ Lab
Land season 1 1 1 -1 ≤ 0
Land season 2 1 1 -1 ≤ 0
Labor season 1 L1 L3 -0.5 ≤ 0
Labor season 2 L2 L4 -0.5 ≤ 0
* Land, Lab – household resource endowments; Li – labor requirements
Table B.3: Certainty equivalents and future value coefficients
Grow crop Sell crop
-C current future
Maximize Pc Pf ∗ V
Land 1 ≤ Land
Yield balance -Y c 1 ∗ Eq ≤ 0
Future yield balance -Y f 1 ≤ 0
* C – input costs; Pc – expected market price of this year;
Pf – expected market price of future years;
V – valuation coefficients of future returns;
Land – household land endowment; Y c – expected yield in current year;
Y f – annuity of expected yields over remaining lifespan of plantation;
Eq – certainty equivalent;
Table B.4: Allocation of income between savings and expenditures
Income transfer Binary Savings Cancel savings * Expenditure
Maximize -10−9 1
Upper bound
1
(for solution)
Household income 1 = I
Min income for savings -1 Ψ ≤ 0
Save / not save -109 ≤ 0
Cancel savings 109 1 ≤ 109
Savings balance -1 β 1 = 0
Budget balance 1 -1 -1 = 0
*solution of this activity is not considered in the final calculation of the LP objective value – the activity
was introduced in order to avoid LP infeasibility in case of not saving agents;
I – household income; Ψ – agent-specific zero-savings bound; β – slope of the savings function;
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Table B.5: Cash flow
Transfer Grow Sell Consume Purchase Remaining
liquidity crops crops crops food cash
Maximize -C P1 P2
Land 1 ≤ Land
Starting liquidity 1 C ≤ Cash
Food energy demand E1 E2 = En.r
Crop yield balance -Y 1 1 ≤ 0
Cash flow end of year -1 -P1 P3 1 = 0
*C – production costs; Pi – market prices; Land, Cash – household resource endowments;
En.r. – household food energy requirement; Ei – food energy contents; Y – crop yield;
Table B.6: Remittances transfer
Grow crops Production costs Remittances Income
Maximize P -1 1
Land 1 ≤ Land
Income P 1 -1 = 0
Costs C -1 ≤ 0
Remittances 1 ≤ Rem
*Land – household land endowment; Rem – received remittances
Table B.7: Motivation payments in household MILP
Grow Sell coffee Sell coffee Receive Receive Requirement
coffee RPO-channel trader premium bonus binary
Maximize -C P1 P2 M1 M2
Upper bound 1 1
(for soultion)
Coffee plantation 1 ≤ Cof
Balance coffee -Y 1 1 ≤ 0
Payment base -1 1 Q ≤ 0
Requirement binary 1 1 -109 ≤ 0
* C – variable costs per unit; Pi – expected market prices of current year; Mi – values of motivation payments
Cof – size of coffee plantation; Y – yield; Q – sales quantity requirement for motivation payments
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Table B.8: Crop management practices
Grow crop
Lab
min
Lab
med
Lab
max
Lab
min
Lab
med
Lab
max
Lab
min
Lab
med
Lab
max
Buy
NPK
Buy
CAN
Buy
seed
Sell
crop
Manure Manure Manure NPK NPK NPK CAN CAN CAN
Maximize -C1 -C2 -C3 P
Land 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ≤ Land
Labor L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3 ≤ Lab
Seed S S S S S S S S S -1 ≤ 0
NPK fertilizer F1 F1 F1 -1 ≤ 0
CAN fertilizer F2 F2 F2 -1 ≤ 0
Yield balance -Y1 -Y2 -Y3 -Y4 -Y5 -Y6 -Y7 -Y8 -Y9 1 ≤ 0
* Ci – input costs; P – crop market price; Land, Lab – household resource endowments; Li, S, Fi – labor, seed and fertilizer requirements;
Yi – expected crop yields
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Table B.9: Chicken production
Maintain Hatch Buy Raise Replace Grow Collect Sell
Hen Eggs Chick Chicken Hen Crops/Pasture Manure Chicken Eggs
Maximize -C1 -C2 -C3 -C4 -C5 P1 P2
Land 1 ≤ Land
Labor Lb1 Lb2 Lb3 Lb4 ≤ Lab
Liquidity C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 ≤ Cash
Chicken limit 1 T ≤ Chmax
Feed balance F1 F2 -Y ≤ 0
Chick balance -1 -1 1 ≤ 0
Replacement hens 1/Ls -1 ≤ 0
Chicken balance -1 1 1 ≤ 0
Eggs balance -E H ×W 1 ≤ 0
Manure balance -M1 -M2 1 ≤ 0
* Ci – input and production costs; Pi – expected market prices of this year; Land, Lab, Cash – household resource endowments;
Chmax, – maximum number of chicken and pigs household can manage at once;
Lbi, Fi – labor and feed requirements; Y – stover yield; Ti – age of chicken maturity (in years);
Ls – hen productive lifespan (in years); E – yearly egg production (per laying hen); H – egg hatchability rate;
W – percentage of chicks weaned; Mi – manure outputs of chicken production;
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Table B.10: Pig production
Maintain Buy Raise to Grow Collect Sell
Breeding sow Weaner Sow Weaner Finisher Sow Crops/Pasture Manure Weaner Finisher
Maximize -C1 -C2 -C3 -C4 -C5 -C6 -C7 P1 P2
Land 1 ≤ Land
Labor Lb1 Lb2 Lb3 Lb4 Lb5 ≤ Lab
Liquidity C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 ≤ Cash
Pig limit 1 T1 T2 T3 ≤ Pigmax
Feed balance F1 F2 F3 F4 -Y ≤ 0
Weaner balance -1 -1 1 1 1 ≤ 0
Replacement sows 1/Ls -1 -1 ≤ 0
Litter balance -Lt 1 ≤ 0
Finisher balance -1 1 ≤ 0
Manure balance -M1 -M2 -M3 -M4 1 ≤ 0
* Ci – input and production costs; Pi – expected market prices of this year; Land, Lab, Cash – household resource endowments;
Pigmax – maximum number of pigs household can manage at once;
Lbi, Fi – labor and feed requirements; Y – stover yield; Ti – durations of various stages of pig growth (in years);
Ls – sow productive lifespan (in years); Lt – yearly litter size (per sow); Mi – manure outputs of various stages of pig production;
212
Table B.11: Durable livestock (example of nanny-goats)
Maintain Sell goat Grow Collect Sell
Goat Age 0 Age 0 Age 1 Age 1 Crops/Pasture Manure Meat Milk Meat Milk
start end start end future future
Maximize -C1 -C2 -C3 -P1 -P2 -Pf1 -Pf2
Land 1 ≤ Land
Labor Lb1 Lb2 Lb3 Lb4 ≤ Lab
Liquidity C1 C2 -Mt1 ∗ P1 C3 ≤ Cash
Feed balance F1 F2 F3 -Y ≤ 0
Meat balance -Mt1 -Mt1 -Mt2 1 ≤ 0
Future meat bal. -Mtf 1 ≤ 0
Milk balance -Mk1 -Mk2 1 ≤ 0
Future milk bal. -Mkf 1 ≤ 0
Offspring balance -O1 -O2 W ≤ 0
Future offspring bal. -Of W ≤ 0
Manure balance -Mn1 -Mn2 -Mn3 1 ≤ 0
Total goats 1 1 1 1 1 ≤ Gtstot
Goats of age 0 1 1 ≤ Gts0
Goats of age 1 1 1 = Gts1
* Ci – production costs; Pi – expected market prices of this year; Pfi – expected market price of future years; Land, Lab, Cash – household resource endowments;
Gtstot – total number of goats; Gtsi – number of goats of a specific age; Ln, Lbi, Ci, Fi – land, labor, cash and feed requirements; Y – stover yield;
Mti, Mki, Oi, Mni – meat, milk, offspring and manure outputs of livestock production; W – offspring liveweight
Mti, Mki, Oi – annuity of the meat, milk, offspring outputs of the remaining years of livestock unit;
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Table B.12: Coffee production
Grow coffee Switch practice Grow plantain Sell
Soil 1 Soil 1 Soil 2 Soil 2 Soil 1 Soil 1 Soil 2 Soil 2 Soil 1 Soil 2 Coffee Coffee Plan-
Pr. A Pr. B Pr. A Pr. B A to B B to A A to B B to A future tain
Maximize P1 Pf P2
Soil 1 1 1 1 1 1 ≤ S1
Soil 2 1 1 1 1 1 ≤ S2
Labor Lc1 Lc2 Lc1 Lc2 Lc2 Lc1 Lc2 Lc1 Lp Lp ≤ Lab
Coffee soil 1 pr. A 1 1 = C S1 A
Coffee soil 1 pr. B 1 1 = C S1 B
Coffee soil 2 pr. A 1 1 = C S2 A
Coffee soil 2 pr. B 1 1 = C S2 B
Intercrop soil 1 Ir Ir Ir Ir -1 ≤ 0
Intercrop soil 2 Ir Ir Ir Ir -1 ≤ 0
Coffee balance -Y c1 -Y c2 -Y c3 -Y c4 -Y c2 -Y c1 -Y c4 -Y c3 1 ≤ 0
Future coffee bal. -Y cf1 -Y cf2 -Y cf3 -Y cf4 -Y cf2 -Y cf1 -Y cf4 -Y cf3 1 ≤ 0
Plantain balance -Y p1 -Y p2 1 ≤ 0
* Pi – expected market prices of this year; Pf – expected market price of future years; Si household soil endowments; Lab – household labor endowment;
C Si j – sizes of coffee plantations (by soil and initial management practice); Lci – age-specific labor requirements of coffee; Lp – labor requirements of plantain;
Ir – coffee/plantain intercropping ratio; Y ci – age-specific expected yields of coffee; Y cfi – annuity of expected yields of the remaining years of the coffee plantation;
Y pi – expected yields of plantain;
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Table B.13: Partitioning of total expenditure
Exp. transfer Const. H. size Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. binary Food exp. Non-f. exp.
Maximize 1 1
Upper bound
E1 E2 1(for solution)
Total exp. 1 = E
Exp. balance 1 -1 -1 = 0
Food exp. β0 β2HS Υ1 Υ2 -1 = 0
Constant 1 -1 = 0
H. size part 1 -1 = 0
Exp. part 1 -1 -1 = 0
Upper bound 1 -1 E1 ≤ 0
Lower bound 2 -1 -1 ≤ 0
Upper bound 2 1 -E2 ≤ 0
*β0, β1 – regression coefficients of estimated Working-Leser model, E – household expenditure budget;
HS – agent household size in gigajoules; Υ1, Υ2 – segment average food expenditure coefficients;
E1, E2 – segment upper bound (expressed as total expenditure);
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Table B.14: Choice between food categories
Food exp. Const. H. size Price Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. Consume
binary cat. 1 cat. 2
Maximize UV1 UV2
Upper bound (for solution) FE1 FE2 1
Category 1 β0,1 β2,1HS
k∑
1
ε1,klnUVk Ω1,1 Ω2,1 -1 = 0
Category 2 β0,2 β2,2HS
k∑
1
ε2,klnUVk Ω1,2 Ω2,2 -1 = 0
Constant 1 -1 = 0
Household size part 1 -1 = 0
Expenditure part 1 -1 -1 = 0
Upper bound 1 -1 FE1 ≤ 0
Lower bound 2 -1 -1 ≤ 0
Upper bound 2 1 -FE2 ≤ 0
*UV1, UV2 – monetary unit values of food items; FE1, FE2 – segment upper bound (expressed as total expenditure spent on food);
βi,k,εi,k – regression coefficients of estimated linear approximation of almost ideal demand system;
Ωi,k – segment average food category expenditure coefficients; HS – agent household size in gigajoules;
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Table B.15: Food consumption requirement
Produce Purchase Make Energy Protein Utility loss
food food investments demand supply deficit supply (due to hunger)
Maximize Ic If -109 *
Land L1 L2 ≤ Land
Liquidity P C ≤ Cash
Energy demand -1 = En.r.
Energy supply E1 E2 -1 ≤ 0
Energy balance 1 -1 -1 ≤ 0
Energy deficit 1 -1 = 0
Protein supply Pr1 Pr2 -1 = 0
*sufficiently large negative value ensures preference for current food consumption; Ic – current contribution margin;
If – expected future contribution margin; Land, Cash – household resource endowments;
En.r. – household food energy requirement; Li – land requirements of production alternatives;
P – food price; C – investment cost; Ei, Pri – food energy and protein contents;
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Table B.16: RPO-agent MILP with basic and certified products
Process Process Sell Sell Fixed Cert. Profit * Cert. *
basic certified basic certified costs costs base premium
Maximize -C1 -C2 P1 P2 -1 -1
Raw volume basic 1 ≤ Q1
Raw volume certified 1 ≤ Q2
Processed volume basic -(1-R) 1 ≤ 0
Processed volume certified -(1-R) 1 ≤ 0
Fixed costs 1 = FC
Certification costs 1 = CC
Profit base -C1 -C2 P1 P1 -1 -1 = 0
Certification premium -(C2-C1) (P2-P1) -1 -1 = 0
* solutions of these activities are allowed to be negative;
Ci – variable costs per unit; Pi – market prices of current year;
Qi – available quantity; FC – fixed costs; CC – certification costs; R – weight reduction coefficient;
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Table B.17: RPO-agent MILP with motivation payments
Process Sell Fixed Pay Pay Profit Budget Budget
produce produce costs premiums bonuses premiums bonuses
Maximize -C P -1 -M1 -M2
Raw volume 1 ≤ Q
Processed volume -(1-R) 1 ≤ 0
Fixed costs 1 = FC
Profit -C P -1 -M1 -M2 -1 = 0
Budget premiums 1 -1 = 0
Budget bonuses 1 -1 = 0
* C – variable costs per unit; P – expected market prices of current year; Mi – values of motivation payments
FC – fixed costs; R – weight reduction coefficient;
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Appendix C
Estimation of the consumption model
Table C.1: Logit estimates on propensity to make savings
Dependent variable = 1 if house-
hold makes savings, 0 – otherwise
coef se
Farm income, .00 ugx 6.57e-06 7.66e-06
Household size, GJ -0.016 0.015
Apac -2.207** 1.047
Bushenyi -1.911* 1.099
Kabalore -1.927* 1.141
Kamuli -1.155 1.082
Kasese -1.243 1.173
Masaka -1.564 1.087
Mituyana -1.648 1.251
Mpigi -2.145 1.476
Mubende -2.187* 1.186
Mukono -1.181 1.246
Nebbi -2.874*** 1.042
Ntungamo -1.582 1.137
Constant 4.299*** 1.060
LR-test (14) 30.52***
Pseudo R-squared 0.0624
N obs 757
Source: Own estimation from IFPRI (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.2: Savings model
Dependent variable = Savings in a
“good month”, .00 ugx
coef se
Farm income, .00 ugx 0.033*** 0.005
Farm income squared, .00 ugx -8.21e-08* 4.55e-08
Household size, GJ 8.163 5.452
Apac 218.149 454.286
Bushenyi 56.127 462.219
Kabalore -157.737 475.627
Kamuli 274.397 448.122
Kasese 4.197 467.023
Luwero 218.313 480.258
Masaka 607.573 449.739
Mituyana 787.290 498.061
Mubende 400.046 509.492
Mukono 121.688 476.221
Nebbi 336.937 460.975
Ntungamo 917.574** 465.061
Wakiso 195.770 498.925
Constant -209.124 456.279
F-test (16, 663) 11.45***
R-squared 0.2165
N obs 680
Source: Own estimation from IFPRI (2010) survey for households
with non-zero savings;
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
Table C.3: Savings model (as represented in MILP)
Dependent variable = Savings in a
“good month”, .00 ugx
coef se
Farm income, .00 ugx 0.030*** 0.002
F-test (1, 681) 282.12***
R-squared 0.2929
N obs 682
Source: Own estimation from IFPRI (2010) survey for households
with non-zero savings;
*** implies a significance at 1% level
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Table C.4: Food expenditure model
Dependent variable = Share of household
expenditure budget spent on food
coef se
Ln(Expenditure) -0.0864*** 0.004
Household size, GJ 0.0020*** 0.0004
Urban 0.0664*** 0.0082
Agricultural -0.0355*** 0.0093
Central Region (without Kampala) -0.0221* 0.0131
Eastern Region -0.0280** 0.0139
Northern Region -0.0122 0.0141
Western Region -0.0009 0.0140
Constant 1.430*** 0.047
F-test (8, 2922) 147.41***
R-squared 0.2875
N obs 2931
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, at *** – at 1%
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Table C.5: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 1 (plantain)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 1 (plantain) in household food ex-
penditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) 0.00095 0.00715
Ln(category 2 unit value) 0.00126 0.00353
Ln(category 3 unit value) 0.01273*** 0.00395
Ln(category 4 unit value) 0.00032 0.00323
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00675*** 0.00208
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.00615* 0.00319
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00348 0.00225
Ln(category 8 unit value) 0.00111 0.00362
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index 0.03101*** 0.00677
Central Region (without Kampala) 0.03805*** 0.01207
Eastern Region -0.08158*** 0.01410
Northern Region -0.14719*** 0.02126
Western Region 0.08784*** 0.01317
Household size, GJ 0.00224*** 0.00038
Agricultural 0.02130** 0.00826
Urban 0.00951 0.00743
Nonselection hazard 0.03845** 0.01643
Constant -0.18514*** 0.06283
Chi-squared test 985.25***
R-squared 0.2518
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.6: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 2 (tubers)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 2 (tubers) in household food ex-
penditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) 0.00126 0.00353
Ln(category 2 unit value) 0.03671*** 0.00608
Ln(category 3 unit value) 0.00104 0.00423
Ln(category 4 unit value) -0.01981*** 0.00299
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.01081*** 0.00173
Ln(category 6 unit value) 0.00055 0.00331
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00274 0.00218
Ln(category 8 unit value) -0.00620 0.00401
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index -0.01500** 0.00711
Central Region (without Kampala) 0.00074 0.01528
Eastern Region 0.05055*** 0.01698
Northern Region 0.03695** 0.01649
Western Region 0.02388 0.01646
Household size, GJ 0.00056 0.00042
Agricultural 0.07166*** 0.01153
Urban -0.05514*** 0.00914
Nonselection hazard 0.01471 0.02811
Constant 0.21908*** 0.06512
Chi-squared test 530.29***
R-squared 0.134
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.7: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 3 (cereals)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 3 (cereals) in household food ex-
penditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) 0.01274*** 0.00395
Ln(category 2 unit value) 0.00104 0.00423
Ln(category 3 unit value) 0.02982*** 0.00777
Ln(category 4 unit value) -0.00841** 0.00328
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00138 0.00204
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.01172*** 0.00329
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00972*** 0.00229
Ln(category 8 unit value) -0.01237*** 0.00396
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index -0.02597*** 0.00813
Central Region (without Kampala) -0.01748 0.01378
Eastern Region 0.04106*** 0.01492
Northern Region 0.00855 0.01464
Western Region -0.03791** 0.01507
Household size, GJ 0.00023 0.00045
Agricultural -0.00097 0.01002
Urban -0.00534 0.00938
Nonselection hazard 0.06625* 0.03763
Constant 0.30597*** 0.07247
Chi-squared test 220.28***
R-squared 0.0624
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.8: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 4 (legumes and bakery)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 4 (legumes and bakery) in household
food expenditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) 0.00032 0.00323
Ln(category 2 unit value) -0.01981*** 0.00299
Ln(category 3 unit value) -0.00841** 0.00328
Ln(category 4 unit value) 0.03281*** 0.00458
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00418** 0.00206
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.00275 0.00278
Ln(category 7 unit value) 0.00198 0.00201
Ln(category 8 unit value) 0.00005 0.00276
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index -0.03059*** 0.00571
Central Region (without Kampala) -0.01705* 0.00974
Eastern Region -0.03210*** 0.01085
Northern Region 0.03127*** 0.01058
Western Region 0.02252** 0.01105
Household size, GJ -0.00110*** 0.00031
Agricultural 0.01721** 0.00698
Urban -0.00057 0.00612
Nonselection hazard -0.10228*** 0.02679
Constant 0.37866*** 0.04959
Chi-squared test 476.6***
R-squared 0.1449
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.9: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 5 (additives)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 5 (additives) in household food ex-
penditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) -0.00675*** 0.00208
Ln(category 2 unit value) -0.01081*** 0.00173
Ln(category 3 unit value) -0.00138 0.00204
Ln(category 4 unit value) -0.00418** 0.00206
Ln(category 5 unit value) 0.03223*** 0.00179
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.00221 0.00151
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00295** 0.00128
Ln(category 8 unit value) -0.00394** 0.00181
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index -0.01505*** 0.00232
Central Region (without Kampala) 0.02127*** 0.00529
Eastern Region 0.01031* 0.00568
Northern Region -0.00209 0.00575
Western Region -0.02222*** 0.00566
Household size, GJ -0.00066*** 0.00015
Agricultural -0.01556*** 0.00381
Urban 0.02155*** 0.00324
Nonselection hazard -0.22471*** 0.04807
Constant 0.21103*** 0.01936
Chi-squared test 859.11***
R-squared 0.2318
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.10: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 6 (animal products)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 6 (animal products) in household
food expenditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) -0.00616* 0.00319
Ln(category 2 unit value) 0.00055 0.00331
Ln(category 3 unit value) -0.01172*** 0.00329
Ln(category 4 unit value) -0.00275 0.00278
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00221 0.00151
Ln(category 6 unit value) 0.03762*** 0.00426
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00223 0.00190
Ln(category 8 unit value) -0.01310*** 0.00315
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index 0.04874*** 0.00615
Central Region (without Kampala) 0.01979 0.01209
Eastern Region 0.02992** 0.01281
Northern Region 0.02344* 0.01292
Western Region 0.01188 0.01291
Household size, GJ 0.00115*** 0.00034
Agricultural -0.03750*** 0.00863
Urban 0.00292 0.00742
Nonselection hazard -0.05589*** 0.01003
Constant -0.17524*** 0.05157
Chi-squared test 381.75***
R-squared 0.1290
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
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Table C.11: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 7 (fruits and vegetables)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 7 (fruits and vegetables) in house-
hold food expenditures
coef se
Ln(category 1 unit value) -0.00348 0.00225
Ln(category 2 unit value) -0.00274 0.00218
Ln(category 3 unit value) -0.00972*** 0.00229
Ln(category 4 unit value) 0.00198 0.00201
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00295** 0.00128
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.00223 0.00190
Ln(category 7 unit value) 0.02146*** 0.00230
Ln(category 8 unit value) -0.0023 0.00192
Ln(per capita expenditure)/Stone’s index -0.02428*** 0.00311
Central Region (without Kampala) -0.01441** 0.00723
Eastern Region 0.01272* 0.00767
Northern Region 0.00156 0.00774
Western Region -0.02008** 0.00801
Household size, GJ -0.00146*** 0.00019
Agricultural 0.00351 0.00522
Urban -0.00175 0.00453
Nonselection hazard -0.03454* 0.02041
Constant 0.30114*** 0.02599
Chi-squared test 315.22***
R-squared 0.0972
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* implies a significance at 10%-level, ** – at 5%, *** – at 1%
229
Table C.12: Almost ideal demand system. Food category 8 (food luxuries)
Dependent variable = share of food cat-
egory 8 (food luxuries) in household food
expenditures
coef se
Ln(category 2 unit value) -0.00620 –
Ln(category 3 unit value) -0.01237 –
Ln(category 4 unit value) 0.00005 –
Ln(category 5 unit value) -0.00394 –
Ln(category 6 unit value) -0.01310 –
Ln(category 7 unit value) -0.00230 –
Ln(category 8 unit value) 0.03675 –
Ln(per capita expenditure)/stone index 0.03114 –
Central Region (without Kampala) -0.03091 –
Eastern Region -0.03087 –
Northern Region 0.04750 –
Western Region -0.06591 –
Household size, GJ -0.00095 –
Agricultural -0.05966 –
Urban 0.02882 –
Nonselection hazard 0.29802 –
Constant -0.05551 –
Chi-squared test –
R-squared –
N obs 2794
Source: Own estimation from UNPS (2010) survey
* coefficients are derived from estimates for other food categories
(tables C.5 -C.11) using equations 3.17 - 3.19
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Appendix D
Model calibration and validation
Figure D.1: Hierarchy of model components
Source: Author
Table D.1: Calibration benchmarks
Model component Benchmark
Random asset assignment Asset distribution functions from IFPRI (2010)
Household decision model Household production estimated from IFPRI (2010) survey
Livestock Amount of livestock kept or sold according to IFPRI (2010)
Population dynamics World Bank (2012), CIA (2012) and UDHS (2007) demo-
graphic estimates for Uganda
Source: Author
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Table D.2: Calibration parameters
Model component Parameters
Random asset assignment
Number of copula bins
Minimum/maximum values
Interpolation method used
Crop production
Certainty equivalents
Valuation coefficients of future returns
Values assigned to home consumption of own produce
Wage rate of hired labor
Livestock
Labor requirements
External grazing effect
Feed security buffer
Farm-gate prices for livestock products
Wage rate of hired labor
Valuation coefficients of future returns
Demography and population dynamics
Age group definition
Coefficients of Brass relational model lifetable
Source: Author
Table D.3: Household size
Characteristic Populations Mean Median Stdev 10% 25% 75% 90%
Total, persons survey 6.55 6.00 2.51 4.00 5.00 8.00 10.00
generated 6.78 6.96 2.46 4.00 5.00 8.91 10.00
Males, persons survey 3.48 3.00 1.80 1.00 2.00 5.00 6.00
generated 3.60 3.67 1.74 1.10 2.08 5.00 6.00
Females, persons survey 3.07 3.00 1.60 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00
generated 3.19 3.00 1.64 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.04
Total, male adult survey 4.93 4.72 1.88 2.73 3.46 6.26 7.67
equivalent generated 5.11 5.02 1.87 2.72 3.66 6.47 7.62
Males, male adult survey 2.82 2.76 1.50 1.03 1.69 3.85 4.90
equivalent generated 2.92 2.86 1.47 1.03 1.90 3.79 4.88
Females, male adult survey 2.11 2.15 1.11 0.78 1.31 2.75 3.69
equivalent generated 2.19 2.11 1.14 0.78 1.38 2.91 3.69
Density, survey 3.67 3.29 2.40 1.37 2.02 4.94 6.18
persons per ha generated 3.84 3.32 2.67 1.28 2.04 4.92 6.78
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** generated populations are represented by average values over 50 populations drawn with
different random seeds
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Figure D.2: Construction and calibration of model baseline
Source: Author
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Table D.4: Household coffee plantations
Characteristic Populations Mean Median Stdev 10% 25% 75% 90%
Coffee, survey 48.10 46.65 21.57 22.22 33.33 59.83 79.37
% of land generated 48.63 46.90 21.61 22.22 33.25 60.41 82.34
Coffee, ha survey 1.15 0.81 0.91 0.28 0.45 1.62 2.25
generated 1.18 0.89 0.93 0.30 0.50 1.61 2.34
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** generated populations are represented by average values over 50 populations drawn with
different random seeds
Table D.5: Household livestock ownership
Characteristic Populations Mean Median Stdev 10% 25% 75% 90%
Cattle, head survey 2.46 2.00 5.05 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.00
generated 2.44 2.00 4.41 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.82
Goats, head survey 2.32 1.00 3.56 0.00 0.00 3.00 6.00
generated 2.36 0.98 3.49 0.00 0.00 3.47 5.98
Chicken, head survey 11.37 0.00 19.33 0.00 0.00 18.00 35.00
generated 11.63 0.26 19.06 0.00 0.00 18.52 34.80
Pigs, head survey 1.17 0.00 1.59 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00
generated 1.18 0.29 1.57 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00
Total livestock, survey 1.81 1.30 2.66 0.20 0.70 2.20 2.94
FAO units generated 1.81 1.37 2.32 0.18 0.54 2.26 3.33
Stocking rate, survey 1.05 0.62 2.02 0.12 0.26 1.08 1.82
FAO units per ha generated 1.00 0.59 1.54 0.07 0.25 1.16 2.27
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** generated populations are represented by average values over 50 populations drawn with
different random seeds
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Figure D.3: Correlations between area under coffee plantations and available land
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
Figure D.4: Correlations between household size and available land
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
235
Figure D.5: Correlations between amount of livestock and available land
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
Figure D.6: Correlations between area under coffee plantations and household size
Source: Author, based on results of sampling from empirical copula
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
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Table D.6: Farm livestock, heads
Type of livestock
Population Random seed Cattle Chicken Goats Pigs
Survey* N/A 2.46 4.59 2.32 0.79
Model** 1 1 2.12 4.22 1.82 0.83
Model 2 2 2.01 4.33 2.19 0.85
Model 3 3 2.09 4.81 1.99 0.86
Model 4 4 2.08 4.69 2.15 0.82
Model 5 5 2.15 5.11 1.94 0.85
Model 6 6 2.07 4.54 2.07 0.81
Model 7 7 2.06 4.42 2.13 0.83
Model 8 8 2.01 4.23 1.99 0.79
Model 9 9 2.10 4.62 2.14 0.83
Model 10 10 2.12 4.77 1.86 0.80
Model Average 2.08 4.57 2.03 0.83
Stdev 0.047 0.284 0.127 0.022
CV 0.023 0.062 0.063 0.026
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* livestock of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model livestock are reported as annual means of 5 period simulation
Table D.7: Model prediction errors, absolute value percentage difference
Type of livestock
Population Random seed Cattle Chicken Goats Pigs
1 1 13.94 8.07 21.48 5.20
2 2 18.60 5.73 5.68 7.50
3 3 15.29 4.81 14.40 8.49
4 4 15.74 2.22 7.59 4.25
5 5 12.90 11.31 16.62 8.02
6 6 16.16 1.12 10.75 2.55
7 7 16.50 3.80 8.51 4.63
8 8 18.46 7.88 14.31 0.76
9 9 14.61 0.54 8.04 5.62
10 10 13.81 3.78 19.97 1.09
Average error 15.60 4.93 12.73 4.81
Maximum error 18.60 11.31 21.48 8.49
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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Figure D.7: Farm livestock. Density functions
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* survey livestock are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
** model livestock are reported as annual means of 5 period simulation
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Figure D.8: Demography model. Population structure
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* characteristics of survey population are estimated from IFPRI (2010)
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Appendix E
Scenario description and simulation
results
Table E.1: Motivation schemes. Results compilation
Scenario
code
Requirement,
kg
Premium,
ugx/kg
Bonus, ugx Budget, th.
ugx
∆* Household
income
∆ Household
revenue, %
∆ RPO turnover,
%
∆ RPO profit, %
M1 250 100 0 78.5 0.34 1.12 7.06 -0.33
M2 250 0 25,000 29.9 0.13 0.12 10.31 10.56
M3 250 50 5,000 44.3 0.32 1.23 10.13 6.49
M4 500 200 0 80.9 -1.19 -4.42 -38.21 -46.85
M5 500 50 50,000 76.1 0.08 0.63 16.08 13.80
M6 250 25 0 19.2 0.40 0.90 4.34 2.60
M7 250 50 0 38.6 0.38 0.81 5.04 1.45
M8 250 200 0 148.5 -0.10 -0.24 -2.83 -17.15
M9 250 0 5,000 4.3 0.20 0.64 2.50 2.56
M10 250 0 10,000 8.9 0.21 0.59 3.21 3.29
M11 250 0 50,000 67.0 0.11 -0.25 12.43 12.73
M12 250 0 100,000 11.2 -2.55 -8.41 -96.35 -98.54
M13 250 25 5,000 23.8 0.38 0.89 8.52 6.83
M14 250 25 10,000 27.7 0.39 0.68 6.83 5.17
M15 250 50 10,000 49.5 0.46 1.18 12.58 8.92
M16 500 50 0 28.9 0.27 0.68 2.90 0.19
M17 500 100 0 57.7 0.27 0.60 2.83 -2.64
M18 500 0 25,000 19.5 0.17 0.45 5.50 5.64
M19 500 0 50,000 48.9 0.39 0.86 14.93 15.28
M20 500 0 100,000 49.6 -2.21 -7.63 -72.53 -74.18
M21 500 0 200,000 89.9 -2.51 -8.25 -75.25 -76.97
M22 500 50 25,000 49.9 0.41 1.10 11.87 9.15
M23 500 100 25,000 78.2 0.20 0.26 7.91 2.28
M24 1,000 50 0 14.0 0.21 0.47 -0.49 -1.84
M25 1,000 200 0 59.5 0.06 0.10 1.67 -3.99
M26 1,000 0 50,000 22.6 -0.14 -0.07 1.85 1.90
M27 1,000 0 300,000 1.8 -2.85 -10.05 -99.15 -101.43
M28 1,000 50 50,000 37.6 -0.01 0.50 4.84 3.48
M29 1,000 50 100,000 66.9 0.10 0.45 10.18 9.09
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Table E.1 (cont.): Motivation schemes. Results compilation
Scenario
code
Requirement,
kg
Premium,
ugx/kg
Bonus, ugx Budget, th.
ugx
∆* Household
income
∆ Household
revenue, %
∆ RPO turnover,
%
∆ RPO profit, %
M30 1,000 100 50,000 52.0 0.13 0.21 3.43 0.62
M31 2,000 50 0 2.3 0.18 0.64 -0.17 -0.40
M32 2,000 200 0 8.9 0.16 0.36 -1.84 -2.74
M33 2,000 300 0 13.2 0.13 0.19 -2.40 -3.73
M34 2,000 0 100,000 9.9 0.01 0.09 -1.53 -1.57
M35 2,000 0 300,000 29.6 0.12 0.78 -0.67 -0.68
M36 2,000 0 500,000 50.6 -0.10 0.11 -1.64 -1.67
M37 2,000 50 50,000 6.9 -0.16 -0.36 -1.75 -1.99
M38 2,000 50 100,000 12.1 -0.04 -0.08 -0.94 -1.19
M39 2,000 100 50,000 8.8 -0.09 -0.23 -2.49 -2.93
M40 2,000 100 100,000 14.8 0.09 0.44 -1.07 -1.56
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation input
* relative difference with baseline
** results reported as annual averages of 15 period simulation
Table E.2: Group certification. Scenario description
Scenario
code
Costs covered by
RPO
Annual interest rate Reinvestment
period, years
Certified members,
% of all members
Share of produce
certified
C1 none n/a n/a current (22.4 %) 25%
C2 none n/a n/a current 50%
C3 none n/a n/a current 75%
C4 none n/a n/a current 100%
C5 none n/a n/a half (50%) 25%
C6 none n/a n/a half 50%
C7 none n/a n/a half 75%
C8 none n/a n/a half 100%
C9 none n/a n/a all (100%) 25%
C10 none n/a n/a all 50%
C11 none n/a n/a all 75%
C12 none n/a n/a all 100%
C13 running only n/a n/a current 25%
C14 running only n/a n/a current 50%
C15 running only n/a n/a current 75%
C16 running only n/a n/a current 100%
C17 running only n/a n/a half 25%
C18 running only n/a n/a half 50%
C19 running only n/a n/a half 75%
C20 running only n/a n/a half 100%
C21 running only n/a n/a all 25%
C22 running only n/a n/a all 50%
C23 running only n/a n/a all 75%
C24 running only n/a n/a all 100%
C25 full zero (0%) 5 current 25%
C26 full zero 5 current 50%
C27 full zero 5 current 75%
C28 full zero 5 current 100%
C29 full zero 5 half 25%
C30 full zero 5 half 50%
C31 full zero 5 half 75%
C32 full zero 5 half 100%
C33 full zero 5 all 25%
C34 full zero 5 all 50%
C35 full zero 5 all 75%
C36 full zero 5 all 100%
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Table E.2 (cont.1): Group certification. Scenario description
Scenario
code
Costs covered by
DC
Annual interest rate Reinvestment
period, years
Certified members,
% of all members
Share of produce
certified
C37 full zero 10 current 25%
C38 full zero 10 current 50%
C39 full zero 10 current 75%
C40 full zero 10 current 100%
C41 full zero 10 half 25%
C42 full zero 10 half 50%
C43 full zero 10 half 75%
C44 full zero 10 half 100%
C45 full zero 10 all 25%
C46 full zero 10 all 50%
C47 full zero 10 all 75%
C48 full zero 10 all 100%
C49 full risk-free (8.5%) 5 current 25%
C50 full risk-free 5 current 50%
C51 full risk-free 5 current 75%
C52 full risk-free 5 current 100%
C53 full risk-free 5 half 25%
C54 full risk-free 5 half 50%
C55 full risk-free 5 half 75%
C56 full risk-free 5 half 100%
C57 full risk-free 5 all 25%
C58 full risk-free 5 all 50%
C59 full risk-free 5 all 75%
C60 full risk-free 5 all 100%
C61 full risk-free 10 current 25%
C62 full risk-free 10 current 50%
C63 full risk-free 10 current 75%
C64 full risk-free 10 current 100%
C65 full risk-free 10 half 25%
C66 full risk-free 10 half 50%
C67 full risk-free 10 half 75%
C68 full risk-free 10 half 100%
C69 full risk-free 10 all 25%
C70 full risk-free 10 all 50%
C71 full risk-free 10 all 75%
C72 full risk-free 10 all 100%
C73 full market (19.21%) 5 current 25%
C74 full market 5 current 50%
C75 full market 5 current 75%
C76 full market 5 current 100%
C77 full market 5 half 25%
C78 full market 5 half 50%
C79 full market 5 half 75%
C80 full market 5 half 100%
C81 full market 5 all 25%
C82 full market 5 all 50%
C83 full market 5 all 75%
C84 full market 5 all 100%
C85 full market 10 current 25%
C86 full market 10 current 50%
C87 full market 10 current 75%
C88 full market 10 current 100%
C89 full market 10 half 25%
C90 full market 10 half 50%
C91 full market 10 half 75%
C92 full market 10 half 100%
C93 full market 10 all 25%
C94 full market 10 all 50%
C95 full market 10 all 75%
C96 full market 10 all 100%
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation input
242
Table E.3: Group certification. Simulation results
Scenario Arrangement
sustainability
Added value*,
ugx/kg
∆** Household
income, %
∆ RPO profit, %
C1 + (sustainable) 331 1.33 31.55
C2 + 331 2.25 37.08
C3 + 331 3.45 69.80
C4 + 331 4.69 85.82
C5 + 331 2.20 49.27
C6 + 331 4.57 86.74
C7 + 331 6.26 100.90
C8 + 331 8.13 114.58
C9 + 331 4.24 86.19
C10 + 331 7.42 115.06
C11 + 331 11.04 140.93
C12 + 331 14.73 162.31
C13 + 222 0.84 17.59
C14 + 284 1.99 35.33
C15 + 300 3.37 62.32
C16 + 309 4.79 86.97
C17 + 256 2.24 45.42
C18 + 292 4.57 85.06
C19 + 305 6.24 99.84
C20 + 312 7.93 113.41
C21 + 261 3.91 83.73
C22 + 295 7.07 109.91
C23 + 308 10.70 135.78
C24 + 314 14.54 160.60
C25 - (not sustainable) n/a -0.01 n/a
C26 + 189 1.56 29.94
C27 + 240 2.43 40.89
C28 + 266 4.21 83.73
C29 - n/a 0.42 n/a
C30 + 233 3.77 80.17
C31 + 267 5.38 93.03
C32 + 284 7.18 107.12
C33 + 180 2.98 68.16
C34 + 251 6.01 97.46
C35 + 278 10.14 127.87
C36 + 292 14.03 154.63
C37 + 107 0.68 9.96
C38 + 249 1.70 34.32
C39 + 277 2.84 46.83
C40 + 292 4.40 85.33
C41 + 206 1.61 36.15
C42 + 268 3.98 83.22
C43 + 289 5.68 96.56
C44 + 301 7.81 111.83
C45 + 227 3.60 80.59
C46 + 277 6.81 104.76
C47 + 296 10.15 131.25
C48 + 305 14.29 157.91
C49 - n/a 0.08 n/a
C50 + 148 1.34 25.75
C51 + 221 2.24 38.10
C52 + 252 4.04 82.16
C53 - n/a -0.11 n/a
C54 + 216 3.65 76.83
C55 + 255 5.38 90.47
C56 + 275 7.30 105.91
C57 + 136 1.67 34.29
C58 + 238 6.17 95.80
C59 + 270 9.77 126.23
C60 + 286 13.71 154.06
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Table E.3 (cont.1): Group certification. Simulation results
Scenario Arrangement
sustainability
Added value*,
ugx/kg
∆** Household
income, %
∆ RPO profit, %
C61 - n/a 0.18 n/a
C62 + 222 1.58 31.82
C63 + 260 2.72 43.04
C64 + 280 4.05 84.20
C65 + 147 0.83 18.91
C66 + 252 3.94 80.71
C67 + 280 5.78 96.71
C68 + 293 7.50 109.44
C69 + 205 3.18 75.76
C70 + 265 6.29 101.45
C71 + 288 10.14 128.87
C72 + 299 14.30 156.87
C73 - n/a -0.05 n/a
C74 - n/a 0.05 n/a
C75 + 192 2.05 33.82
C76 + 231 3.75 77.97
C77 - n/a -0.08 n/a
C78 + 191 2.92 60.77
C79 + 237 4.87 88.09
C80 + 263 6.79 103.34
C81 - n/a -0.01 n/a
C82 + 219 5.30 91.02
C83 + 257 9.41 121.55
C84 + 277 13.45 152.23
C85 - n/a 0.12 n/a
C86 + 176 1.35 28.86
C87 + 234 2.18 39.15
C88 + 262 4.06 83.98
C89 - n/a 0.17 n/a
C90 + 227 3.69 77.93
C91 + 263 5.29 92.67
C92 + 281 7.22 106.69
C93 + 170 2.77 63.73
C94 + 246 6.05 96.68
C95 + 275 9.69 125.46
C96 + 290 13.78 154.46
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
* added value of certification calculated per kg of certified FAQ coffee
** relative difference with baseline
*** implies sustained group certification after 15 period simulation
**** added value,∆ income and∆ profit reported as annual averages over 15 periods
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Figure E.1: Price variability. Effect of expectations
Source: Author, based on MP-MAS simulation results
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Appendix F
Other tables and figures
Table F.1: List of distributed household variables
Variable Unit
Spatial
Elevation masl
Slope %
Flow accumulation 30 m grid cell
Demographic
Female household members (by age groups*) persons
Male household members (by age groups) persons
Financial
Starting liquidity (as annual cash requirement) ugx
Annual value of received remittances ugx
Monthly rate of time preference %
Physical assets
Available land ha
Size of coffee plantations (as share of total land) %
Cattle number of units
Goats number of units
Chicken number of units
Pigs number of units
Symbolic assets
Access to mineral fertilizers yes/no
Source: Author
* age groups are described in section 3.8
246
Table F.2: Correlations between survey variables. Spearman’s rho
Land Members Mean
age
Elevation Slope Flow
accum.
Coffee Trad.
cattle
Imp.
cattle
Goats Sheep Pigs Chicken Savings
Members 0.360 1
Mean Age 0.127 -0.398 1
Elevation -0.036 0.042 -0.304 1
Slope 0.040 0.030 0.143 0.067 1
Flow accum. 0.012 - 0.097 0.308 -0.301 0.022 1
Coffee 0.719 0.220 0.135 -0.020 0.073 0.130 1
Trad. cattle 0.126 0.158 - 0.189 0.095 0.043 0.011 0.079 1
Imp. cattle 0.289 0.108 0.095 -0.053 0.045 -0.031 0.282 -0.285 1
Goats 0.067 0.160 - 0.065 0.083 0.119 -0.164 -0.011 0.165 0.275 1
Sheep 0.155 0.304 -0.013 -0.002 0.186 -0.049 0.199 -0.031 - 0.093 0.108 1
Pigs -0.008 -0.019 -0.079 -0.022 0.060 -0.003 -0.183 -0.048 - 0.065 0.119 -0.115 1
Chicken 0.120 0.318 -0.100 0.055 0.031 0.012 0.063 0.053 0.246 0.359 -0.037 0.234 1
Savings 0.157 0.104 - 0.053 -0.098 -0.039 0.014 0.256 -0.137 0.046 0.012 0.024 0.177 0.147 1
Credit 0.055 0.058 0.050 0.091 0.013 0.084 0.123 -0.124 -0.120 0.013 0.322 0.060 0.083 0.184
Source: Author, based on the IFPRI (2010) data
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Table F.3: Correlations between survey variables. Error probability of dcov test
Land Members Mean
age
Elevation Slope Flow
accum.
Coffee Trad.
cattle
Imp.
cattle
Goats Sheep Pigs Chicken Savings
Members 0.030 1
Mean Age 0.140 0.005 1
Elevation 0.825 0.500 0.005 1
Slope 0.785 0.745 0.695 0.050 1
Flow accum. 0.240 0.170 0.015 0.030 0.075 1
Coffee 0.015 0.065 0.390 0.635 0.895 0.300 1
Trad. cattle 0.675 0.155 0.210 0.520 0.650 0.730 0.845 1
Imp. cattle 0.060 0.130 0.625 0.955 0.720 0.925 0.250 0.125 1
Goats 0.825 0.410 0.975 0.655 0.350 0.050 0.865 0.005 0.030 1
Sheep 0.675 0.005 0.805 0.480 0.105 0.840 0.460 0.095 0.375 0.045 1
Pigs 0.070 0.670 0.870 0.955 0.880 0.815 0.100 0.665 0.475 0.545 0.260 1
Chicken 0.220 0.015 0.630 0.440 0.410 0.850 0.230 0.315 0.060 0.045 0.700 0.030 1
Savings 0.645 0.490 0.935 0.195 0.410 0.960 0.170 0.105 0.690 0.530 0.865 0.115 0.015 1
Credit 0.100 0.030 0.515 0.125 0.770 0.320 0.020 0.595 0.555 0.860 0.045 0.480 0.140 0.040
Source: Author, based on the IFPRI (2010) data
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Figure F.1: Value chain of robusta coffee
Source: Author
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Table F.4: Institutions influential for the Uganda’s coffee sector
Name Status Related functions Source of funding
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal In-
dustry and Fisheries (MAAIF)
Government – Governance of agricultural sector in general State budget
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Eco-
nomic Development (MFPED)
Government – Planning and implementation of public expenditure programs State budget
Ministry of Tourism, Trade, and In-
dustry (MTTI)
Government – Development of trade policies and export regulations State budget
National Agricultural Advisory Ser-
vices (NAADS)
Statutory – Promotion of market-oriented agriculture through the provision of extension services MAAIF
National Agricultural Research Organ-
ization (NARO)
Statutory – Guidance and coordination of all agricultural research activities MAAIF, donors
Coffee Research Center (COREC) Statutory – Research and development of effective coffee production technologies NARO, donors
Uganda Coffee Development Authority Statutory – Promoting the development of the coffee sector Coffee export tax
(UCDA) – Provision of extension services
– Registration and licensing of businesses in the coffee sector
– Price and production forecasts
– Propagation, development and distribution of safe planting materials
– Registration of trade contracts
Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) Private – Apex body for all registered cooperatives Membership fees,
– Advocacy and representation of the cooperative entities on national and international
levels
donors
– Capacity building for cooperative members
– Mobilization of the resources for the development of the cooperative movement
Uganda Coffee Trade Federation Private – Promotion and maintenance of sustainable development of the coffee sector Membership fees
(UCTF) – Lobbying and guarding interests of persons and organizations engaged in the coffee
production and trade
250
Table F.4 (cont.): Institutions influential for the Uganda’s coffee sector
Name Status Related functions Source of funding
National Union of Coffee Agribusi- Private – Ensuring better position of the farmers within the coffee value chain Membership fees,
nesses and Farm Enterprises – Establishment of a sustainable farmer-ownership model of a coffee marketing donors
(NUCAFE) – Representation and advocacy of interests of coffee farmers
National Organic Agriculture Private – Promotion of organic agriculture Membership fees
Movement of Uganda (NOGAMU) – Advocacy and representation for related POs and NGOs
– Capacity building and provision of certification services
Uganda Coffee Roasters Association
(UCRA)
Private – Representation of interests of local coffee roasters Membership fees
Source: Author
Table F.5: Coffee research in African countries
Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Research staff, persons 68 31 27 4
Annual budget, mln. usd 3.5 3.0 4.0 0.2
Annual coffee production, kt. 280 47 50 200
Export revenue share, % 70 5 20 25
Source: UCTF (2010)
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